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The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2(3), Utah Code (1992); Article III, Section 2 of 
the Utah Constitution; and Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. This case presents the question of whether the 
trial court correctly determined that the Act of March 1, 1933, 
47 Stat. 1418 (the "1933 Act"), does not pre-empt state taxation 
of non-Indian oil and gas lessees on the lands added to the Utah 
portion of the Navajo Reservation by the 1933 Act. The 
applicable standard of review is correction of error. See 
Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Dixie Power, 789 P.2d 24, 25 (Utah 
1990). 
B. If the Court reverses the trial court and 
determines that the 1933 Act pre-empts state taxation, the Court 
should then remand this case to the trial court for a 
determination of whether this ruling requires a refund of those 
taxes paid by the appellants under protest since January 1, 1978. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
A. Act of March 1, 1933. ch. 160, 47 Stat. 1418, is 
set out in full in Addendum A. It provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
[Sec. 1.] Be it enacted by the Senate and 
House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, that all vacant, 
unreserved, and undisposed of public lands within 
the areas in the southern part of the State of 
Utah, bounded as follows: . . .be, and same are 
hereby permanently withdrawn from all forms of 
entry or disposal for the benefit of the Navajo 
and such other Indians as the Secretary of the 
Interior may see fit to settle thereon; Provided, 
that no further allotments of lands to Indians on 
the public domain shall be made in San Juan 
County, Utah, nor shall further Indian homesteads 
be made in said county under the Act of July 4, 
1884 (23 Stat. 96; U.S.C., title 43, Sec. 190). 
Should oil or gas be produced in paying quantities 
within the lands hereby added to the Navajo 
Reservation, 37^ per cent of said royalties shall 
be expended by the State of Utah in the tuition of 
Indian children in white schools and/or in the 
building or maintenance of roads across the lands 
described in Section 1 hereof, or for the benefit 
of the Indians residing therein. 
B. Act of Mav 17, 1968. P.L. 90-306, 82 Stat. 121, 
which amended the 1933 Act, is set out in full in Addendum B. It 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Section 1 of the Act of March 1, 1933 (47 
Stat. 1418), is amended by deleting all of that 
part of the last proviso of said section 1 after 
the word "Utah" and inserting in lieu thereof: 
"for the health, education, and general welfare of 
the Navajo Indians residing in San Juan 
County. . . ." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellants Texaco, Inc., Exxon Corporation, and Union 
Oil Company of California (collectively the "Oil Companies") 
appeal from the May 15, 1990, Judgment of the Tax Division of the 
Seventh Judicial District Court, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
presiding, which declared and held that the 1933 Act does not 
pre-empt the nondiscriminatory taxation of the Oil Companies by 
the State of Utah and its political subdivisions. 
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On appeal, the Oil Companies contend that the 1933 Act 
created a unique haven free from state and local taxes for non-
Indian oil and gas producers within the Aneth Extension portion 
of the Navajo Reservation. To support this contention, they 
argue (1) that the silence of the 1933 Act regarding state 
taxation of non-Indian oil and gas lessees doing business on the 
Aneth Extension, which was added to the Navajo Reservation by the 
Act, pre-empts any such taxation in light of what the Oil 
Companies believe was the then prevailing constitutional 
doctrine; and (2) that the 1933 Act's allocation to the State of 
Utah of 37^ percent of any royalties accruing from production on 
the 1933 Act lands for the exclusive benefit of San Juan County 
Navajos was in lieu of all state taxes that the State could 
otherwise assess on the Oil Companies doing business on those 
lands. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
The complaints were filed in 1979 by ten of the largest 
oil and gas producers in the United States, including Mobil 
Exploration and Producing North America, Inc. ("Mobil"), 
Southland Royalty Company ("Southland"), Anadarko Petroleum 
Corporation ("Anadarko"), Wilshire Oil Company of Texas 
("Wilshire"), Union Oil Company of California ("Union"), Texaco, 
Inc. ("Texaco"), Phillips Petroleum Company ("Phillips"), Chevron 
USA, Inc. ("Chevron"), Shell Oil Company ("Shell") and Exxon 
Corporation ("Exxon"). Each of these companies had or has oil 
and gas leases on the Utah portion (the "Utah Strip") of the 
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Navajo Indian Reservation (the "Reservation11). The complaints 
challenged the application of five state and local taxes to the 
oil and gas producers1 property and activities within the Utah 
Strip.4 
In 1989, the United States Supreme Court decided Cotton 
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico. 490 U.S. 163 (1989), a case in 
which the plaintiffs had raised issues that were virtually 
identical to most of those originally raised by the plaintiffs in 
this case. In Cotton Petroleum, the Court held, inter alia, that 
state taxes on non-Indian oil and gas producers must be "upheld 
unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress," 490 U.S. 
at 173, and that "a State can impose a nondiscriminatory tax on 
private parties with whom . . . an Indian tribe does business." 
490 U.S. at 175. The federal leasing statute at issue in Cotton 
Petroleum is the same statute pursuant to which the Oil Companies 
obtained their leases in this case. 
Following Cotton Petroleum. Phillips, Shell, Chevron, 
Southland, Anadarko and Wilshire moved for the dismissal with 
prejudice of all of their claims. The four other plaintiffs — 
Mobil, Union, Exxon and Texaco — also sought dismissal with 
4. The challenged taxes include the Oil and Gas Severance Tax 
(formerly the Mining Occupation Tax), imposed by §59-5-101, et 
seq.. Utah Code (1989); the Oil and Gas Conservation Tax, imposed 
by §40-6-14, Utah Code (1989); the Corporate Franchise Tax, 
imposed by §§59-7-101, et seq.. Utah Code (1989); the Sales and 
Use Tax, imposed by §§59-12-101, et seq.. and §§11-9-1, et seq.. 
Utah Code (1989); and the Property Tax, imposed by §§59-2-101, et 
seq.. Utah Code (1989) (collectively the "Utah Taxes"). 
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prejudice of their primary claims. The District Court granted 
the plaintiffs1 motions for dismissal.6 
The only issue remaining after the dismissal of the 
claims controlled by Cotton Petroleum was the applicability of 
the Utah Taxes to the operations of Mobil, Union, Exxon and 
Texaco on the Aneth Extension. On November 13, 1989, defendants 
moved for summary judgment against the remaining plaintiffs on 
this issue. The Oil Companies filed a cross-motion.7 After 
5. The claims that all of the plaintiffs (including appellants) 
successfully moved to dismiss with prejudice included those 
alleging that the Utah Taxes (1) were pre-empted by the Indian 
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938; (2) unlawfully infringed on the 
sovereignty of the Navajo Tribe; (3) violated the Indian Commerce 
and/or Interstate Commerce Clauses of the U. S. Constitution; and 
(4) violated plaintiffs1 rights to due process, equal protection, 
and just compensation under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U. S. 
Constitution. In seeking their dismissal, the plaintiffs 
admitted that these claims were those upon which they had 
principally relied throughout this litigation. See, e.g., 
Phillips Plaintiffs1 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Plaintiffs1 Motion for Voluntary Dismissal (July 1989) 
at 2 ("We are now of the view that Cotton Petroleum materially 
undermines the major claims asserted in our pleadings against the 
state and local defendants. . . .M) (R. 5762, 5763). 
6. In its Memorandum Decision from which this appeal has been 
taken, the District Court characterized the impact of Cotton 
Petroleum on plaintiffs' principal claims as follows: "When the 
opinion in the Cotton case was handed down in April of 1989, it 
did decide most of the claims asserted by plaintiffs and made it 
impractical and unreasonable for plaintiffs to continue asserting 
those claims." Memorandum Decision on Motions for Summary 
Judgment ("Mem. Dec") at 7. Judge Bunnell's Memorandum Decision 
and his Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are set forth at 
Addenda C and D, respectively. 
7. The cross-motion of the Oil Companies demanded only a partial 
summary judgment determining that the 1933 Act pre-empted the 
Utah Taxes. It did not ask for a judgment refunding taxes paid 
under protest. Defendants have raised several defenses to the 
refund claims that have not been addressed by the trial court. 
See p. 49, below. 
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briefing was complete, Judge Bunnell heard oral argument on 
March 13, 1990. 
C. Disposition in the Court Below. 
On March 22, 1990, Judge Bunnell issued his Memorandum 
Decision (Addendum C) granting defendants1 motion for 
judgment and holding that "the 1933 Act did not, and < 
preclude the defendants from imposing taxes on the pic 
Mem. Dec. at 5. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, ana a 
Judgment (Addendum D) were signed by the Court on May 15, 1990, 
and entered on May 17, 1990. Texaco, Exxon and Union appealed 
the trial court1s decision to this Court; Mobil did not. 
D. Statement of Relevant Facts 
A. 
This appeal presents a purely legal issue. All parties 
agreed below that there was no dispute as to material facts and 
that the case was ripe for summary judgment. See Mem. Dec. at 1. 
The trial court's Findings of Fact — which the Oil Companies do 
not challenge here and did not challenge below8 — provide a 
helpful background for the disposition of this appeal. We rely 
on those findings, and summarize the most pertinent below. 
8. For its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial 
court adopted the proposed findings and conclusions submitted to 
the court by the defendants. With one exception not pertinent to 
this appeal, the Oil Companies did not object to the proposed 
findings and conclusions. See Defendants1 Joint Reply Regarding 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 2 (R. 6652, 
6653). 
-6-
1. The Oil Companies have leases from the Navajo 
Tribe of Indians covering lands within the Utah Strip. Those 
leases were issued to the Oil Companies between 1953 and 1974 
pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 347, 
25 U.S.C. S 396a, et seq. (the "1938 Indian Mineral Leasing 
Act"). Finding of Fact ("Finding") no. 2. 
2. Congress expanded the Utah Strip in 1933 when it 
passed the 1933 Act (Addendum A). The lands added to the 
Reservation by the 1933 Act include those commonly referred to as 
"the Aneth Extension," which consists of approximately 52,000 
acres running North and East of Montezuma Creek, Utah, to the 
Utah-Colorado state line. It is the applicability of the Utah 
Taxes to the Oil Companies' operations on the Aneth Extension 
that is at issue in this appeal. Finding no. 4. 
3. Before passage of the 1933 Act, the lands added to 
the Reservation by the Act were a part of the public domain. As 
such, they were subject to leasing under the Mineral Lands 
Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 450 (now codified at 30 U.S.C. 
§ 181 et seq.). The Act expressly permitted state taxation of 
production from any such leases and also allocated 37^ percent of 
the royalties from that production to the states in which the 
production occurred. Finding no. 7. 
4. The Act of May 17, 1968, 82 Stat. 121 (the "1968 
Amendment") (Addendum B) amended the 1933 Act to provide that the 
37^ percent of the royalties generated on Aneth Extension lands 
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could be used for the health, education and welfare of all San 
Juan County Navajos. Finding no. 5. 
5. At the time the 1933 Act was passed, the Indian 
Oil Leasing Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 244 (now codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 398), for "bought and paid for" lands, and the Indian Oil Act 
of 1927, 44 Stat. 1347 (now codified at 25 U.S.C. S 398c), for 
Executive Order reservations, provided the only congressional 
authorization for oil and gas leasing on Indian lands. Both Acts 
explicitly authorized state taxation of production from any such 
Indian lands. Finding no. 9. 
6. The Oil Companies discovered oil and gas within 
the Aneth Extension in the mid-1950s. Most of the Oil Companies1 
leases are now in secondary or tertiary recovery. Finding no. 
10. 
7. From the date of first production until 1978, the 
Oil Companies paid all of the Utah Taxes without protest. In 
1978, when the Navajo Tribe of Indians began to impose taxes on 
property and production on the Utah Strip, the Oil Companies for 
the first time began paying their state and local taxes under 
protest. Finding no. 11. 
8. The Oil Companies (and all of the other plaintiffs 
below) conceded for the purposes of this litigation that their 
exploration, development and production decisions relating to 
their properties on the Utah Strip, including the Aneth 
Extension, have not been adversely affected by the Utah Taxes. 
Finding no. 12. 
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9. Total production from the Utah Strip between 
January 1# 1978, and the date of the trial court decision 
exceeded $1.5 billion. Utah Taxes during the same period 
approximated $80 million. Finding nos. 13 and 14. 
10. The Oil Companies continue to produce oil and gas 
from the Utah Strip and the Aneth Extension. 
11. None of the Utah Taxes are imposed on Navajo 
tribal property or activities. Finding no. 16. 
B. 
Before turning to our Argument, we pause briefly to 
correct two misimpressions that may result from the Statement of 
Relevant Facts in the Oil Companies1 Opening Brief. 
Oil Companies' Fact no. 7. In their Fact no. 7 
(Opening Brief at pp. 10-11), the Oil Companies claim that a Utah 
Division of Indian Affairs ("UDIA") report written in 1968 by 
Bruce G. Parry, former director of UDIA, supports their 
contention that the State's acceptance of the royalty monies was 
"in lieu of taxes" on the Oil Companies. We do not believe that 
the views of Mr. Parry — a state employee writing 35 years after 
passage of the 1933 Act — are entitled to any weight in 
interpreting an act of Congress. 
But even if they were, it is misleading for the Oil 
Companies to claim here that Mr. Parry's views are consistent 
with their own. In an uncontested affidavit below, Mr. Parry 
averred that the phrase "in lieu of taxes" in the UDIA report he 
authored meant "in lieu of taxes on the Indians resident on the 
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portion of the Navajo Reservation.11 As the Oil Companies know, 
in Mr. Parry's view the phrase had "no application whatever to 
non-Indian oil and gas lessees" such as the Oil Companies. Reply 
Affidavit of Bruce G. Parry, R. 6463. 
Oil Companies' Fact no. 9. The linchpin of the Oil 
Companies' argument on appeal is set out in what they call "Fact 
No. 9" (at p. 12 of their Opening Brief). "Fact no. 9" asserts 
that (1) the 1933 Act "evidenced congressional intent" that the 
State would receive royalty monies rather than taxes, and (2) 
"Congress recognized that application of the federal 
instrumentality doctrine would have required specific 
congressional consent [in the 1933 Act] to enable state taxation 
of a non-Indian mineral lessee on Indian lands." 
First, by no stretch of the imagination may these be 
considered "facts." Instead, they are conclusory statements 
regarding precisely the question of law that is before the Court 
— namely, does the 1933 Act pre-empt state taxation of the Oil 
Companies' operations on the Aneth Extension. 
Second, these conclusory statements of law do not come 
from the 1933 Act (or, for that matter, any other act of 
Congress) or from any of the Committee reports or legislative 
history that led to the 1933 Act. Rather, these conclusions 
emanate from the affidavit and report of Mr. John R. Alley, Jr., 
a "self-employed historian, writer and editor" (Affidavit of 
John R. Alley, Jr., R. 6310) who was retained by plaintiffs below 
in connection with their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Even 
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when it stays within the factual realm, we do not believe Mr, 
Alley's report is entitled to any weight. More fundamentally, 
when the Report ventures into the realm of legal conclusions (as 
it does in the Oil Companies1 "Fact no. 9") it is entitled to no 
weight whatever and is, in any event, inadmissible.9 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE OIL COMPANIES1 LEASES ISSUED UNDER THE 1938 INDIAN 
MINERAL LEASING ACT ARE TAXABLE UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN COTTON PETROLEUM 
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico. 490 U.S. 163 
(1989), is one of three United States Supreme Court decisions 
that completely disposes of the Oil Companies1 appeal. In Cotton 
Petroleum, the Court held that state taxes on non-Indian oil and 
gas lessees such as the Oil Companies must "be upheld unless 
expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress." Id. at 173. 
Finding no express prohibition of state taxation in the 1938 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act — the same leasing statute under 
which the Oil Companies conduct their operations on the Aneth 
Extension — the Court in Cotton next examined the Act's silence 
regarding state taxation to see if it implied immunity. Finding 
a long and uninterrupted history of congressional approval of 
9. Defendants moved to strike the Alley affidavit in the trial 
court. See Defendants' Joint Motion to Strike the Affidavit and 
Study of John R. Alley, Jr. (R. 6548). The District Court did 
not rule on defendants' motion, concluding that the "legal 
conclusions reached and expressed [in the affidavit and report] 
are of very limited value and, as everyone concedes, are not 
binding on the Court in any way. The Court can see no value in 
going through the Affidavits and attached materials to try to 
separate fact from legal conclusion." Mem. Dec. at 2. 
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state taxation, the Court held that the silence of the 1938 
Indian Mineral Leasing Act manifested Congress's "intent to 
permit state taxation of non-member lessees.11 Id. at 183. 
The Courtfs holding in Cotton squarely applies to the 
Oil Companies1 operations on the Aneth Extension. The 1933 Act 
does not expressly prohibit state taxation and the Actfs silence 
does not imply anything different. Thus, these Oil Companies are 
subject to the Utah Taxes just like all other oil and gas lessees 
doing business on the Navajo Reservation, including their former 
co-plaintiffs. 
II. IF THE OIL COMPANIES HAD HAD LEASES ON THE ANETH 
EXTENSION AT THE TIME OF THE 1933 ACT, THEY WOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUBJECT TO STATE TAXATION 
Attempting to circumvent the unambiguous holding of 
Cotton Petroleum, the Oil Companies advance two arguments that, 
they say, in combination immunize their operations on the Aneth 
Extension from the Utah Taxes. First, they argue that the 
"instrumentality doctrine" was in effect in 1933 and required 
that the 1933 Act expressly authorize state taxation in order for 
the taxes to be valid. Critical to this argument is the Oil 
Companies1 contention that neither of the leasing statutes in 
effect in 1933 applied to the Aneth Extension. 
This argument is of no moment. Regardless of the state 
of the instrumentality doctrine in 1933, leasing on the Aneth 
Extension at the time the 1933 Act was passed was controlled by 
the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924. That Act expressly permitted 
state taxation of non-Indians and, under the leading United 
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States Supreme Court precedent on the matter, applied to 
reservations such as the Aneth Extension that were created by 
legislation. British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Bd. of 
Equalization, 299 U.S. 159f 161-63 (1936). Like Cotton 
Petroleum, this alone disposes of the Oil Companies' appeal. 
In addition, the premise of the Oil Companies1 argument 
regarding the applicability of the constitutionally derived 
instrumentality doctrine to the 1933 Act has already been 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court. In Oklahoma Tax 
Com'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342, 366 (1949), the Court held that 
an immunity from state taxation "formerly said to rest on 
constitutional implication cannot now be resurrected in the form 
of statutory implication." This, too, disposes of the Oil 
Companies1 appeal. 
III. NOTHING IN THE 1933 ACT SUPPORTS THE OIL COMPANIES1 
CONTENTION THAT THE ACT ESTABLISHED A TAX-FREE ZONE FOR 
NON-INDIAN OIL COMPANIES WITHIN A SMALL PORTION OF THE 
NAVAJO RESERVATION 
The second prong of the Oil Companies1 argument is 
based on their understanding of the purpose of the 1933 Act, 
which, they contend, was to provide the State of Utah with a 
mutually exclusive choice between taxes and royalties. But these 
two forms of revenue are not mutually exclusive. Had the Aneth 
Extension remained in the public domain the State would receive 
both royalties and tax revenues. Moreover, the Oil Companies 
paid without protest both royalties and taxes to the State until 
initiating these lawsuits and they pay both to the Navajo Nation. 
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More fundamentally, neither the 1933 Act nor its 
legislative history supports the contention that Congress 
intended to create a tax haven for oil companies on the Aneth 
Extension. The "in lieu of taxes" language that the Oil 
Companies rely on was introduced in connection with another 
statute unrelated to the 1933 Act; the language was never 
incorporated into any statute even remotely connected to the 1933 
Act; and, in any event, the language was never meant to apply to 
non-Indians. 
The purpose of the 1933 Act was simply to ensure that 
Navajos residing in San Juan County received a portion of oil and 
gas revenues generated on the Aneth Extension. With regard to 
state taxation, the 1933 Act is silent. We know from Cotton 
Petroleum that silence is not enough. This also disposes of the 
Oil Companies1 appeal. 
IV. IF THE OIL COMPANIES PREVAIL IN THEIR APPEAL THIS CASE 
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
Should the Court reverse the trial court, the case 
should be remanded for a determination of what, if any, refunds 
should be awarded. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE OIL COMPANIES1 LEASES ISSUED UNDER THE 1938 INDIAN 
MINERAL LEASING ACT ARE TAXABLE UNDER THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN COTTON PETROLEUM 
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Cotton 
Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989), doomed the Oil 
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Companies1 primary claims in the trial court. Plaintiffs1 
various motions to dismiss those claims — including those of the 
appellants — attest to that.11 Cotton Petroleum just as surely 
dooms the residual claims that the Oil Companies are pursuing 
here. 
In Cotton Petroleum. appellants argued — as had the 
plaintiffs in this case — that the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing 
Act pre-empted state taxes imposed on oil and gas companies 
operating on Indian reservations. Like the 1933 Act, however, 
the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act was silent on the subject. 
The Supreme Court therefore initially confronted appellants' 
argument that state taxes on oil and gas companies were "invalid 
unless expressly authorized by Congress" (id. at 173).12 
The Court held that with respect to private companies 
express congressional authorization to tax was not required. 
Rather, state taxes on non-Indian oil and gas companies will be 
"upheld unless expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress." 
Id.13 If Congress has not addressed the subject — if it has 
10. See n.5, supra. 
11. Plaintiffs' motions for dismissal of their claims with 
prejudice are at R. 5757, 5770, 5781, 5792, 5801 and 5810. 
12. That was the rule the Supreme Court had applied to state 
taxes on Indian tribes. 490 U.S. at 178-80, 183 n.14. Unless 
Congress specifically authorizes such taxes, the Tribe enjoys tax 
immunity. 
13. The holding in Cotton Petroleum is fully consistent with one 
forty years earlier involving one of the companies before the 
Court on this appeal. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. The Texas 
Company. 336 U.S. 342, 366 (1949) (if Congress has not created 
(continued...) 
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remained silent — the states are free to tax such companies 
until federal legislation provides otherwise. Of particular 
significance to this case, the Court applied this aspect of its 
ruling not only to the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act but also 
to other federal statutes concerning Indians that (like the 1933 
Act) were also silent on the subject of state taxation. Id. at 
183 n.14. 
While congressional silence did not bar state taxes, 
the question remained whether, in the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing 
Act, Congress had by implication prohibited state taxation. 
After reviewing the 1938 Act's legislative history and its 
contemporaneous setting, the Court could find no "congressional 
purpose to close the door to state taxation" of such companies. 
Id. at 182. Indeed, on Executive Order reservations "state 
taxation of non-member oil and gas lessees was the norm from the 
very start." Id. The Court therefore concluded that, far from 
prohibiting state taxes, the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act 
manifested Congress1s "intent to permit state taxation of non-
member lessees." Id. at 183. 
While this ruling rejected as a matter of law the 
Cotton appellants1 claims under the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing 
Act, the Supreme Court did not stop there. Urging a more 
expansive reading of the Act than the Court was willing to give 
it, appellants had relied upon several of the Courtfs earlier 
13. (...continued) 
tax "immunity . . . by affirmative action," oil lessees on Indian 
Reservations are not exempt). 
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decisions. Id. at 183-86. The Supreme Court answered that 
"federal law, even when given" — not the correct, but — "the 
most generous construction, does not pre-empt" state taxes on 
non-Indian oil and gas operations. Id. at 186. Unlike the 
decisions appellants relied upon, Cotton Petroleum was not a case 
"in which the State . . . had nothing to do with the on-
reservation activity"; and it was not a case in which "an 
unusually large state tax imposed a substantial burden on the 
Tribe." Any actual financial impact on the Tribe was "simply too 
indirect and too insubstantial to support [the oil company's] 
claim of pre-emption." Id. at 185-86. 
In the balance of its opinion, the Supreme Court 
disposed of appellants' arguments under the Indian and Interstate 
Commerce Clauses. In response to appellants' contention that tax 
payments exceeded the value of services provided by the State on 
the reservation, the Court held that "there is no constitutional 
requirement that the benefits received from a taxing authority by 
an ordinary commercial taxpayer — or by those living in the 
community where the taxpayer is located — must equal the amount 
of its tax obligations." Id. at 190. Moreover, Indian 
reservations cannot be treated as if they were separate states 
when it comes to taxing authority. Rather, the "States and 
tribes have concurrent jurisdiction" to tax companies operating 
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on reservations and those companies cannot escape their 
obligations on the basis that this results in a multiple tax 
burden on them. Id. at 192.14 
The trial court was thus plainly correct in concluding 
that Cotton Petroleum is a complete answer to the Oil Companies' 
position. Mem. Dec. at 2. The fact that some of their 
Reservation leases under the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act 
happen to be on land added by the 1933 Act is irrelevant. The 
subject of State taxation of oil and gas leases has always been 
controlled by the various federal leasing statutes, not the 
Executive Orders, treaties or legislation that have created 
Reservations. And, as we shall see (pp. 21-22), not once in 
those leasing statutes has Congress ever barred state taxation. 
Furthermore, the 1933 Act could be viewed as overriding 
the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act if and only if it 
affirmatively barred State taxation. This much follows directly 
from Cotton Petroleum, where the Court held that after 1938 "oil 
14. If factual differences mattered, every difference between 
the facts of Cotton Petroleum and the facts of this case cuts 
against the Oil Companies. Utah's regulation of plaintiffs' 
activities and provision of services to them are significantly 
greater than the regulation and services provided by New Mexico 
to appellant Cotton. Statement of Material Facts as to Which No 
Genuine Issue Exists in Support of Defendants1 Joint Motion for 
Summary Judgment, 5J 4-55 (R. 5950-5964). Services provided 
throughout the Utah Strip are more extensive and much more 
comparable to revenues from the Utah Strip than was the case in 
Cotton Petroleum. Id. at M 73-101 (R. 5967-5976). In this case 
there is not just a judicial finding of no impact on exploration, 
development and production; plaintiffs have conceded that their 
operations are not affected by the Utah Taxes. Finding no. 12. 
Finally, the Utah Taxes, at 5-6 percent of production (Finding 
no. 11), are significantly less than the New Mexico taxes, which 
were 8 percent of production. 490 U.S. at 169. 
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and gas lessees operating on Indian Reservations were subject to 
nondiscriminatory state taxation as long as Congress did not act 
affirmatively to pre-empt the state taxes.11 Id. at 175 (emphasis 
added).15 
The short of the matter is that when the Oil Companies 
conduct their operations on the Aneth Extension (and everywhere 
else on the Reservation, for that matter), they do so under the 
authority of the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act. Accordingly, 
under the principles plainly enunciated by the United States 
Supreme Court just four years ago they remain subject to state 
and local taxation until Congress provides otherwise. 
II. IF THE OIL COMPANIES HAD HAD LEASES ON THE ANETH 
EXTENSION AT THE TIME OF THE 1933 ACT, THEY WOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUBJECT TO STATE TAXATION 
We believe that the trial court correctly interpreted 
the Supreme Court's decision in Cotton Petroleum and that the 
decision completely disposes of the Oil Companies1 arguments. 
Confronted by the insurmountable obstacles presented by Cotton. 
however, the Oil Companies are reduced to two arguments. Each is 
untenable. 
15. It is impossible to square the clear and unambiguous 
language from Cotton Petroleum we have just quoted with the Oil 
Companies1 contention that Cotton "only reflects the Courtfs 
conclusion that the 1938 Actfs general repealer did not serve to 
repeal the taxation provision in the 1927 Act." (Opening Brief 
at p. 37 (footnote omitted). That is pure fantasy. In its 
opinion in Cotton Petroleum, the Court expressly declined to rest 
its decision on the idea that the 1927 Act's tax authorization 
continued after 1938. 490 U.S. at 182. 
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First, they contend that the "instrumentality doctrine" 
was in effect in 1933 and that it barred then and continues to 
bar today state taxation in the absence of express congressional 
approval (Opening Brief at pp. 22-29). Second, they contend that 
the 1933 Act reflects Congress's intent to provide the State of 
Utah a choice between royalties and taxes and that the State 
chose the former to the exclusion of the latter (Opening Brief at 
pp. 29-33). We address these contentions in parts II and III, 
respectively. 
A. Leases on the Aneth Extension in 1933 Would Have 
Been Subject to the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 
1924, Which Explicitly Permitted State Taxation 
1. 
The Oil Companies contend that at the time of the 1933 
Act the instrumentality doctrine required specific 
congressional authorization in order for states to tax non-Indian 
lessees and that there was no applicable leasing statute 
providing any such authorization for the Aneth Extension. But 
the historical fact is that oil and gas lessees were not exempt 
from state taxes when the 1933 Act became law. See generally 
Cotton Petroleum. 490 U.S. at 180-82. 
Before 1919, Indian reservations were generally created 
in two ways: by treaties ratified by Congress and by Executive 
Orders setting aside federal lands for Indian use and occupancy. 
16. The "instrumentality doctrine" is a subset of the judicially 
created intergovernmental immunity doctrine. Its rise and demise 
are chronicled in Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 173-75. 
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Executive Order reservations were not necessarily permanent. 
Often, Executive Orders creating reservations for the Indians 
were revoked and the lands were returned to the public domain. 
In 1919, the process of creating Executive Order 
reservations came to an end. The Act of June 30, 1919, 41 Stat. 
3, prohibited the Executive Branch from establishing or adding to 
Indian reservations through Executive Orders without 
congressional approval. After 1919, the Executive Branch, 
through the Department of the Interior, followed the practice of 
temporarily withdrawing lands from the public domain and then 
submitting proposed legislation to Congress to confer reservation 
status on the area. The 1933 Act adding the Aneth Extension to 
the Navajo Reservation illustrates the process at work. 
Oil and gas leasing on reservations that have been 
"bought and paid for"17 has been authorized since the Act of 
Feb. 28, 1891, 26 Stat. 795, 25 U.S.C. § 397. Although the 1891 
Act was silent about state taxation of non-Indian lessees, the 
Supreme Court held that such taxation was permitted. Thomas v. 
Gay. 169 U.S. 264, 274 (1898). In 1924, Congress amended the 
1891 Act. The Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 244, 25 
U.S.C. § 398, set forth leasing procedures, extended the leasing 
terms, and made explicit that the states were free to tax oil and 
gas companies operating under such leases. 
17. The Aneth Extension is a "bought and paid for" addition to 
the Navajo Reservation. See pp. 24-25, below. 
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Executive Order reservations were another matter. As 
the Supreme Court describes in Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 180-
82, prior to 1927 oil and gas leasing had not been specifically 
authorized on such reservations. Some contended that such lands 
could be leased under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 in 
the same manner as other federal lands and that the Indians 
residing there had no claim to the minerals. The Indian Oil Act 
of 1927, 44 Stat, (part 2) 1347, 25 U.S.C. § 398c, put an end to 
the controversy by authorizing oil and gas leasing on Executive 
Order reservations and recognizing the Indians9 interest in the 
mineral deposits. Like the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, the 
Indian Oil Act of 1927 specifically authorized state taxation of 
oil companies which held leases granted pursuant to its 
provisions. Id. at 182. 
Thus, by 1933 when the Aneth Extension was added to the 
Navajo Reservation, it was as clear as it could be that oil and 
gas companies operating on Indian reservations throughout the 
Nation were not immune from state and local taxes.18 As a 
result, by making the Aneth Extension part of the Navajo 
Reservation Congress necessarily subjected oil and gas leasing on 
those 52,000 acres to the same federal laws then applicable 
throughout the Reservation's other 14.5 million acres. 
18. As the Supreme Court stated in Cotton Petroleum, "[t]here 
is, accordingly, simply no history of tribal independence from 
state taxation of these lessees to form a 'backdrop1 against 
which the" 1933 Act must be read. Id. 
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The Oil Companies, however, contend otherwise, arguing 
that the Aneth Extension was a "third-type" of reservation, 
neither Treaty nor Executive Order but rather the result of 
legislative enactment. The consequence of this, they continue, 
is that leasing on the Aneth Extension was not covered by either 
the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924 or the Indian Oil Act of 1927. 
(Opening Brief at p. 26). Thus, they conclude, there was no 
explicit authorization for state taxation on the Aneth Extension. 
Foremost among the problems with the Oil Companies1 
argument that a "legislatively" created reservation is outside 
the scope of any leasing statute in 1933, is that it is directly 
contrary to the leading Supreme Court decision in the area. In 
British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization. 299 
U.S. 159, 161-163 (1936), the Supreme Court specifically held 
that the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924 applied to reservations 
created by legislation enacted by Congress: "There have been two 
related but distinct lines of legislation respecting the leasing 
of tribal Indian lands for mining purposes. The older and more 
general line has been regarded uniformly as including lands in 
reservations created by legislation, such as a treaty or 
congressional enactment . . . . The Act of February 28, 1891, 
and the [Indian Oil Leasing] Act of May 29, 1924 . . . belong of 
the first line." Id. at 161-62 (emphasis added).19 
19. The "second line," the Court continued, is "confined to 
lands in reservations created by Executive Order." Id. at 162. 
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As a reservation "created by legislation" (as the Oil 
Companies insist), the Aneth Extension at the time of its 
addition to the Reservation thus was governed with respect to oil 
and gas leasing by the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, which 
expressly authorized the states to tax lessees. In the face of 
this history, it is as certain as it can be that the 1933 Act 
could not possibly have had the opposite effect of prohibiting 
state taxation of oil and gas operations on the Aneth 
Extension.20 
One further point remains in this regard. The Oil 
Companies explicitly contended below that a careful reading of 
British-American Petroleum indicated that the phrase "bought and 
paid for" meant lands reserved by treaty but not by legislation 
and that therefore the Aneth Extension was not "bought and paid 
for" as the phrase has come to be interpreted. Plaintiffs1 
Answer to Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment 
("Plaintiffs1 Opposition") at 31 n.53 (R. 6111). They appear to 
make the same argument here. (Opening Brief at pp. 39-40). 
The problem with the argument is that, once again, it 
is irreconcilable with the explicit language of British-American 
Petroleum: "by uniform administrative practice and by judicial 
20. At page 24 of their Opening Brief, the Oil Companies rely on 
Jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U.S. 609 (1926), and Burnet v. 
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932), for their contention 
that the instrumentality doctrine required explicit congressional 
authorization for states to tax. These cases are inapposite, 
however, since they involve the lands of the Five Civilized 
Tribes and the Osage Tribe in Oklahoma, which were specifically 
excluded from the coverage of the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 
1924. 
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decision, ["bought and paid for11] has been construed as not 
confined to lands acquired by Indians through payment of a 
consideration in money, but equally including lands reserved for 
Indians in return for a cession or surrender by them of other 
lands, possessions, or rights." 299 U.S. at 164 (emphasis 
added); see also Montana v. Blackfoot Tribe. 471 U.S. 759, 765 
n.3 (1985) (same). 
From the face of the 1933 Act itself, the Navajo quite 
clearly ceded "rights" in exchange for the Aneth Extension. In 
return for the lands added to the Reservation, "no further 
allotments of lands to Indians on the public domain shall be made 
in San Juan County, Utah, nor shall further Indian homesteads be 
made in said county under the Act of July 4, 1884 . . . ." Act 
of March 1, 1933, § 1. The Aneth Extension was thus plainly 
"bought and paid for." 
2. 
In evaluating the Oil Companies1 novel contention that 
no leasing statute applied to the 1933 Act lands, it is also 
useful to consider what would have occurred between 1933 and the 
enactment in 1938 of the comprehensive leasing statute at issue 
in Cotton Petroleum. Consider, for example, what Exxon would 
have done in, say, 1935, if it had wanted to undertake oil and 
gas operations on the Aneth Extension. One thing is clear: Exxon 
could not have relied on the 1933 Act as authority for granting 
it an oil and gas lease in this area. The Oil Companies agreed 
-25-
before the trial court, as they must, that the 1933 Act was not 
a leasing statute and that it did not authorize oil and gas 
leases on the Aneth Extension, although it clearly anticipated 
that oil operations could be undertaken there. 
Therefore, if Exxon had wanted an oil lease on the 
Aneth Extension in 1935, it would have had to rely on some other 
federal leasing statute. As the Oil Companies admit (Opening 
Brief at 15), at the time Exxon would have had but two choices: 
the 1927 Indian Oil Act and the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924. 
The 1927 Act, however, would not have applied to the area created 
by the 1933 Act; it governed only Reservations created by 
Executive Order. Exxon thus would have had to obtain its lease 
under the 1924 Act. 
This circumstance places the Oil Companies in a 
predicament regarding their arguments about the Aneth Extension. 
If they admit that oil leasing on the Aneth Extension was 
originally governed by the 1924 Act, they would contradict 
themselves because the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924 expressly 
permitted State taxation of oil and gas lessees. On the other 
hand, if they deny that the 1924 Act applied, which is what they 
have done,22 they render their interpretation of the 1933 Act 
absurd because their denial leads to the untenable conclusion 
that no oil leasing could have occurred between 1933 and 1938. 
21. Plaintiffs1 Opposition at 17 (R. 6097) ("Defendants argue 
that the 1933 Aneth Act itself was not a leasing statute. . . . 
This is correct.11). 
22. Opening Brief at pp. 15, 26. 
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Put another way, the Oil Companies1 contention, to be accepted, 
requires that this Court conclude that Congress engaged in an 
exercise of complete futility in the 1933 Act, carefully dividing 
oil and gas royalties between the State and the Tribe in an area 
— the Aneth Extension — where there could be no oil and gas 
leases and thus no royalties to divide.23 
The Oil Companies are also in a predicament if we 
assume that Exxon had embarked on its leasing on the Aneth 
Extension before 1933, when the land was still in the public 
domain. At that time, there is no question Exxon would have been 
required to pay the Utah Taxes (as lessees on public lands do to 
this day) and pay the State 37^ percent of the royalties 
generated from production on those lands.24 On the Oil 
Companies' theory, Exxon's explicit obligation to pay the Utah 
Taxes would have been eliminated in 1933 when the land was added 
to the Reservation, despite the fact that the 1933 Act has not 
one word to suggest any such intention on the part of Congress. 
23. The United States Supreme Court has frequently admonished 
that statutes should not be construed so as to lead to absurd 
results. E.g.. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 
564, 575 (1982) ("interpretations of a statute which would 
produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative 
interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are 
available"). 
24. Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 450, 30 U.S.C. 
§§ 189, 191. Prior to 1933, the remaining 62^ percent would have 
been paid to the United States. 
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B. The 1933 Act Did Not Enshrine the Instrumentality 
Doctrine for All Time on the Aneth Extension 
Whatever one might think of the status of the 
instrumentality doctrine in 1933, it would not have applied to 
the lands added to the Navajo Reservation by the 1933 Act. Any 
leases covering those lands would necessarily have been entered 
into pursuant to the Indian Oil Leasing Act of 1924, which 
explicitly permitted state taxation of non-Indian oil and gas 
lessees such as the Oil Companies. 
That in itself disposes of the Oil Companies1 argument 
(at pp. 22-29 of their Opening Brief) regarding the effect of the 
instrumentality doctrine on the 1933 Act. But let us grant the 
Oil Companies what they wish — that is, assume for the moment 
that the instrumentality doctrine required specific congressional 
approval for state taxation at the time of the 1933 Act and that 
the doctrine applied to the Aneth Extension. In other words, 
assume (as the Oil Companies do) that the instrumentality 
doctrine announced in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922), 
was good law until overruled by Helverina v. Mountain Producers 
Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), and that the doctrine attached to any 
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legislation passed between 1922 and 1938. The argument still 
leads nowhere. 
1. 
First, this precise argument was rejected by the United 
States Supreme Court in a case brought forty-five years ago by 
one of the appellants here — Texaco, then known as Texas 
Company. In Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co.. 336 U.S. 342 
(1949), the issue before the Court was "whether a lessee of 
mineral rights in allotted and restricted Indian lands is 
immunized by the Constitution against payment of 
nondiscriminatory [state taxes] on petroleum produced from such 
lands." 336 U.S. at 343. This is precisely the question that 
the Oil Companies raise on appeal. 
The Court's unanimous answer to this question could not 
have been more clear. First, the Court directly overruled those 
cases that Texas Company argued had survived the Mountain 
Producers case and provided an ongoing source of tax immunity 
25. The Oil Companies apparently mistakenly believe that prior 
to Helverina v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), 
when the Supreme Court finally explicitly overruled the 
intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine, oil companies were 
completely exempt from state taxes unless Congress affirmatively 
said otherwise. (Opening Brief at pp. 23-25.) But even before 
1938, the Supreme Court had upheld State taxes on oil lessees 
despite the absence of congressional approval. E.g.. Group No. 1 
Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U.S. 279, 282-83 (1931) (sustaining State 
tax on oil lessee on Indian lands); Indian Territory Illuminating 
Oil Co. v. Board of Equalization, 288 U.S. 325 (1933)(sustaining 
State ad valorem tax on lessee's oil taken from restricted Indian 
lands); Taber v. Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co., 300 U.S. 
1 (1937) (sustaining State ad valorem tax on equipment of a non-
Indian oil lessee operating on restricted Indian lands). 
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26 
under the instrumentality doctrine. 336 U.S. at 365. Next, 
and of particular importance here, the Court considered what 
effect the demise of the constitutional doctrine has on statutory 
interpretation: 
We do not imply, by this decision, that 
Congress does not have power to immunize 
these lessees from the taxes we think the 
Constitution permits Oklahoma to impose in 
the absence of such action. The question 
whether immunity shall be extended in 
situations like these is essentially 
legislative in character. But Congress has 
not created an immunity here bv affirmative 
action, and "The immunity formerly said to 
rest on constitutional implication cannot now 
be resurrected in the form of statutory 
implication. . . . [I]f it appears that there 
is no ground for implying a constitutional 
immunity, there is equally a want of any 
ground for assuming any purpose on the part 
of Congress to create an immunity." 
336 U.S. at 365-66 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
Finally, the Court addressed precisely the issue that 
we have here — whether congressional silence (such as in the 
1933 Act) leads to an inference of immunity from state taxation: 
26. Specifically, the Court held that ,f[i]n light of the broad 
groundings of the Mountain Producers decision and of later 
decisions, we cannot say that the Gipsy Oil, Large Oil and 
Barnsdall Refineries decisions remain immune to the effects of 
the Mountain Producers decision and others which have followed 
it. They fare out of harmony with correct principle,• and they 
should be, and they now are, overruled . . . . Moreover, since 
the decisions in Choctaw, 0. & G. R. Co. v. Harrison, supra, and 
Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, supra, rest 
upon the same foundations as those underlying the Gipsy Oil, 
Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions, indeed supplied 
those foundations, we think they too should be, and they now are, 
overruled." 336 U.S. at 365. 
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Finally, we refuse to infer from mere 
congressional silence approval of the 
doctrine of immunity enunciated in the 
Choctaw, 0, & G. R. Co,, Indian Territory 
Illuminating Oil (240 U.S.C. 522), Gipsy Oil, 
Large Oil and Barnsdall Refineries decisions, 
supra. Congress1 silence prior to the 
Mountain Producers decision did not preclude 
this Court from curtailing the lessee's 
immunity in that case; and Congress seems to 
have accepted that decision with equanimity. 
336 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added). 
While the Court's decision in Texas Co. provides yet 
another ground for rejecting the Oil Companies' argument, the 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in that case (which 
we have attached hereto as Addendum E) is also instructive.27 In 
urging the Supreme Court to conclude that Texas Company enjoyed 
no immunity under the instrumentality doctrine, the Solicitor 
General argued as follows: 
We believe that Congress, by failing to make 
specific provision for the taxation of the 
lessees here, has not indicated any intention 
that they should be exempt from taxation on 
their activities. The situation is similar 
to the silence of Congress during the time 
that the Gillespie decision stood for the 
existence of the lessee's immunity against a 
state net income tax. The Mountain Producers 
case demonstrates that no significance should 
be attached to this, for the tax exemption 
there, guite properly, fell along with the 
constitutional doctrine, unchecked by notions 
of legislative intent that could only have 
been fabricated out of congressional 
inaction. Surely, the failure of the 
legislature to mark its disagreement with 
constitutional decisions does not signify an 
adoption of those opinions as the policy of 
27. The views of the United States are accorded particular 
deference by the Court in matters involving Indians. 
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the lav makers which will persist beyond the 
time that they are overruled. 
. . . 
The failure of Congress, either before or 
after the Mountain Producers decision, to 
assert a tax exempt status for the lessees of 
restricted Indian lands, undoubtedly 
indicates an intent to permit them to be 
taxed by the local authorities to the limit 
of constitutional power. 
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at pp. 34 and 36, in 
Oklahoma Tax CQTnm'n v . Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949) . 2 8 
In short, the argument that the Oil Companies pursue 
leads nowhere. Even if the instrumentality doctrine had applied 
to the lands added to the Navajo Reservation by the 1933 Act (and 
we reiterate that it did not), the doctrine died no later than 
1938, as the Oil Companies admit (Opening Brief at 25). It 
"cannot now be resurrected in the form of statutory implication." 
336 U.S. at 366. 
2. 
Even without the Supreme Court's decision in Texas Co.. 
the Oil Companies1 argument regarding the instrumentality 
doctrine would fail. The premise of the argument is that a 
constitutional doctrine once announced is incorporated for all 
time into statutes that are passed before the doctrine is 
explicitly overruled. 
28. A copy of the Brief for the United States was provided to 
the trial court during oral argument on the cross-motions for 
summary judgment. (Tr. at 19, R. 6724). 
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But that cannot be the law. If it were, all of the 
legislation formalizing segregation in the South between the time 
the Supreme Court decided Plessv v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 537 
(1896), which first announced the constitutional doctrine of 
"separate but equal," and Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), which reversed the doctrine, would still be good law. 
III. NOTHING IN THE 1933 ACT SUPPORTS THE OIL COMPANIES1 
CONTENTION THAT THE ACT ESTABLISHED A TAX-FREE ZONE FOR 
NON-INDIAN OIL COMPANIES WITHIN A SMALL PORTION OF THE 
NAVAJO RESERVATION 
The second prong of the Oil Companies1 attempt to 
overcome Cotton Petroleum is their contention that the 1933 Act 
culminated a debate resulting in Utah having to make a mutually 
exclusive choice between royalties, on the one hand, and taxes, 
on the other. This is nonsense. 
First, as the Oil Companies well know, there is no 
inherent inconsistency in the State receiving both royalties and 
tax revenues. Indeed, before 1978, the Oil Companies paid both 
royalties and taxes to the State without protest for their 
operations on the Aneth Extension (Opening Brief at 13), and, 
like other lessees, they continue to pay both to the Navajo 
Nation. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navaio Tribe of Indians. 471 
U.S. 195 (1985).29 Moreover, the "debate" regarding the Aneth 
Extension that the Oil Companies cling to was in reality no 
debate at all, at least as far as the 1933 Act was concerned. 
29. Like the Navajos, other tribes also receive both royalties 
and receive taxes from the same production. See, e.g., Merrion 
v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 148 (1982). 
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A. The Only Exemption from State Taxes Even 
Contemplated by Congress Was for the Navajo Tribe, 
and Even It Did Not Become Part of the 1933 Act 
The purported factual basis for the Oil Companies' 
contention regarding a congressional "debate" over royalties and 
taxes is set forth at Jf 4-7 of their Statement of Material Facts 
(Opening Brief at pp. 8-10). Except for citations to defendants1 
moving papers below and to the trial court's findings, all of the 
record citations in 5J 4-7 are to the report of Mr. Alley, the 
Oil Companies' historian.30 The trial court did not accord any 
weight to Mr. Alley's report (see p. 11 n.9, supra). 
Nevertheless, we address below the substance of the report which 
requires digressions into the legislative histories of the Indian 
Oil Act of 1927 and the 1933 Act. 
In the 1920s, during the controversy surrounding oil 
and gas leasing on Executive Order reservations, legislation was 
proposed that would have given the states 37^ percent of the 
royalties "in lieu of taxes." This, in its entirety, is the 
"debate" regarding royalties and taxes to which the Oil Companies 
attach such importance. 
As finally enacted, however, the Indian Oil Act of 1927 
contained no such provision. Undeterred, the Oil Companies 
contend that the 1933 Act was modeled after the bill that did not 
become law. Therefore, they continue, the phrase "in lieu of 
30. In 5 7 the Oil Companies also cite to a UDIA document. 
However, the uncontested view of the author of the report is 
directly contrary to the Oil Companies' contention. See pp. 9, 
10, supra. 
-34-
taxes" contained in the unenacted bill should be read into the 
1933 Act, although the statute says no such thing. In this 
respect, the Oil Companies assxime that if the phrase "in lieu of 
taxes" had been included in the 1933 Act, this would have meant 
that the State of Utah was granted a share of the royalties "in 
lieu of" taxing them. 
We believe this theory is far-fetched. To make the 
argument, the Oil Companies are forced to rely on the purported 
intent of the 1926 Congress regarding an unenacted bill to 
determine the intent of the 1933 Congress regarding a statute 
that dealt with a different subject31 and omitted the very 
language the Oil Companies deem critical to their case. "Going 
behind the plain language of a statute in search of a possibly 
contrary congressional intent is a step to be taken cautiously 
even under the best of circumstances." United States v. Locke, 
471 U.S. 84, 95-96 (1985) (internal quotations omitted). Here, 
plaintiffs urge the Court to undertake this search in the worst 
of circumstances. 
The first link in the Oil Companies' tenuous chain of 
reasoning is a bill proposed and drafted by the Department of the 
Interior in January 1926 and introduced one month later as H.R. 
9133 by Representative Hayden (hereinafter the "Hayden bill"). 
See H.R. Rep. No. 763, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1926); S. Rep. 
31. The unenacted bill dealt with oil and gas leasing on 
Executive Order reservations while the 1933 Act dealt with 
additions to the Navajo Indian Reservation. 
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No. 768, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1926). As proposed, the 
Hayden bill provided among other things that on Executive Order 
reservations, the states would receive 37^ percent of the 
royalties — and this is the language the Oil Companies consider 
crucial — "in lieu of taxes to the State." S. Rep. No. 768, 
supra. at 3. 
As we have noted, the bill never passed in the form 
proposed. All of the language upon which the Oil Companies rely 
was deleted in committee (H.R. Rep. No. 763, supra, at 1, 9) or 
not adopted (S. Rep. No. 768, supra, at 4), and none of it is 
contained in the statute Congress ultimately enacted as the 
Indian Oil Act of 1927. 
In order to show that the 1933 Act had the same purpose 
and effect as the unenacted 1926 bill, the Oil Companies rely not 
on any House or Senate committee reports, or on anything said by 
any members of Congress, but on a statement in 1931 by Herbert 
James Hagerman, a former federal commissioner to the Navajo 
Tribe. According to Hagerman, Utah congressional representatives 
were insisting that legislation adding the Paiute Strip to the 
Reservation contain a provision granting 37^ percent of the 
royalties to the State of Utah — a provision, as Hagerman put 
it, "similar" to that in the bill proposed five years before with 
respect to Executive Order reservations. Survey of Conditions of 
the Indians in the United States. Part 11: Hearings Before a 
32. The Senate and House Reports are set out at Addendum F and 
G, respectively. 
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Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs. 71st Cong., 3d 
Sess. 4562 (1931). 
We pause here to make several observations. If, as the 
United States Supreme Court has held, the views of a single 
Senator are entitled to little or no weight in statutory 
construction (United States v. Wells Farao Bank. 485 U.S. 351, 
358 (1988)), the views of Mr. Hagerman are entitled to even less. 
This is especially so in Mr. Hagerman*s case in light of the fact 
that he was thoroughly discredited and discharged from office.33 
Moreover, Hagerman was speaking in 1931 and it was 
therefore impossible for him to state what the Congress of 1933 
intended when it enacted the legislation in question. As the 
United States Supreme Court has warned on many occasions, it "is 
the intent of the Congress that enacted [the legislation] . . . 
that controls." Teamsters v. United States. 431 U.S. 324, 354 
n.39 (1977). 
Furthermore, Hagerman said only that the proposals 
regarding Reservation expansion in Utah were "similar" to — not 
the same as — the unenacted bill from the 1920s. But on the 
subject the Oil Companies consider important, the proposals were 
dissimilar. The 1933 Act did not provide that sharing royalties 
with the state was "in lieu of" taxes. To be sure, there were 
similarities in other respects. Both the Utah proposal and the 
33. See L. Kelly, The Navaio Indians and Federal Indian Policy, 
152 n.6 (1968) (hereafter "Kelly"). A copy of Kelly was lodged 
with the trial court along with Defendants1 Joint Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 6015 n.19). 
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unenacted bill provided that 37^ percent of the royalties would 
go to the State. But in that respect, the Utah proposal was also 
"similar11 to the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, which 
designated the same percentage as the states1 royalty share 
and — more importantly — expressly provided that the states 
could tax the lessees, such as the Oil Companies in this case. 
But, once again, let us suppose that it would be proper 
to grant the Oil Companies all that they argue. In other words, 
assume that Hagerman's statement in 1931 proved that in 1933 
Congress modeled the Act creating the Aneth Extension after the 
Hayden bill and assume further that the "in lieu of" language 
should therefore be added by judicial amendment to the actual 
language of the 1933 legislation. Even then the Oil Companies 
could not prevail. 
The fundamental premise of their entire line of 
reasoning is that the "in lieu of" language in the Hayden bill 
would have meant (if only it had been enacted) that the states 
would be receiving the 37^ percent of the royalties in lieu of 
taxing the oil and gas producers. That premise is flatly wrong. 
The Interior Department, which drafted this proposed legislation 
in 1926, informed both the House and the Senate that the language 
in question meant in lieu of taxing the Indians, and was not 
intended to prevent the states from imposing "taxes against the 
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white man, lessees or otherwise." S. Rep. No. 768, supra at 4 
(Addendum F); H.R. Rep. No. 763, supra at 3 (Addendum G). 3 4 
The Interior Department proposed clarifying this 
possible ambiguity (id.)r which proved unnecessary when the bill 
failed to garner support. During the same Congress, however, in 
legislation concerning several Oklahoma tribes, the Interior 
Department's proposed clarification became law. In this 
legislation, Congress allocated 37^ percent of the royalties from 
certain Indian land in Oklahoma to the state "in lieu of all 
state and local taxes upon said tribal funds."35 
34. The Interior Department drafted the bill and sent it to 
the House and Senate in January 1926. After confusion arose 
regarding the meaning of the "in lieu of" language, the Interior 
Secretary, in March 1926, sent a letter to the Senate Committee 
on Indian Affairs, explaining (S. Rep. No. 768, supra at 4 
(Addendum F)): 
As construed and understood by this department at 
the time the report of January 28, 1926, was made, this 
language "in lieu of taxes to the State" means that 37^ 
per cent of the proceeds from rentals, royalties, or 
bonuses of oil and gas leases upon lands within 
Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals 
shall be paid to the State, for designated purposes, in 
lieu of any and all taxes against the Indians, but does 
not include taxes against others. . . . 
The Interior Secretary sent a nearly identical letter to the 
House Committee on Indian Affairs, stating that the "in lieu of 
taxes to the State" language "does not include taxes against the 
white man, lessees or otherwise." H.R. Rep. No. 763, supra at 3 
(Addendum G). 
35. Joint Resolution Authorizing the Secretary of the Interior 
to Establish a Trust Fund for the Kiowa, Comanche and Apache 
Indians in Oklahoma, 43 Stat. 740 (1926). This legislation is 
analogous to the 1933 Act. It involved an area formerly part of 
the public domain, but to which the Indians held an equitable 
claim. S. Rep. No. 492, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1926). 
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Thus, even the language the Oil Companies wish Congress 
had put into the 1933 Act would not have granted them a tax 
exemption. Even if it had been adopted — and it was not — it 
merely would have provided an exemption to the Navajo Tribe from 
state and local taxes, an exemption the Tribe currently enjoys 
but the Oil Companies do not. The thread the Oil Companies 
pursue to gain tax immunity therefore leads to nothing but a dead 
end. 
B. The 1933 Act Ensured that a Portion of the Royalty 
Revenues Would Be Spent for the Benefit of Navajo 
Tribal Members in Utah, but Did Not Affect Tax or 
Royalty Payments bv Private Oil and Gas Producers 
We turn next to the history of the 1933 Act and its 
1968 amendment. On their face, neither the Act nor its amendment 
supports the Oil Companies1 position. Indeed, there is not even 
a word in the Act or its amendment about state taxation of oil 
and gas companies. Still less is there anything in the statutory 
language to indicate that Congress was ordaining this relatively 
tiny area in Utah a tax haven for oil and gas companies. On that 
score there is simply silence and nothing more. Cotton Petroleum 
tells us that this is not enough. 
1. 
Prior to 1933, the Paiute Strip and the Aneth Extension 
were federal lands and part of the public domain.36 In the early 
36. The status of the Paiute Strip had vacillated over the 
years. First set aside for Indians in 1884, the Paiute Strip was 
withdrawn from the Reservation by Executive Order in 1892, set 
aside for Indians again in 1908 by departmental order, withdrawn 
(continued...) 
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1930s the Department of the Interior proposed taking these tracts 
from the public domain and adding them to the Navajo Reservation. 
Apparently there was no oil or gas production there but future 
discoveries were considered possible. 
The State of Utah and its citizens objected to the 
Interior Department's proposal. See Memorandum from the 
Commissioner on Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior, 
Jan. 7, 1933, reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 1883, 72d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 2-4 (1933).37 In order to resolve the dispute, the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs met with a "Committee of Nine" 
citizens representing San Juan County in 1932. The meeting, 
which took place in Blanding, resulted in a memorandum of 
agreement dated July 15, 1932 (reprinted in H.R. No. 1883, supraf 
at 3-4). Among other things, the Committee of Nine and the 
Commissioner agreed that after the land passed into Reservation 
36. (...continued) 
again by departmental order in 1922 and temporarily set aside 
again "in aid of legislation" in 1929. In 1927, the Department 
of the Interior began studying whether the area should be 
permanently added to the Navajo Reservation. Navaio Indian 
Reservation. Report of H. J. Haaerman Special Commissioner to 
Negotiate with Indians on the Status of Navaio Indian Reservation 
Land Acquisitions. S. Doc. No. 64, 72d Cong. 1st Sess. at 38-39 
(1932) (hereinafter "Haaerman Report"). 
Senate bill No. 3782 was introduced in 1930 to add the 
Paiute Strip to the Reservation. That bill did not pass. 
Congressman Don Colton of Utah introduced H.R. 16464 on January 
22, 1931, again proposing the addition of the Paiute Strip to the 
Reservation. H.R. 16464 did not make it out of committee. 
Governor Dern of Utah adamantly opposed expanding the Navajo 
Reservation if it meant the 37.5 percent of the royalty dedicated 
to the states under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 would be 
lost. Haaerman Report at 39. 
37. The House Report is set out at Addendum H. 
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status, the State would receive 37^ percent of the royalties 
collected from any future oil and gas lessees in these areas, but 
would expend such funds for the benefit of the Indians living 
there. Id. 
2. 
Several points emerge from this history, each of which 
refutes the Oil Companies1 contention that the 1933 Act's 
royalty-sharing provision somehow conferred tax immunity on them 
by implication. First, it is clear that there is no inherent 
inconsistency between granting a state a percentage of the 
royalties and permitting the state to tax the oil and gas 
producers. Existing federal law so provided with respect to 
federal lands in general. If the Paiute Strip and the Aneth 
Extension had remained part of the public domain, oil and gas 
operations there would have been governed by the Mineral Lands 
Leasing Act of 1920. The Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 41 Stat. 
450, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et sea., not only authorized the States to 
impose taxes on federal oil and gas lessees (30 U.S.C. § 189), 
but also granted the states 37% percent of the royalties 
collected by the federal government.38 See Mid-Northern Oil Co. 
v. Walker, 268 U.S. 45, 48-50 (1925); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. 
Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623-33 (1981). The states thus share in 
the federal government's royalties and, at the same time, impose 
taxes on the producers. 
38. The Mineral Lands Leasing Act was subsequently amended so 
that the states now receive 50 percent of the royalties collected 
from oil and gas lessees on federal land. 30 U.S.C. § 191. 
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Second, there can be no contention that the 1933 Act's 
royalty-sharing provision imposed some added burden on oil 
companies that Congress would have sought to offset through a tax 
exemption. From the point of view of any oil company that later 
engaged in operations on the Aneth Extension the division of 
royalties between the State and the Tribe had absolutely no 
financial consequences. Such companies would still pay a full 
royalty on productipn; the 1933 Act concerned only how those 
royalties would be distributed. In short, the Oil Companies are 
not under any special financial burden on the Aneth Extension and 
there is no reason why Congress would have intended — certainly 
not without saying so — to give them a special tax break there. 
Furthermore, the evident purpose of the 1933 Actfs 
royalty-sharing provision is entirely unrelated to the Oil 
Companies' tax status. From the point of view of the State, the 
Tribe and particularly the tribal members living on the Utah 
Strip, the 1933 Act made a significant difference. If these 
52,000 acres had remained part of the public domain, the State 
would have received 37^ percent of royalties from oil and gas 
operations conducted there. When the land passed into 
Reservation status, the 1933 Act had the effect of maintaining 
the State's percentage at the same level, but with one important 
difference. After 1933, if oil and gas were produced on the 
Aneth Extension, the State of Utah was required to expend its 
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share of the royalties for the benefit of the tribal members 
living in the newly-added area.39 
On the other hand, if Congress had not included the 
royalty provision in the 1933 Act, all of the royalties collected 
on the Aneth Extension would have gone to the Tribe. Geography 
explains why Congress required the Tribe to share its royalties 
with the State of Utah. The unusual feature of the Navajo 
Reservation is that it is not wholly within any one State. The 
Utah portion of the Reservation is the smallest and the tribal 
members residing there make up a distinct minority within the 
Tribe. In the absence of a division-of-royalty provision in the 
1933 Act, there was no assurance that the Tribe would expend any 
of the royalty proceeds for the benefit of the tribal members 
living on the Aneth Extension or anywhere else in Utah. That is, 
the Tribe would have been free to spend the Utah royalties in 
Arizona or New Mexico. Yet the language of the 1933 Act shows 
that Congress was concerned about the welfare of the Utah 
Navajos. 
The wisdom of Congress in setting aside specific funds 
for the benefit of the Navajos residing in San Juan County cannot 
really be in doubt. In a case that specifically addressed the 
1933 Act, the Federal District Court for Utah found that while 
generally "the situation of the Navajo Indians is a sad and 
39. The royalty funds generated on the Aneth Extension "do not 
belong to the State of Utah nor are they public funds." Sakezzie 
v. Utah State Indian Affairs Commission. 215 F. Supp. 12, 21 (D. 
Ut. 1963). 
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difficult one . . ., [t]he Navajos living on the Aneth Extension 
particularly live in abject poverty.11 Sakezzie v. Utah State 
Indian Affairs Commission. 215 F. Supp. 12, 22 (D. Ut. 1963); see 
also United States v. Jim. 409 U.S. 80, 84 (1973) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting) (Aneth Extension Navajos "live in a remote and 
relatively inaccessible area11). Moreover, as the District Court 
also found, there are good reasons why Congress decided not to 
rely solely on the largesse of the Navajo Nation to distribute 
any such funds to San Juan County Navajos. "[T]he interest of 
the tribe as a whole in some respects has been in conflict with 
those of the Indians residing upon the Aneth Extension." 
Sakezzie v. Utah Indian Affairs Commission. 198 F. Supp. 218, 221 
(D. Ut. 1961). Or, as Justice Douglas put it, "there are 
tensions and conflicts between these primitive Navajos who live 
on the Aneth Extension and other members of the tribe who live 
elsewhere." United States v. Jim. 409 U.S. at 85 (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
3. 
One other point of critical importance remains 
regarding the 1933 Act. Thus far we have focused only on the 
legislation as enacted in 1933. But the Act was amended in 
1968, a fact which the trial court rightly held "demonstrates 
conclusively congressional approval of the receipt by Utah of 
both tax and royalty income from the Aneth Extension." 
40. P.L. 90-306, 82 Stat. 121 (1968) (Addendum B). 
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Conclusion of Law no. 8. The Oil Companies, of course, 
disagree.41 
Congress's action in 1968 is significant for several 
reasons. The legislative history of the 1968 amendment confirms 
the holding of the trial court that the royalty-sharing provision 
of the 1933 Act was not designed for the benefit of oil and gas 
companies. It was instead intended to protect the few Indians 
living in the then newly-designated Reservation areas. As we 
have discussed, without the royalty-sharing provision those Utah 
Navajos would have had no assurance that any of the royalty 
proceeds would be spent for their benefit since such funds would 
have been paid to the Tribe in Window Rock, Arizona. 
The legislative history of the 1968 amendment fully 
supports this conclusion. In considering whether to continue the 
royalty-sharing provision in 1968 and extend the class of 
beneficiaries, Congress adopted the proposal of John S. Boyden, 
then Chairman of the Utah Indian Affairs Commission. Chairman 
Boyden's testimony before Congress about the purpose of the 1933 
Act confirms each of the points we have stressed and is therefore 
worth quoting at length: 
[Then Utah] Governor Dern took the 
position [regarding the Aneth Extension] that 
if they were going to include this land in 
the Navajo Reservation that special 
protection ought to be given to these Indians 
in this particular area because they were at 
that time regarded as sort of an isolated 
people. 
41. Opening Brief at pp. 42-43. 
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They were far away from both the Navajo 
headquarters and from the State and 
Government and were very isolated and I know 
that Governor Dern was very interested in 
seeing that these people had the benefits. 
So that, as you know, there were certain 
reservations with respect to oil even on 
Federal lands that work to the benefit of the 
schools of the State. I think that is where 
this percentage came from. 
So there was an endeavor at this time to 
say, "Well what would ordinarily go if this 
were public lands to the school? We will 
give it to these Indians that need it so 
badly and we will go along with it." 
I think that is about the history [of 
the 1933 Act] as near as I can tell. 
Furthermore, when Congress amended the Act in 1968 it 
did so against the backdrop of the Supreme Court1s decision in 
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336 U.S. 342 (1949), which set 
forth the controlling principles in this area. The Supreme Court 
held in Texas Co. — as it did again forty years later in Cotton 
Petroleum — that the question whether tax immunity should be 
extended to oil and gas lessees operating on Indian lands "is 
essentially legislative in character" and if Congress has not 
created "an immunity . . . by affirmative action," the Court will 
not imply one. Id. at 365-66. 
By no stretch of the imagination did either the 1933 
Act or its 1968 amendment grant tax immunity to oil lessees 
42. Hearings on S.391 Before the Subcom. on Indian Affairs of 
the Senate Com, on Interior and Insular Affairs. 89th Cong. 2d 
Sess. 10 (1967) (Statement of John S. Boyden). The full text of 
Chairman Boydenfs statement was attached to Defendants' Joint 
Reply Brief in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment 
before the trial court. R. 6469. 
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through "affirmative action11 by Congress. The point of Texas 
Co.. which continues to elude the Oil Companies, is that if the 
statute does not affirmatively grant tax immunity to them they 
remain subject to state and local taxation. Silence is not 
enough.43 
In short, whether any Indian Reservation, in whole or 
in part, ought to be transformed into a unique tax-free zone for 
the benefit of oil and gas companies is a legislative question, 
not a judicial one. It is a question that Congress has without 
exception resolved against oil and gas companies by refusing to 
bestow tax immunity on their reservation operations anywhere in 
the United States. 
IV. IF THE OIL COMPANIES PREVAIL IN THEIR APPEAL THIS CASE 
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
In their Opening Brief the Oil Companies do not comply 
with Rule 24(a)(10) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
which requires that they state the precise relief they seek on 
appeal. In the trial court, the Oil Companies sought only a 
partial summary judgment determining that they are exempt from 
the Utah Taxes. In their complaints, the Oil Companies have also 
asserted claims for tax refunds, to which the defendants have 
43. If, however, congressional silence is to be given some 
meaning, what meaning can be given its silence as to State 
taxation in the 1968 amendment? Faced with the situation that 
for 10 years the State had been both taxing the oil companies and 
collecting a royalty for the benefit of the Navajos residing in 
the affected area, Congress, far from correcting what in the Oil 
Companies1 view is an unintended windfall for the State of Utah, 
expanded the beneficiary class under the royalty. 
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raised defenses.44 Should the Court determine that the 1933 Act 
does pre-empt the Utah Taxes, this case should be remanded for a 
trial court determination of what, if any, refunds should be 
awarded.45 
44. These defenses include (1) refunds should not be awarded 
because of the failure of the Oil Companies to pursue diligently 
their claims; (2) the decision would represent an unexpected 
change in the law and work a hardship; and (3) the Oil Companies 
failed to perfect their refund claims. Defendants expressly 
reserve all of their defenses. 




For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Seventh 
Judicial District Court of San Juan County should be affirmed. 
DATED the 23rd day of March, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM A 
ACT OF MARCH 1, 1933 
THE 
STATUTES AT LARGE 
OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
FROM 
DECEMBER 1931 to MARCH 1933 
CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS 
RECENT TREATIES, EXECUTIVE PROCLAMATIONS AND AGREEMENTS 
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION AND 
TWENTIETH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 
EDITED. PRINTED. AND PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY OF CONGRESS 
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE 
VOL. XLVII 
IN TWO PARTS 
PABT 1—Public Acts and Resolutions, and Proposed Amendments 
to the Constitution. 
PART 2—Private Acts and Resolutions, Concurrent Resolutions 
Treaties, Executive Proclamations and Agreements 
and Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution. 
PART 1 
UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 
WASHINGTON : 19S3 
1418 72d CONGRESS. SESS. II. CHS. 159,160. MARCH l 1933. 
March 1,1033. 
(H. R. 11733.) 
[Public No. 403.] 
[CHAPTEH 160.] 
AN ACT 
To permanently set aside certain lands in Utah as an addition to the Navajo 
Indian Reservation, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
erSS^uSS111 Res" United States of America in Congress assembled. That all vacant, 
Midfi^ Sftion » Mt unreserved> and undisposed of public lands within the areas in the 
Description, southern part of the State of Utah, bounded as follows: Beginning 
at a point where the San Juan River intersects the one hundred 
and tenth degree of west longitude; thence down said river to its 
confluence with the Colorado River; thence down the Colorado River 
to a point where said river crosses the boundary line between Utah 
and Arizona; thence east along said boundary line to the one hundred 
and tenth degree of west longitude; thence north to the place of 
beginning; also beginning at a point where the west rim of Monte-
zuma Creek or wash intersects the north boundary line of the Navajo 
Indian Reservation in Utah; thence northerly along the western nm 
of said creek or wash to a point where it intersects the section line 
running east and west between sections 23 and 26, township 39 south, 
range 24 east, Salt Lake base and meridian in Utah; thence eastward 
along said section line to the northeast section corner of section JG, 
township 39 south, range 25 east; thence south one mile along the 
section line between sections 25 and 2G to the southeast section corner 
of section 26, township 39 south, range 25 east; thence eastward 
along the section line between sections 25 and 36, township 39 south, 
range 25 east, extending through township 39 south, range 26 east. 
to its intersection with the boundary line between Utah and Colo-
rado; thence south along said boundary line to its intersection with 
the north boundary line of the Navajo Indian Reservation; thence 
in a westerly direction along the north boundary line of said reser-
vation to the point of beginning be, and the same are herebv. per-
manently withdrawn from all iorms of entry or disposal for the 
benefit of the Navajo and such other Indians as the Secretary of 
the Interior may see fit to settle thereon: Provided, That no further 
allotments of lands to Indians on the public domain shall be made 
in San Juan County, Utah, nor shall further Indian homesteads 
be made in said county under the Act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat. 96; 
£^t?b!%*M ^- S. C, title 43,sec. 190). Should oil or gas be produced in paying 
suu. quantities within the lands hereby added to the Navajo Reservation, 
37% per centum of the net royalties accruing therefrom derived 
from tribal leases shall be paid to the State of Utah: Provided. That 
said 37% per centum of said royalties shall be expended by the 
Rdtnetkm on fur 
tberiUotmtats. 
Vol. 23, p. 96 
U. 8. C, p. 1338. 
Uatot 
72d CONGRESS. SESS. II. CHS. 160-162. MARCH 1, 1933. 1419 
State of Utah in the tuition of Indian children in white schools 
and/or in the building or maintenance of roads across the lands 
described in section 1 hereof, or for the benefit of the Indians residing 
therein. 




school land within the areas added to the Navajo Reservation by tracts to Indians. 
section 1 of this Act as it mav see fit in favor of the said Indians, 
and shall have the right to select other unreserved and nonmineral j ^ ! * ^ ^ of otner 
public lands contiguously or noncontiguously located within the State 
of Utah, equal in area and approximately of the same value to that 
relinquished, said lieu selections to be made in the same manner as 
is provided for in the Enabling Act of July 10. 1SD4 (25 Stat. L. J -^^ 0 9 -
107), except as to the payment of fees or commissions which are 
hereby waived. 
Approved, March 1, 1933. 
ADDENDUM B 
ACT OF MAY 17, 1968 
INDIANS—NAVAJO INDIAN RESERVATION-
USE OF FUNDS 
PUBLIC LAW 90-306; 82 STAT. 121 
[S. 391] 
An Act to amend the Act of March 1, 1933 (47 Stat. 1418), entitled "An Act 
to permanently set aside certain lands in Utah as an addition to the 
Navajo Indian Reservation, and for other purposes". 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That: 
Section 1 of the Act of March 1, 1933 (47 Stat. 1418), is amended 
by deleting all of that part of the last proviso of said section 1 after 
the word "Utah" and inserting in lieu thereof: "for the health, edu-
cation, and general welfare of the Navajo Indians residing in San 
Juan County. Planning for such expenditures shall be done in coop-
eration with the appropriate departments, bureaus, commissions, di-
visions, and agencies of the United States, the State of Utah, the 
county of San Juan in Utah, and the Navajo Tribe, insofar as it is 
reasonably practicable, to accomplish the objects and purposes of 
this Act. Contribution may be made to projects and facilities within 
said area that are not exclusively for the benefits of the beneficiaries 
hereunder in proportion to the benefits to be received therefrom by 
said beneficiaries, as may be determined by the State of Utah through 
its duly authorized officers, commissions, or agencies. An annual 
report of its accounts, operations, and recommendations concerning 
the funds received hereunder shall be made by the State of Utah, 
through its duly authorized officers, commissions, or agencies, to 
the Secretary of the Interior and to the Area Director of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs for the information of said beneficiaries." 
Approved May 17, 1968. 
ADDENDUM C 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SAN JUAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TEXACO, INC., a Delaware, 
Corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SAN JUAN j 
COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., ; 
Defendants in ] 
Intervention. ; 
> MEMORANDUM DECISION 
| ON MOTIONS FOR 
I SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Consolidated Cases 




The plaintiffs and the defendants have each 
respectively submitted motions for summary judgment and have 
both conceded that there is no dispute as to the material 
facts and that the case is in a position to be determined by 
summary judgment. The parties have submitted their legal 
memorandums and authorities together with affidavits and 
exhibits that the Court has considered, and the parties 
appeared before the Court on the 13th day of March, 1990, 
and the Court heard oral arguments relative to the Motions. 
The Court took the Motions under advisement and rules as 
here and after stated. 
Challenges have been made to the admissibiltiy of 
certain matters submitted by way of affidavit and Motions to 
Strike and responses thereto have been filed. The Court has 
reviewed those Motions and responses, and at this time 
declines to act on the Motions since the Court has concluded 
that, although some of the factual material stated is helpful 
in putting the issue before the Court in its proper 
perspective, the legal conclusions reached and expressed are 
of very limited value and, as everyone concedes, are not 
binding on the Court in any way. The Court can see no value 
in going through the Affidavits and attached materials to try 
to separate fact from legal conclusion. 
The recent cases ot the United States Supreme Court 
have pretty well put to rest any question relative to the 
right of state and local governments to tax non-Indians and 
non-Indian activity on Indian reservations. The Court will 
not cite those cases since all of the parties are aware of 
them and have cited them in their Memorandums. 
The parties here are in agreement that the issue in 
this case is "whether the act of March 1, 1933, 47 Stat. 14 18, 
which added the 'Aneth Extension' to the Navajo reservation 
preempts the state and local taxes at issue in this 
litigation". 
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Both parties also agree that the Act is completely 
silent with regard to taxation of oil and gas lessees. 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the 
instrumentality doctrine, which the plaintiffs contend was in 
affect in 1933, required express congressional authorization 
to permit state taxation on federal Indian lessees; defendants 
contend that express congressional prohibition was necessary. 
After reviewing the material and cases submitted, 
the Court has concluded that the 1933 Act setting asidrj the 
Aneth Extension was not a leasing statute and was never 
intended to address or cover the issue of oil and gas leases 
to non-Indians or the allowance or disallowance of the 
imposition of taxes by states on non-Indians lessees-
The Act took land from the public domain and added 
it to the reservation, and then provided that the state would 
receive the thirty seven and one-half percent of the royalties 
of any oil and gas that might be found, and to use such funds 
for the benefit of the Utah Navajos. 
Prior to the enactment of the 1933 Act, the State 
was entitled to receive the thirty seven and one-half percent 
royalty as its share of any oil and gas production on the 
public domain. The Act changed nothing as far as oil and gas 
lessees were concerned except to bring them under the 
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provisions of the then existing minerals leasings acts that 
applied to Indian reservations. Such acts allowed state 
taxation of non-Indian lessees. The royalty was the same 
before and after the Act, and the only change relative to oil 
and gas production was the fact that the funds received from 
royalties would go to the state of Utah for the benefit and 
use of the Utah Navajos. 
In order for the Court to add words to an act of the 
legislative body, there has to be some ambiguity or difficulty 
in determining the meaning of the Act that would require a 
search for legislative intent. This Act is not ambiguous or 
difficult to understand. When an act is silent on a subject 
matter, the Court has to assume, and rightly so, that the 
legislative body did not desire to address the unexpressed 
matter at this particular time. To reach the conclusion 
urged by the plaintiffs, the Court would not only have to 
insert in the Act the words Min lieu of taxes", but would 
also have to add "in lieu of taxes on non-Indian oil and gas 
lessees". To do so would change the entire subject matter 
covered by the Act and would go way beyond the mere interpre-
tation of some ambiguity. 
One of the very compelling reasons why the Court *-*•> 
concluded that it was never Congresses7 intent to cover 
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taxation or non-taxation in the 1933 Act of non-Indian 
lessees, is the fact that the Act was amended in 1968 and the 
royalty payments have been made and taxes have been imposed 
both before and after the amendment, and there has been no 
effort by Congress to change this long accepted procedure as 
it applies to the Aneth addition. 
Therefore, the Court has concluded that the 193 3 Act 
did not, and does not, preclude the defendants from imposing 
taxes on the plaintiffs, and the Court o r a n t s defendants 
Motions for Summary Judgment as prayed for. 
There is still one additional issue that must be 
determined before these cases can be put to rest in this 
court. 
When the plaintiffs abandoned some of their causes 
of action either by Motions to Dismiss or by Motions to Amend 
the Complaint so as to eliminate causes of action, the 
defendants moved the Court to award them reasonable attorney's 
fees incurred because of plaintiff's asserted claims that were 
later voluntarily dropped. The parties previously submitted 
their Memorandums of Legal Points and Authorities that the 
Court has considered. The Court, at that time, reserved 
ruling on the Motions relative to attorney's fees until the 
final conclusion of these cases. 
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This Court has concluded from a review of this 
Authorities submitted that under ordinary circumstances when 
a plainitff abandons a cause of action, the other party who 
has incurred legal fees in defense of the now abandoned suit 
would be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees to help 
offset the out of pocket expense incurred in the defense of 
what amounts to a non-existing claim. However, the general 
statement must be tempered by the facts peculiar to each case, 
At the time the plaintiffs filed their Complaint, 
the claims by plaintiffs presented litigimate legal issues 
that needed to be determined by a court, and the Complaints 
presented issues that had not been previously settled by any 
authoritative source that was binding upon the parties. In 
other words, there were gray areas surrounding the rights and 
procedures of the taxing authority that needed a judicial 
determination. 
Some years after the filing of the original 
Complaints, the U. S. Supreme Court accepted for 
consideration the case of Cotton Petroleum Corporation. 
et al, v. New Mexico, et al., now reported in 109 Sup. Crt. 
Rep. 1698. Pursuant to a formal order issued in these 
matters, further proceedings in these cases were stayed 
pending ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Cotton Case, 
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since it appeared that many of the previously undetermined 
issues involved in these cases were before the Supreme Court 
in that case. 
When the opinion in the Cotton case was handed down 
in April of 1989, it did decide most of the claims asserted 
by plaintiffs and made it impractical and unreasonable for 
plaintiffs to continue asserting those claims and thus, the 
Motions to Dismiss or Amend were made and granted. 
It is indicative of the fact that issues presented 
in plaintiff's original Complaints were litigimate and viable 
claims when presented is demonstrated when we note that there 
was a dissenting opinion in Cotton written by Justice 
Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. 
Under these circumstances, the Court is of the 
opinion that attorney's fees should not be allowed and, 
therefore, the Motion to Award Attorney's Fees is denied. 
The defendants, as the prevailing party in these 
actions, are entitled to their reasonable costs. 
The Court directs that the attorneys for the 
defendants prepare a formal judgment in accordance with this 
opinion. 
DATED this ^^^- day of March, 1990. 
ADDENDUM D 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Attorneys for the Local 
Defendants 
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L. Robert Anderson 
Lyle R. Anderson 
ANDERSON 6 ANDERSON, P.C. 
P. 0. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
(801) 587-2222 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
P. 0. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
(801) 587-2231 
A. Raymond Randolph 
Bruce R. Stewart 
PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEETZ 
1300 Nineteenth Street, N.w, 
7th Floor 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 828-1200 
Michael M. Quealy 
Assistant Attorney General 
1636 West North Temple 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116 
(801) 538-7227 
IN THE TAX DIVISION OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TEXACO, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, ££ frj., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, fi£ fll-# 
Defendants, 
and 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF SAN 
JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
§1 &!• , 
Defendants in 
Intervention. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Consolidated Cases 
Civil Nos. 4152-4153, 
4156-4157, 4973-4977 
This matter came before the Court, Honorable Boyd 
Bunnell presiding, on March 13, 1990, in the courtroom at the San 
Juan County Public Safety Building in Monticello, Utah, for 
hearing on Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
November 13, 1989 ("Defendants' Motion"), and Plaintiffs' Joint 
Motion for Summary Judgment, dated December 20, 1989 
("Plaintiffs' Cross Motion"). The parties had submitted various 
motions in connection with their Motion and Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment, but these ancillary motions were not argued at 
the hearing. 
The following counsel appeared at the hearing 
representing the parties indicated: 
Counsel Parti?? Rgpre?ents<3 
A. Raymond Randolph State of Utah; Utah State Tax 
Bruce R. Stewart Commission; and related State 
PEPPER, HAMILTON & SCHEET2 Defendants 
Special Assistant Attorneys 
General 
Lyle R. Anderson San Juan County; Board of 
ANDERSON & ANDERSON, P.C Education of San Juan County 
School District; and related 
Local Defendants 
Bruce D, Black Texaco, Inc. 
CAMPBELL & BLACK 
Kevin N. Anderson Exxon Corporation 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
Exxon counsel Kevin N. Anderson stated that Mr. John 
K. Mangum of Nielson & Senior, counsel for Mobil Exploration and 
Producing North America, Inc. ("Mobil") and Union Oil Company of 
California ("Union"), had authorized him to state that Mobil and 
Union joined in the arguments presented by the other plaintiffs 
at the hearing. 
The Court heard the arguments of the parties and 
considered the memoranda and other documents submitted by each 
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party in support of its position. The Court finds that the 
following relevant facts are undisputed: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1* Plaintiffs are corporations authorized to do 
business in the State of Utah. 
2. Plaintiffs have leases from the Navajo Tribe of 
Indians covering lands within the Utah portion of the Navajo 
Indian Reservation (the "Utah Strip")• Those leases were issued 
to plaintiffs between 1953 and 1974 pursuant to the Indian 
Mineral Leasing Act of 1938; 52 Stat. 347, 25 U.S.C. § 396a ££ 
sea, (the "1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act"). 
3. The first lands in Utah were added by Executive 
Order to the Navajo Reservation in 1884. Additional lands were 
added by Executive Order in 1905 and a portion of the lands that 
had been added in 1884 were withdrawn in 1892 by Executive Order. 
4. Certain of the lands within the Utah Strip in 
which plaintiffs have oil and gas leases from the Navajo Tribe 
were added to the Navajo Reservation by the Act of March 1, 1933, 
47 Stat. 1418 (the "1933 Act"). Those lands, which consist cf 
approximately 52,000 acres, run North and East of Montezuma 
Creek, Utah to the Utah-Colorado state line. This tract is 
commonly referred to as the Aneth Extension. 
5. The 1933 Act, as amended by the Act of May 17, 
1968, 82 Stat. 121, allocates 37.5% of all royalties on 
production from the Aneth Extension to the State of Utah, to it 
used for the health, education and welfare of Navajos living in 
San Juan County, Utah. 
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6. The great majority of plaintiffs' leases in the 
Aneth Extension carry royalties of one-eighth of production- A 
few carry royalties of one-sixth of production. 
7. Prior to passage of the 1933 Act, the lands in 
what became the Aneth Extension had been part of the public 
domain and subject to leasing under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act 
of 1920, 41 Stat. 450 (now codified at 30 U.S.C. § 181 §£ seq.) 
(the "1920 Act*). The 1920 Act expressly permitted state 
taxation of production from any such leases, and also allocated 
37.5% of royalties on that production to the states in which the 
production occurred. 
8. Prior to passage of the 1933 Act, there were 
negotiations between the State of Utah, local citizens, and the 
federal government, concerning the specific language of the 1933 
Act. As a result of those negotiations, the 1933 Act included a 
provision allocating 37.5% of royalties to the State of Utah for 
the benefit of the Utah Navajos resident on the Aneth Extension. 
Also as a result of the negotiations, the Act barred any 
additional applications for homesteads or allotments by the 
Indians living on the Aneth Extension. 
9. At the time the 1933 Act was passed, the Indian 
Oil Leasing Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 244 (now codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 398) (the "1924 Act"), for "bought and paid for" lands, and the 
Indian Oil Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1347 (now codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 398c) (the "1927 Act"), for executive order reservations, 
provided the only congressional authorization for oil and gas 
leasing on Indian lands. Both the 1924 Act and the 1927 Act 
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explicitly authorized state taxation of production from any such 
Indian lands. 
10. Plaintiffs (or their predecessors) discovered oil 
within the Aneth Extension in the mid-1950's. They have 
developed those discoveries and formed units for secondary and 
tertiary recovery. Plaintiffs continue to produce oil and gas 
from the Aneth Extension at the present time. 
11. Plaintiffs (or their predecessors) have paid taxes 
to defendants on their property and operations within the Utah 
Strip since the mid-1950's. The Navajo Tribe began to tax 
plaintiffs' property and operations in 1978. Beginning in 1978, 
plaintiffs paid some or all of their taxes to defendants under 
protest. They filed these lawsuits in 1979, challenging the Oil 
and Gas Severance Tax (formerly the Mining Occupation Tax), 
imposed by § 59-5-101, s£ sea.. Utah Code (1989); the Oil and 
Gas Conservation Tax, imposed by § 40-6-14, Utah Code (1989); the 
Corporate Franchise Tax, imposed by §§ 59-7-101, si seq. Utah 
Code (1989); the Sales and Use Tax, imposed by §§ 59-12-101, et 
sea,, and §§ 11-9-1, si seq, Utah Code (1989); and the Property 
Tax, imposed by §§ 59-2-101, si sea., Utah Code (1989) 
(collectively the "Utah Taxes"). The Utah Taxes as applied to 
plaintiffs' operations average 5-6% of production. 
12. All plaintiffs have conceded for the purpose of 
this litigation that their exploration, development and 
production decisions relating to their properties on the Utah 
Strip, including the Aneth Extension, have not been adversely 
affected by the Utah Taxes. See Memorandum Decision on Motion 
5 
for Order to Compel and Motions for Protective Order (dated 
November 9, 1987), as modified by Order Modifying Prior 
Memorandum Decision of November 9, 1987, and Setting Trial 
Schedule (dated December 22, 1987). 
13. Since January 1, 1978, plaintiffs have produced 
over $1.5 billion of oil and gas from the Utah Strip. 
14. During the same time period, plaintiffs have paid 
approximately $80 million in the Utah Taxes at issue in this 
litigation. 
15. Plaintiffs have paid more in taxes to the Navajo 
Tribe since January 1, 1978, than in the Utah Taxes at issue. 
16. None of the Utah Taxes at issue in this litigation 
have been assessed with respect to the Navajo Tribe's share of 
production. 
17. Defendants have necessarily incurred reasonable 
costs in the amount of $6,000.00 in defending against the claims 
of plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the Court makes 
the following conclusions of law: 
1. Under the United States Supreme Court's decision 
in Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 109 S. Ct. 1698 (1989), state 
taxes on non-Indian oil and gas lessees will be "upheld unless 
expressly or impliedly prohibited by Congress." 109 S. Ct, at 
1706. Nothing in the legislative history of the 1938 Indian 
Mineral Leasing Act or its contemporaneous setting suggests any 
such intent to prohibit state taxes on the part of Congress, li. 
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at 1710. Indeed, the Act manifests Congress' "intent to permit 
state taxation of non-[Indian] lessees." Id. at 17U. 
2. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Cotton 
Petroleum, all ten of the original plaintiffs moved to dismiss 
with prejudice those claims controlled by Cotton Petrolg^. six 
of those plaintiffs also moved to dismiss with prejudice all of 
their remaining claims, removing them entirely from this 
litigation. The remaining plaintiffs — Texaco, Exxon, Mobil and 
Union — have continued to pursue only those claims under the 
1933 Act (and certain state statutory, constitutional and 
Enabling Act claims that plaintiffs contend provide background to 
their 1933 Act claims). 
3. The 1933 Act is silent on the question of state 
taxation. 
4. The language, history and contemporaneous setting 
of the 1933 Act show that Congress did not intend to address in 
the Act the issue of the taxability of non-Indian oil and gas 
lessees on the Aneth Extension. 
5. The 1933 Act was not a leasing statue. If the 
leasing of lands in the Aneth Extension had been intended when 
the 1933 Act was passed, any such leasing would have had to have 
taken place under either the 1924 Act or the 1927 Act, both of 
which authorized taxation by states of non-Indian producers of 
oil and gas. 
6. The 1933 Act changed neither the taxability of 
non-Indians within the Aneth Extension nor the allocation of 
royalties from production from the Aneth Extension. It only 
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removed lands from the public domain, set them aside for Indians, 
and imposed greater restrictions on the use of the 37.5% of the 
royalty allocated to the State of Utah. 
7. The Court finds no ambiguity in the 1933 Act. To 
read the 1933 Act as plaintiffs suggest, the Court would have to 
insert in the Act the words "in lieu of taxes on non-Indian oil 
and gas lessees.* To do so would change the very subject matter 
of the Act and go beyond the mere interpretation of an ambiguity 
which, in any event, does not exist. 
8. The amendment of the 1933 Act supports the Court's 
conclusion that the 1933 Act does not preclude defendants from 
imposing the Utah Taxes on plaintiffs. When Congress amended the 
Act in 1968, these plaintiffs and other producers had been paying 
to the State of Utah both royalties and taxes on production from 
the Aneth Extension for over ten years. Congress' decision in 
1968 not to interfere in this scheme demonstrates conclusively 
congressional approval of the receipt by Utah of both tax and 
royalty income from the Aneth Extension. 
9. Plaintiffs have either abandoned all their other 
theories for invalidation of the Utah Taxes, or failed seriously 
to assert them here. The Court finds all such other theories to 
be without merit. 
10. Because the claims initially presented to this 
Court by plaintiffs, although later abandoned, involved 
legitimate legal issues that needed to be determined, the Court 
will award no attorneys' fees to defendants. 
8 
11. Defendants are, however, the prevailing parties in 
this litigation and are entitled to recover their reasonable 
costs in the amount of $6,000.00. 
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Supreme Court of tfje Winitth States 
OCTOBER TEUM, 1948. 
No. 40 
OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION, Petitioner 
v. 
T11 K TEXAS COM I»AN Y 
No. 41 
OKLAHOMA TAX COMMISSION, Petitioner 
v. 
MAMXOLIA PETROLEUM COMPANY 
On Writs of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Oklahoma 
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS 
AMICUS CURIAE 
OPINIONS BELOW 
In No. 40, the District Court of Oklahoma 
County did not lile an opinion, and the opinion of 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (No. 40, R. 36-39} 
2 
mission did not file an opinion and the opinion of 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma (No. 41, R. 30-31) 
is not reported. 
JURISDICTION 
In both eases the judgments of the Supreme 
(•oui1 of Oklahoma were entered on Septcml>er 
23, 11)47 (No. 40, R. 3G-39; NO. 41, R. 30-31). and 
petitions for rehearing were denied on January 27, 
1948 (No. 40, R. 42; No. 41, R. 34). Appeals wen-
hied in this Court on February 18 and 19, 1948. 
(No. 40, R. 4G-49; No. 41, R. 3G-38.) 
On April 19, 1948, the appeals in these cases were 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Treating the 
papers whereon the appeals were allowed as |K»ti-
tions for writs of certiorari, the Court granted the 
petit ions, the cases were consolidated for argument, 
and the Solicitor (Scncral was requested to tile a 
brief as auucits curiae. (No. 40, R. 60; No. 41, R. 
1(>3). Tin* jurisdiction of this Court rests ou Sec-
tion 237(b) of the Judicial Code, as amended. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether, under the Constitution of the 
l/nited States, a lessee of restricted allotted Indian 
lauds is immune from Oklahoma taxes on his gross 
income and on his portion of the gross production 
derived from such lands. 
2. Whether, if such constitutional immunity 
3 
created an immunity for the lessee against the im-
position of these taxes. 
STATUTES INVOLVED 
The applicable portions of the statutes involved 
are set forth in the Appendix, infra, pp. 41-51. 
STATEMENT 
In No. 40, the taxpayer, the Texas Company, 
brought suit in the District Court for Oklahoma 
County against the Oklahoma Tax Commission to 
recover certain taxes asserted to have been illegally 
collected. The taxpayer's petition (No. 40, R. 
3-10) and amended petition (No. 40, R. 29-30) 
stated that it was the owner of oil and gas leases 
to certain specified properties which were restric-
ted lands of members of the Kiowa and Apache 
Indian Tribes, title to which was held in trust by 
the United States pursuant to the General Allot-
ment Act, as amended, and that the Indian lessors, 
in making the leases, were subject to the super-
vision and control of the United States Govern-
ment. Asserting that the imposition of the Okla-
homa gross production and petroleum excise taxes 
on the oil produced from these leases would con-
stitute a burden and restriction on an instrumental-
ity and agency of the Federal Government and 
would violate the Constitution of the United States, 
the petition claimed that the taxes so imposed were 
illegal and void. The taxpayer sought recovery of 
4 
the gross production and petroleum excise taxes 
which it had paid with respect to its working inter-
est in the production from these leases during the 
months of September, October and November, 1!M2. 
The lower court sustained a demurrer filed by the 
Oklahoma Tax Commission. (No. 40, It. 31.) The 
Supreme Court of Oklahoma reversed, with direc-
tions to overrule the demurrer. (No. 40, K. :MI.) 
No. 41 involved consolidated proceedings before 
the Oklahoma Tax Commission with respect to ad-
ditional assessments proposed against the tax 
payer, Magnolia Petroleum Company, for gms? 
product ion and petroleum excise taxes on its in 
terest in the production from certain specifm 
leases tor the period June 1,1!M2 to March «H, 1JMI 
together with penalties. (No. 41, R. 47-50, 5t-.Vi 
5*M»0, <»r>-(>7.) The stipulations of facts before tin 
Oklahoma Tax Commission (No. 41, R. (MS 
showed that the leases in question in which lh< 
taxpayer possessed a working interest were exc 
ruled by allottees, or heirs and devisees of allottee-
of members of the Citizen Pottawatomie, Apache 
Comanche, and Otoe and Missouria Indian Tribe.* 
that the allotted lands were held under land cer 
titicates or trust deeds, that the leases were aji 
proved by the United States Department of In 
terior, and that, in some instances, all or part o 
the lessor's interest was owned by non-Indians dm 
ing the taxable periods. The Oklahoma Tax (\mi 
mission ordered the proposed assessments approve 
5 
(No. 41, li. 26-28), but the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa reversed the order, with directions that the 
assessments be vacated (No. 41, R. 31). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A. The Oklahoma gross production and petro-
leum excise taxes may be validly imposed on a les-
see of restricted allotted Indian lands so as to reach 
his interest in the oil and gas produced. Earlier 
decisions of this Court holding that taxes of this 
nature may not be asserted against the lessee be-
cause of an implied constitutional immunity 
(Jloirard v. Gipsy OH Co., 247 U. S. 503; Large Oil 
Co. v. J/oirard, 248 U. 8. 549) are basically incon-
sistent with subsequent rulings, and ought to be 
direct I v overruled. It is now well established that 
contractors or lessees of the United States are not 
immune from non-discriminatory taxes of this 
kind, the validity of the tax not being affected by 
the possible economic effects on the Federal Gov-
ernment. Moreover, the taxation of the lessees 
hen; has no direct economic consequences to the 
(iovernment. 
The present line of decisions denying the exist-
ence of an implied constitutional immunity for 
Federal lessees or contractors against local taxa-
tion has not drawn any distinction between taxes 
measured by net income, gross income or physical 
production. Accordingly, when it became settled 
that the State could impose a tax measured by the 
6 
net income of the lessees of restricted Indian lands, 
it similarly meant that the State could impose a 
non-discriminatory tax measured by their gross in-
come or gross physical production. 
The gross production tax in issue here, more-
over, is imposed in lieu of other ad valorem taxes 
on the property and equipment of the lessee used in 
connection with his operations. Since the State 
may tax the value of such property directly by an 
ad valorem tax, there is no reason to deny it the 
right to lax the same property interests by another 
type of tax, especially since, though measured by 
gross production in the first instance, the amount 
of the exaction is ultimately measured by what the 
ad ralorcm taxes would have been. 
I>. Congress has not acted to establish a stat-
utory immunity for lessees of restricted Indian 
lands, and none is to be implied from its legislative 
silence. While Congress has, on prior occasions, 
subjected the mineral production from certain 
lands to local taxation (thereby also causing the 
lessees to be taxed under the then prevailing con-
stitutional doctrine), this cannot be construed as 
an assertion of immunity for other lessees. Differ-
ences in Congressional policy respecting the tax-
able status of Indian lands do not, by implication, 
create similar differences with respect to the pri-
vate lessees. When the doctrine of implied consti-
tutional immunity for private lessees was over-
turned by this Court, Congress was entitled to as-
7 
sume that every lessee would be subject to all local, 
non-discriminatory taxes, unaffected bv whether 
the royalties of their Indian lessors were or were 
not immune from taxation. There is no compelling 
reason why Congress should have acted to create an 
immunity for the lessees here, and there is no rea-
son why any should be implied in the absence of a 
direct expression of Congressional policy in favor 
of the creation of siu-h an immunity. 
ARGUMENT 
L M I I I I of Restricted Allotted Indian Lands Are Not Im-
mune From the Oklahoma Gross Production and Pe-
troleum Excise Taxes 
A. No Constitutional Immunity Exists 
1. Introductory. These cases involve the valid-
ity of the Oklahoma gross production tax (68 0. S. 
11)41, Sections 821-840, as amended by Article 1, 
Section 2, Laws, 1947, p. 495 (68 O. S. 1947 Supp., 
Section 827)), and of the Oklahoma petroleum ex-
cise tax (68 O. S. 1941, Sections 12181-1218q; Scss. 
Laws 1943, title 68, c. 26, p. 189) as applied to op-
erators of oil and gas leases on restricted allotted 
lands of Indians, the leases having been approved 
by the Secretary of the Interior as required by law. 
The lands involved are restricted against aliena-
tion and, for the most part, are held in trust by the 
United States, pursuant to allotments under the 
(leneral Allotment Acl,' for various members of 
1
 Act of February 8, 1887, c. 11!). 24 Stat. 388, as amended. 
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the Pottawatomie, Kiowa, Apache, Comanche, Otoe 
and Missouri Indian tribes.2 In both cases the Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma, one Justice dissenting, 
held that the lessees or the leases were federal in-
strumentalities, and that, in the absence of permis-
sive action by Congress or appropriate waiver of 
immunity, the lessees were not constitutionally sub-
jeet to tax with respect to the production of oil and 
the oil produced. 
We believe that the court below erred in holding 
that the lessees possess any immunity with respect 
to these taxes. It is our view that the State of Ok-
lahoma has full authority to require the lessees to 
pay non-discriminatory taxes measured by the 
value or amount of oil and gas produced—oil and 
gas in which the lessees, and they alone, have any 
interest. The lessees, absent any express Congrcs-
>i«>nal action to exempt them from local exactions, 
- Allotments were made under the General Allotment Act 
to members of flic Citizen R«ud of Pottawatomie Indians in 
conformity with the agreement of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 
1016. Allotments were made to members of the Kiowa, 
Comanche and Apache tribes pursuant to the agreement ap-
proved June 6, 1000, 31 Stat. 676, the land being held in 
trust by the United States in the same manner as provided 
for in the General Allotment Act. Allotments were made 
to the Otoe or Missouri Indians under the General Allot-
ment Aet without any special agreement. See Mills, Okla-
homa Indian Land Laws (192i), Section 438. Lands al-
lotted under the General Allotment Act were to be. held in 
trust by the United States for a period of twenty-five year*, 
and the trust periods here involved have been extended from 
lini»* to time. 
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do not possess any immunity from these Oklahoma 
taxes merely because they are engaged in the busi-
ness of producing oil and gas from restricted lands, 
and because they are operating under leases which 
have been approved by the Secretary of the In-
terior. 
These cases do not involve any taxes levied on 
or measured by the royalty oil or its proceeds and, 
hence, do not present any question respecting the 
tax immunity of the Indians whose restricted lands 
have been leased. Accordingly, we express no views 
whether these taxes would be valid if imposed on or 
measured by the royalty oil. See Carpenter v. 
Shaw, 280 U. S. 363. 
2. The nature of the taxes. The Oklahoma gross 
production tax which is involved here is equal to 5 
per centum of the gross value of the production in 
the case of petroleum, crude oil or other mineral 
oil, and natural gas and casinghead gas. The tax is 
required to be paid by every person engaged in the 
production of these mineral products. The tax is 
also levied on the royalty interests, and is made a 
lien on such interests. It is provided, however, that 
where the royalty is claimed to be exempt from tax-
ation by law, the facts on which the exemption is 
claimed are to be reported. C8 0. S. 1941, Section 
821. 
The statute levying the tax states that it is in lieu 
of all taxes by the State and its political sub-
divisions on any property rights with respect to the 
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minerals, producing leases, mineral rights or priv-
ileges, machinery and equipment used in and 
around any well producing oil and gas, the oil and 
gas during the tax year in which produced, and 
any investment in any of the leases, rights, priv-
ileges, minerals, or other property mentioned. The 
State Hoard of equalization is given power to raise 
or lower the gross production tax where, if im-
posed, it is greater or less than would he the gen-
eral ml ralorcw tax for all purposes on the prop-
erty of the produeer suhjeet to taxation in the dis-
triet or districts where situated, Revision of the 
amount of tax is suhjeet to review by the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma. (>8 O. S. 1941, Section 821. 
A gross production tax on oil, gas and other min-
erals (the levy being in addition to any ad rnlornn 
taxes) was instituted by Oklahoma in 1908. Sess. 
Laws, 1!MIK, e. 71, Art ide 11, Section 0, p. 642. This 
was the statute before this Court in Choctaw d-
(,'nlf /.*.//. v. Harrison, 235 U. S. 292, where, as 
applied to a lessee of restricted Indian coal lands, 
it was construed to be an occupational tax and an 
unconstitutional burden on a federal instrumental-
ity. This interpretation was contrary to that 
adopted in MeAlestcr-Edwards Coal Co. v. Trapp, 
4*.> Okl. 310, in which the court considered the 1910 
re-enaetmeut of the statute (Sess. Laws, 1910, c. 44, 
Section (». p. 07) (where an additional provision 
was inserted permitted the producer to deduct the 
amount of royalties paid for the benefit of an In-
11 
diau tribe), and in which it was held that, the tax 
being on the value of the product, less the royalties 
to Indians, the levy was a property tax which could 
be validly imposed on a lessee of restricted Indian 
lands. 
The gross production tax was extensively revised 
in 1915 (Sess. Laws, 1915, c. 107, Article 2, Sub-
division A, p. 151 )t and again in .191(5 (Sess. Laws, 
191(i, <\ IJ9, p. U)2),:t one of the primary changes 
being to impose the tax in lieu of all other ad 
valorem taxes.4 
3
 The basic sections of the present statute are derived from 
these provisions. Further amendments were made by Sess. 
Laws, 11)33, e. 103, p. 198, and by Sess. Laws, 1935, c. 66, 
Article 4, p. 271. 
4
 The Oklahoma Supreme Court at first expressed the view 
that the 1915 amendments did not alter the essential struc-
ture of the statute and, following the Clwctaw d Gulf R. R. 
decision, ruled that the tax was not a property but an occu-
pation tax. In re Gross Production Tax of Wolverine Oil Co., 
53 Okl. 24. It, however, was quick to recede from this posi-
tion. In Large Oil Co. v. Iloward, 63 Okl. 143, reversed per 
curiamf 248 U. S. 54!), it construed the tax, as amended by 
Sess. Laws, 1916, c. 39, p. 102, to be a tax on property, and 
considered tbat it could be validly levied on a lessee of re-
stricted lands; the Wolverine case, supra, was distinguished 
because of changes made in the 1916 legislation. See also 
Whitehall v. Howard, 63 Okl. 176. The holding of the Wol-
verine case, so far as it denied that the tax was a property 
tax, was later specifically overruled in In re Skelton Lead & 
Zinc Co.'* Gross Production Tax, 1019, 81 Okl. 134, and this 
was reiterated in lieryhb Oil d' Gu* Co. v. Howard, 82 Okl. 
176. Following the Skclton ease, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court has consistently held for all purposes that the tax is 
a property tax which is in lieu of other ad valorem taxes. 
V 
The new tax, however, was held unconstitutional 
as applied to a lessee of restricted Indian lands in 
the per curiam decisions in La rye Oil Co. V. llotr-
tint, 24s l". S. 54!), and Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 
217 l \ S. 51M. The fact that, unlike the statute 
considered in the Choctaw d- Gulf li.lt. ease, the 
gross production tax was imposed in lieu of ad 
valorem taxes was not commented on by this Court 
in those decisions. The Oklahoma Supreme Court, 
nevertheless, perservered for a time. In In re SUel-
ton Lead «('• Zinc Co.'s Gross Production Tax, 191V, 
SI Okl. i:>4, the court refused to accept the Laryc 
Oil Co. and Gipsy Oil Co. decisions as studied eval-
uations of the changes in the statutory provisions.* 
A Iter Gilh spie v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 504-505, 
where, in holding invalid an Oklahoma net income 
tax on a leasee's income from restricted lauds, Jus-
tire Holmes expressed the view that the Howard 
and Gipsy Oil cases had not been inadvertent de-
cisions and that the statutory differences from 
those prc.-ciricd in the Choctaw <0 Gulf K.lt. cast 
had not been of any moment, the Supreme Court ot 
In IT Protest of liimlehni, Ayrnt. 82 Okl. 97; In re Protnn 
of V. S. Smelting, Refining A Mining Co., 82 Okl. 106; In r 
Protisl of St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co., 82 Okl. 12fi 
See al*o: Mniieithir v. Lovett, 16(> Okl. 73; American (h 
tt Refining Co. v. Cornish, 173 Okl. 470; State v. India 
Rogaltg Co., 177 Okl. 238; I'elat v. (Umuivkarl, 1!)1 Okl. 5!K 
6
 The same view was expressed in In re Protest of Bcndclar 
Agtnt, 82 Okl. 07, and was followed in In re Protest of U. I 
Smelting. Rt fining d- Mining Co., 82 Okl. 106. 
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Oklahoma accepted the proposition that the gross 
production tax, even though in lieu of other ad 
valorem taxes, could not be levied on the lessee. See 
AtchiHon, 1\ <<; S.FM. Co. v. McCurdy, 86 Okl. 148. 
The remaining provisions of the taxes involved 
may be briefly reviewed. Seventy-eight percent of 
the gross production tax is paid into the State 
Treasury, and is available for the general expenses 
of the state government. One-tenth of the sum is 
payable to the County Treasurer of the county 
whore the oil or gas is produced, and is available 
for the construction and maintenance of county 
highways. Ten percent is also payable to the 
County Treasurer for distribution among the vari-
ous school districts in the county. The remaining 
two percent is placed to the credit of the Oklahoma 
Tax Commission, and is available for collection and 
enforcement activities. 0*8 O. S. 1941, Section 827, 
as amended by Article 1, Section 2, Laws, 1947, p. 
495 (<>8 0. S. Supp. 1947, Section 827). 
The gross production tax becomes due on the 
first day of each calendar month with respect to 
production during the preceding monthly period. 
On oil or gas sold at the time of production, the tax 
is to be paid by the purchaser who, in making set-
tlement with the producer and royalty owner, is 
authorized to deduct the amount of the tax paid. 
Where the fax is due before the oil is sold, and 
where the oil has been retained by the producer, he 
is required to pay the tax including that due on the 
14 
royalty oil not sold, and he is authorized, in settling 
with the royalty owner, to deduct the amount of tax 
paid on the royally oil, or to deduct royalty oil 
equivalent in value to the amount of the tax paid. 
CS (). S. 1!U1, Section 833. The tax is made a first 
and paramount lien against the purchaser's or pro-
ducer's property, as the case may he. 68 O. S. 1941, 
Section 81)6. 
The petroleum excise tax dates from 15>3*5 when 
Oklahoma adopted a proration law to prevent the 
waste of crude petroleum and natural gas (Sess. 
Laws, 1933, c. 1**1, p. 278) and enacted an excise tax 
which was to he used ,to defray the expenses of ad-
ministering the provisions of the proration law 
(Sess. Laws, 1933, c. 132, p. 301). Since that time 
a new excise tax has heen enacted at each succeed-
ing session of the legislature.6 
The Oklahoma petroleum excise tax is one-eighth 
of a cent (one mill after July 1, 1943—See 1943 
statute, footnote (>) per harrel on each and every 
harrel of petroleum oil produced in the State 
<»f Oklahoma. The tax is to be collected in the same 
manner as that provided for the gross production 
tax. As in the case of the gross production tax, 
the petroleum excise tax is paid by the purchaser, 
« Sess. Laws. l!i:r», c. 59, Article 2, p. 236; Sess. Laws, 1937 
v. 59. Article 2, p. 396; SONS. I^IWS, 193!), c. 59, Article 2, j> 
412; Ness, fiiiws, 1911, Title (18. «. 26, p. 380; HttM. LMWI 
1943, Title 08, e. 20, p. ISO; Sess. Laws, 1945, Title 68, c 
26. p. 273; Sess. Lows, 1947, Title 68, c. 26, p. 461. 
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who is authorized to deduct the payment in settling 
with the producer and royalty owner and, where 
the oil is not sold hut is retained by the producer, 
the tax is payable by him, but he is authorized to 
make a similar deduction when settling with the 
loyalty owner. 68 O. S. 1941, Section 12181. The 
monies collected are deposited to the credit of the 
"Conservation Fund" and the "Interstate Oil 
Compact Fund of Oklahoma." 68 0. S. 1941, Sec-
tion 1218m. The excise taxes due in the present 
cases have since expired, but have been replaced by 
similar taxes. See 08 O. S. Supp. 1947, Sections 
1220.1-1220.7. Unlike the gross production tax 
which, as previously referred to, is regarded by 
Oklahoma as a property tax, the petroleum excise 
lax is construed to be an excise tax on the produc-
tion of oil. Harvsdall Itcfineries v. Oklahoma Tax 
Commission, 171 Old. 145, affirmed, 296 U. S. 521. 
3. The taxes are constitutional. The decisions 
below are erroneous in resting on the proposition 
that Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522; 
Lanje Oil Co. v. Howard, 248 U. S. 549; Howard v. 
(tipsif Oil Co., 247 U. S. 503; and, presumably, 
Choctaw <f- (Half ll.lt. v. Harrison, 235 U.S. 292, re-
quire that a lessee be held immune from the Okla-
homa gioss production and petroleum excise taxes 
on his share of the oil and gas derived from re-
stricted allotted Indian lands. Those decisions, 
based as they were on a doctrine of implied consti-
tutional immunity for ageucies or instrumental-
10 
ties of ihe United States, are so thoroughly incon-
sistent with the subsequent course of decisions of 
this Court that they may no longer be regarded as 
possessing any authority as precedents. While 
these eases have not been expressly overruled, they 
have in effect been rejected by the decisions which 
overturned the doctrinal basis on which they had 
rested. 
The inmiunitv from local taxation of allotted 
lands held in trust by the United States under the 
(Jcneral Allotment Act did not arise from an ex-
press assertion of such immunity by Congress, but 
was held to exist because legal title to the lands was 
held in trust bv the United States and because the 
subjection of the lands to local taxation would 
thwart the governmental policy of protecting the 
allottees dining the period in which they wen* to 
prepare for the assumption of "the habits of civ-
ilized life, and ultimately the privileges of citizen-
ship. " I 'nitvd States v. Uickert, 188 U. S. 432, 4:;7, 
4-V.). See also I 'irited States v. Board of Com V.s of 
Fremont County, Wyo., 145 P. 2d 329 (C. C. A. 
10th), certiorari denied, 323 U. S. 804.7 
7
 As previously stated (supra, p. 7), there is no issue 
in this ease rejjardinjr the application of the taxes to the 
royalty oil. the taxpayers having paid or been assessed only 
with respect to production less the royalties. While the Okla-
homa Ktiitute docs not explicitly provide how the producer is 
to 1M» taxed where the royalty oil is immune from taxation, 
it. would seem that he has no liability for the taxes on the 
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The immunity of these lands from taxation was 
further extended to non-Indian lessees of the land 
and to their income derived from the land. See 
the remarks of Justice Black in Oklahoma Tax 
Comm'n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598, 603-604. 
Thus, in invalidating the original Oklahoma gross 
production tax as applied to a lessee of restricted 
Indian lands in Choctaw <fc Gulf R.R. v. Harrison, 
supra, the lessee was regarded as the *4 instrumen-
tality'' employed by the Federal Government, and 
was ruled to be exempt from the tax which the 
Court considered as being tantamount to an occu-
pational tax. In Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 
U. S. 522, it was the lease itself which was regarded 
as the federal instrumentality and immune from a 
direct property tax, it being reasoned that (p. 
530)— 
royalties where they arc non-taxable. See American Oil ift 
Refining Co. v. Cornish, 173 Okl. 470, where the lease was 
from a municipality and it was assumed that the lessee had 
no responsibility for paying the gross production tax on the 
royalty oil, although he was held liable for the tax on his 
share of the oil produced. Accordingly, there is no present 
need to consider the taxable status of the royalty oil. See 
Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U. S. 363, holding that oil royalties 
received from allotted lands, lands which were expressly de-
clared by statute to be non-taxable, were not subject to the 
gross production tax, it being ruled that the tax was not on 
the severed oil but on the lessor's interest in the property. 
Cf. Chateau v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 691; Superintendent v. Com-
missioner, 295 U. S. 418, and Leahy v. State Treasurer, 297 
U. S. 420, holding that such royalty income may be taxed 
under federal and state income tax statutes. 
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A tax upon the leases is a tax upon the power 
to make them, and could be used to destroy the 
power to make them. 
The Choctaw cO Gulf R.H. and Indian Oil Co. eases, 
supra, were the only authorities relied on in the 
pvr curiam dispositions of Larye Oil Co. v. Howard 
and Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., supra, where the later 
enactments of the gross production tax were held 
invalid with respect to lessees of restricted lands. 
The theory of an implied constitutional immu-
nity as extended to such lessees roughly paralleled 
that accorded to private contractors of the (Jovern-
meiit where the rationale was also in terms of "in-
strumentality" and "the power to destroy." Sec 
Williams v. Talladeya, 22(> U. S. 404. It reached 
its culmination in Gillvspiv v. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 
5<H, which denied the State of Oklahoma the power 
to impose a net income tax on the non-Tndian les-
>ce\s income derived from restricted Indian lands. 
The Court there arrived at its decision by relying 
on the previous rulings invalidating the gross pro-
duction tax and the ad valorem tax on the lease it-
self, stating (p. 506): 
The same considerations that invalidate a tax 
upon the leases invalidate a tax upon the 
protits of the leases, and, stopping short of 
theoretical possibilities, a tax upon such profits 
is a direct hamper upon the effort of the 
United States to make the best terms that it 
can for its wards. 
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The Gillespie case, as was true of Indian Oil Co. v. 
Oklahoma and Choctaw & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison, 
supra, was decided on the ground that the lessee or 
the lease was an instrumentality selected by the 
Federal Government to effectuate its policy toward 
the restricted lands of the Indians. The same doc-
trine was applied and the Gillespie decision was 
followed in Burnet v. Coronado Oil dc Gas Co., 285 
U. S. 393," where it was held that the federal in-
come tax could not be applied to a lessee of oil lands 
of the State of Oklahoma, it being said (pp. 400-
401): 
To tax the income of the lessee * * * would 
amount to an imposition upon the lease itself. 
The infirmity of the grounds on which this con-
stitutional immunity rested had become fully ap-
parent (See James v. Drnvo Contracting Co., 302 
U. S. 134, and the cases cited supra, in. 8) when 
Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U. S. 
376, again raised the question of the authority of 
the Federal Government to impose a net income tax 
on a lessee of state-owned oil lands. Upon a re-
examination of the matter, it was there held that 
8
 Decisions subsequent to the Gillespie case had already 
made g^eat inroads in the doctrine of implied immunity. 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514; Willcuts v. Jtunn, 
282 U. 8. 216; Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509; Group No. 1 
Oil Corp. v. Bass, 283 U. S. 279. These decisions, and others, 
convinced the four Justices who dissented in the Coronado 
case thut the Gillespie decision ought to be overrule 
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no constitutional barrier stood to deny Congress 
the power to impose the tax;* after determining 
that 11 nnut v. Coronado Oil tf- Gas Co., supra, and 
Gillespie v. Oklahoma were incorrectly decided, 
both cases were expressly overruled. 
The direct, repudiation of those eases meant more 
than a reversal of decisions respecting the imposi-
tion of a net income tax on private lessees. It, to-
gether with the consistent course of decisions since 
James v. Draco Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134, 
marks the complete destruction of the principles 
on which these lessees were once held immune from 
iiou-disrritiiiiiatory taxation on their property or 
income. This conclusion seems to have been shared 
h\ boih the majority and dissenting opinions in 
Oklahoma Tax Comm 'n v. Vnited States, 319 U. S. 
5!)KjMKM)04,(iir>. 
If nothing more, the fact that the Gillespie case 
had strictly followed the reasoning of the Clioetair 
<l*- Gulf 11.11. and Indian Oil Co. opinions, and had 
also strongly relied on the Gipsy Oil Co. and Lanje 
Oil ('o. decisions, would be most persuasive that all 
those authorities fell along with Gillespie, even 
though it was not necessary to the decision in Moan-
tain Producers that they be expressly overruled at 
that time. 
The verv basis of the decision in the Mountain 
Producers case was to deny the proposition that 
• Aivoiil: lUhvrimj v. Hankline Oil Co., 803 IJ. S. 362. 
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a non-discriminatory tax on a Government con-
tractor or lessee imposed a burden which caused an 
unconstitutional interference with the Govern-
ment; the opinion stated (303 U. S. at 386-387) : 
* * * that immunity from non-discriminatory 
taxation sought hy a private person for his 
property or gains because he is engaged in op-
erations under a government contract or lease 
cannot be supported by merely theoretical con-
ceptions of interference with the functions of 
government. Regard must be had to substance 
and direct effects. And where it merely ap-
pears that one operating under a government 
contract or least; is subjected to a tax with re-
spect to his profits on the same basis as others 
who are engaged in similar businesses, there is 
no sufficient ground for holding that the effect 
upon the Government is other than indirect 
and remote. 
The decisions which invalidated the gross produc-
tion and property taxes for the reason that the tax-
ation of the lessee would burden the tax exempt 
Indian lands and hamper the policy of the Govern-
ment toward its Indian wards were as clearlv "out 
of harmony with correct principle" (303 U. S. 376, 
387) as was Gillespie v. Oklahoma, supra, in apply-
ing the same erroneous concepts. 
The lessees here can derive no comfort in their 
assertion of immunity on the ground that Moun-
tain Producers, by overruling Gillespie, has only 
authorized the State to tax their net income from 
*>2 
operations under tbe leases, and that the taxes here 
are measured by gross income from production 
and by the amount of production. The difference 
between a tax on gross receipts and net earnings 
lias been recognized as not being "controlling" 
{J a men v. Draro Contracting Co., 302 U. S. at 158), 
for once the "burden" theory had been discarded 
such a distinction was no longer valid (see Ilelrer-
iiifi v. (ierhardt, 304 IT. 8. 405, 420-422, and Graves 
v. A*. >\ cr ret O'Keefe, 306 U. S. 466, 480, 487). 
The decisions actually demonstrate that no differ-
ence is to be drawn between a tax measured by gross 
receipts, gross production, or net income; so long 
as the tax is non-discriminatory and the legal in-
cidence is placed on the Government contractor or 
on his property, no constitutional immunity may be 
successfully asserted. James v. Dravo Contracting 
Co., supra, and Mason Co. v. Tax Commission, 302 
U. S. 186 (state gross receipts tax on contractor 
with Federal Government) ; Atkinson v. Tax Com-
mission, 303 U. S. 20 (state net income tax on con-
tractor with Federal Government); Alabama v. 
King <(• Boozer, 314 U. S. 1 (state sales tax on sales 
to cost-plus contractor with Federal Government); 
Curry v. Vnited States, 314 U. S. 14 (state "use" 
tax on materials used by cost-plus contractor with 
Federal Government); Wilson v. Cook, 327 U. S. 
474 (ntntv severance tax imposed on contractor who 
severed and purchased timber from United States 
lands). See also Powell, The Waning of Intergov-
23 
ernmcntal Tax Immunities, 58 Harv. L. Rev. 633, 
640-641, 657-659 (1945). 
The other, but closely related foundation of the 
Choctaw «fc Guff R.1L, Indian Oil Co., Gipsy Oil 
Co. and Large Oil Co. decisions, namely, that the 
lessee or lease is an "instrumentality" of the Gov-
ernment which enjoys a constitutional immunity 
from nou-di8crimiiiatory taxation, is also discarded 
doctrine. Such is the plain teaching of the cases. 
Met calf cD Eddy v. Mitchell, supra; James v. Dravo 
Contracting Co., supra; Mason Co. v. Tax Commis-
sion, supra; Atkinson v. Tax. Commission, supra; 
llelvering v. Bankline Oil Co., supra; llelvering 
v. Mountain Producers Corp., supra; Buckstaff Co. 
v. McKinley, 308 U. S. 358; Alabama v. King dc 
Boozer, supra; Curry v. United States, supra; 
Wilson v. Cook, supra. See United States v. Alle-
gheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 186. 
If there were even the slightest doubt as to what 
the Mountain Producers decision meant with re-
spect to the kind of taxes involved in these cases, 
their validity would be authoritatively established 
by Wilson v. Cook, supra. There the State of Ar-
kansas imposed a severance tax which was mea-
sured by the amount of timber severed. It was held 
that tiie taxpayer, who, under contract with the 
Federal Government, was engaged in cutting and 
purchasing timber from national forest reserves, 
was not immune from the tax, the Court saying 
(327 U. S. at 482-483) : 
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Our decision in James v. Bravo Contracting 
Co., supra, and in Alabama v. King tt- Boozer. 
supra, and the cases cited in those opinions, can 
leave no doubt that the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas correctly held that plaintiffs, who 
are taxed by the state on their activities in sev-
ering lumber from Government lands under 
contract with the Government, cannot claim 
the benefit of the implied constitutional iniiiiu-
nitv of the Federal Government from taxation 
bv the state. 
The taxes involved in the present cases cannot be 
successfully distinguished from those imposed in 
Wilson v. Cook, supra. The taxpayers here are 
engaged in taking natural resources from restricted 
Indians lands and the taxpayer in Wilson v. Conk, 
supra, was so engaged with respect to lands 1H»-
Jonging to the United States. In both situations 
the tax is levied in direct proportion to the amount 
of the natural resources which has been severed. 
The effect of the taxes on the United States here, 
where the beneficial ownership of the lands and the 
royalties is in the Indians, is even more remote than 
that considered in Wilson v. Cook, supra, so that 
the present eases arc a fortiori situations for the 
denial of any immunity to the private lessees. 
In the final analysis, the question is whethei 
these taxpayers, who are engaged in the business 
of exploiting the resources from restricted lanch 
for their own individual profit, and who enjoy tin 
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benefits of state and local government, are to be ex-
cused from contributing through the gross produc-
tion tax to the costs of such government, and from 
paying through the petroleum excise tax their fair 
share of the costs of a conservation program in 
which they derive a direct and immediate benefit. 
Since the Constitution does not require that such 
an extraordinary, preferred status be accorded to 
lessees or contractors of the United States, there 
is even less reason to suppose that a different re-
sult is to obtain where the Government's financial 
interest is not directly involved. See Helve ring v. 
Mountain Producers, supra. 
It is sulxmitted, accordingly, that Choctaw d' 
Gulf Ji.R. v. Harrison, supra; Howard v. Gipsy Oil 
Co., supra, and Large Oil Co. v. Howard, supra, are 
directly contrary to the more recent decisions of 
this Court and should be expressly overruled. 
While the foregoing considerations sufficiently 
demonstrate the constitutional validitv of these 
taxes, it may be appropriate to observe that there 
are added reasons for sustaining the gross produc-
tion tax. This tax, so far as the lessees are con-
cerned, is in lieu of any other ad valorem taxes on 
their property rights and investment in the min-
erals, mineral rights, producing leases, and ma-
chinery and equipment used in and around any 
well. Also, by appropriate proceedings, the gross 
production tax may be raised or lowered to make it 
conform to what the ad valorem taxes would have 
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been if imposed on such property in the first in-
stance. See supra, pp. 9-13. 
The decisions in Howard v. Gipsy Oil (Jo., supra, 
and La rye Oil Go. v. Howard, supra, as previously 
indirnicd. considered that it made no difference 
whether tile gross production tax was in lieu of 
other ad valorem taxes, or was in addition to such 
taxes (as had been true of the statute involved in 
the Clint law <('• Half KM. case). See Gillespie v. 
Oklahoma, 257 U. S. at 504-505. The Gipsy Oil and 
La rye Oil eases, however, are contrary to the later 
derision in Alward v. Johnson, 282 U. S. 509, where 
a state gross receipts tax levied in lieu of ad valo-
rem taxes was sustained, even though a portion of 
the taxpayer's gross receipts was derived from a 
contract with the Post Office Department to trans-
port the I'idled States mail. 
The lessees here, as was true of the taxpayer in 
the Alward ease, own property used in carrying 
on a business for profit. That property could lie 
taxed through a direct property tax. Taber v. /»-
dian Territory Co., )UK) U. S. 1 (sustaining the Ok-
lahoma ad valorem tax on the property and equip-
ment of a lessee of restricted Indian lands) ; Indian 
Territory Oil Co. v. Hoard, 288 U. S. 325 (uphold-
ing the Oklahoma ad valorem tax on the lessee's 
share of oil produced under a lease of restricted 
lands); Carry v. Vuitcd States, supra (holding 
valid a "use" tax on materials purchased by a con-
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tractor to cany out a construction contract for the 
United States). 
Since Oklahoma could undoubtedly exact from 
these lessees their fair share of support for the cost 
of state and local government by means of a non-
discriminatory tax on their property used in pro-
ducing the oil and gas under the leases, it seems rea-
sonable that the same essential obligations can be 
required from them even though the tax, in the first 
instance, is measured by their share of the gross 
production. While the State of Oklahoma has 
found it more feasible to tax the property used in 
this industry through the means of a gross produc-
tion tax, which is subject to revision in accordance 
with ad valorem standards, the effect on the United 
States or on its Indian wards is not any different 
than would be true if a simple ad valorem tax were 
employed. Alward v. Johnson, supra, established 
the validity of this kind of tax even before the 
Dravo decision and the cases following it denied 
any constitutional iimnunity to private contractors 
and lessees. Its authority today is beyond ques-
tion. 
The court below, however, believed that Indian 
Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U. S. 522, which had held 
that a lease of restricted Indian lands was an "in-
strumentality" of the Federal Government whose 
value; could not be reached by a state ad valorem 
tax, was a binding precedent which compelled the 
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conclusion that the lessees here were immune from 
the gross production and petroleum excise taxes.10 
Kven if the actual decision in the Indian Oil Co. 
rase eniihl still he regarded as controlling with re-
spect to the taxation of the lease itself, a proposi-
tion with which we cannot agree, it could not stand 
for the conclusion that the lessees are "instrumen-
talities" who are exempt from the taxes here in-
volved, as must ho apparent from the previous dis-
cussion. Further, the gross production taxes in 
these cast's present no issue concerning the validity 
of taxing the value of the lease, for no question has 
hcen raised, through the appropriate statutory pro-
cedure, to test the amount of the gross production 
tax in comparison to what the ad valorem taxes 
would have heen on the taxpayer's property exclu-
sive of the lease.11 
However, if this is deemed to he an appropriate 
opportunity, we believe that Indian Oil Co. v. OUUt-
'" Tin* Indian Oil Co. ease was also relied on in the per 
curiam decisions in Howard v. (tipsy Oil Co. and in Large Oil 
Co. v. Howard, supra. 
n
 Seeking to conform to the Indian Oil Co. decision, and 
while still attempting to uphold the gross production tax on 
ihc lessee of restricted lands, the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
in In re Skclton Lead <0 Zinc Co., 81 Okl. 134, 149, intimated 
that in making the comparison between the amount of the 
gross production tax and the ad valorem tax, it would not be 
proper to include the value of the lease in the property sub-
ject to tax. Since there is nothing in the Oklahoma statute 
compelling such a result, the express overruling of the Indian 
Oil Co. case would leave the question open to Oklahoma for 
decision, unembarrassed by an infirm precedent of this Court. 
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homa, supra, ought also to be overruled. Since the 
State can validly tax the value of physical property 
used by such a lessee or by a Government contrac-
tor (Tuber v. Indian Territory Co., supra; Indian 
Territory Oil (Jo. v. Board, supra; Curry v. United 
States, supra), and may even tax the value of an 
outstanding claim against the United States due on 
an open account (Smith v. Davis, 323 U. S. I l l ) , 
no firm reason can exist why the State should not 
be able to impose a non-discriminatory tax with 
respect to the value of the lease or of the contract 
itself, either through a direct tax or by a gross pro-
duction tax which is in lieu of other property taxes. 
The effect which such a non-discriminatorv tax 
would have on the United States, where it is the 
immediate party in interest, or on its Indian wards, 
where leases to restricted lands are involved, is 
certainly no more direct or burdensome than that 
resulting from a tax on the lessee's physical prop-
erty, or on his gross income, or on the value of his 
claim against the United States. We believe that 
Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, supra, was wrong in 
holding that the value of such a lease could not be 
taxed the same as other property, and should no 
longer be regarded as an authoritative precedent. 
B. No Statutory Immunity Hat Baan Craaiad 
Since the lessees do not possess a constitutional 
immunity which, itself, would exempt them from 
non-discriminatory taxes measured bjr their gross 
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receipts or gross production, it remains to be con-
sidered whether Congress lias cloaked them with 
an immunity which they would not otherwise en-
joy. If it believed that this would have a beneficial 
effect on the affairs of its Indian wards, and if it 
saw Jit to pursue such a policy, Congress could un-
doubtedly exempt these lessees against the taxes 
which are here in issue. See James v. Dravo Con-
tract in y Co., supra, pp. 160-161; Pittman v. Home 
Owners' Corp., 308 U. S. 21, 32-33; Maricopa 
County v. Valley Bank, 318 U. S. 357, 361; Board 
of Comm 'is V. Seher, 318 U. S. 705, 715-719; Okla-
homa Tax Comm 'n v. United States, 319 U. S. 598; 
Mayo v. United States, 319 U. S. 441, 446; Smith 
y. Davis, supra, pp. 116-119. The question is 
whether Congress has actually done so. 
The court below, noting that in certain instances 
Congress had acted to withdraw immunity and to 
subjert certain designated restricted lands to the 
Oklahoma gross production tax, concluded that 
the lessees here were not subject to tax because Con-
gress (No. 40, R. 37)— 
has acted on the theory that such immunity 
exists in the case of leases of this character un-
less waived. 
We disagree with this reasoning and firmly believe 
that no conclusions can be drawn to the effect that 
Congress has acted so as to create an immunity for 
these private lessees. "The immunity formerly 
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said to rest on constitutional implication cannot 
now be resurrected in the form of statutory impli-
cation." Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United States, 
supra, 319 U. S. at 604. 
A brief summary of the legislative action in this 
field will show that there is no basis for holding 
that Congress presently considers that any immun-
ity is to be accorded to these oil and gas well opera-
tors. Despite the tax-exempt character of the 
land, there have been instances where Congress has 
acted to permit taxation in some respect of the min-
eral production and to authorize the payment of 
the taxes due on account of the Indians* royalty in-
terests. This was done in the case of the Osages,12 
the Kansas or Kaws," the Quapaws,14 and the Five 
"Section 5 of the Act of March 3, 1921, c. 120, 41 Stat. 
124!), authorized Oklahoma to levy its gross production tax 
on all oil and jras produced in Osage County and directed the 
Secretary of the Interior to pay the tax on the royalty in-
terests out of the royalties received by the Osage Tribe. See 
II. Hep. No. 1377, 66th Cong., 3d Sess.; H. Rep. No. 1278, 66th 
Cong., 3d Sess.; S. Itep. No. 704, 66th Cong., 3d Sess. 
In Oklahoma v. Bamsdall Corp., 296 U. S. 521, it was held 
that this statute was not a consent to the imposition of the 
petroleum excise tax and, following the then prevailing im-
munity doctrine, that the lessee was exempt from the imposi-
tion of this tax. 
18
 The Act of May 27, 1924, c. 200, 43 Stat. 176, consented 
to the imposition of Oklahoma taxes on the production of oil 
and gas from the restricted allotted lands of the Kansas or 
14
 Section 26 of the Aet of March 3, 1921, c. 119, 41 Stat. 
1225, as amended by the Act of April 17,1937, c. 108, 50 Stat. 
68, consented to the levy of the Oklahoma gross production 
:J2 
('ivili/.ed Trihes.1"' Congressional action in this re-
spect was prompted primarily by considerations 
arising from the favorable economic position of the 
particular Indians and by the desirability of their 
making a direct contribution through the specified 
taxes to the support of local government. See the 
legislative materials cited in footnotes 12-15, supra. 
The result of this Congressional action, under the 
then prevailing decisions, was similarly to with-
draw the existing immunity of the lessees. 
Congress, significantly, has never taken any posi-
tive or direct action to assert an immunity for any 
Footnote lit (( 'out.) 
Kaw Indians uiul authorized the Secretary of the Interior to 
pay the taxes assessed against the royalties out of the funds 
of tlit* particular Indians. See II. Rep. No. 269, 68th Cong., 
1st S.'ss.; S. Hep. No. 433, tJHth ('ong., 1st Sess., and the letter 
from thf Secretary oT the Interior dated February 16, 1924, 
set forth in 1he Committee Reports. 
Footnote 14 (font.) 
tax on lead and zinc produced from the restricted lands of 
the Quapaws and directed the Secretary of the Interior to 
pay the taxes assessed ajrainst the royalty interests out of the 
funds of the individual Indian royalty owners. See II. Rep. 
No. 431, 75th Coup., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 234, 75th Cong., 
1st Sess. 
,a
 Section 3 of the Act of May 10, 1928, c. 517, 45 Stat. 495, 
provided that all minerals produced from restricted allotted 
lauds of the members of the Five Civilized Tribes should be 
hubjeet to taxation the Mime as minerals produced from other 
lands. See 11. Rep. No. 1193, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. 
No. 982, 70th Cong., 1st Sess., and the letter from the Secre-
tary of the Interior dated March 7, 1928, set forth in the 
Committee Reports. 
• »•» 
lessees of tax-exempt Indian lands. The legislative 
measures have been in the reverse direction, 
namely, to withdraw immunity from the Oklahoma 
gross production tax with respect to the restricted 
lands of certain Indian tribes. These enactments, 
moreover, all took place under a different climate 
of judicial decision, namely, when it appeared that 
the immunity would exist for the Indian lessors as 
well as for the private lessees unless Congress acted 
affirmatively to remove the exemption against taxa-
tion. 
In this limited respect, it is true, Congress form-
erly acted on the assumption that the immunity of 
the lessee existed until waived by legislative action. 
This was so, however, only because such was the 
constitutional situation under the prevailing deci-
sions. It does not follow, however, that Congress, 
ignoring the subsequent decisions of this Court, has 
tacitly made the same assumption during the past 
10 years. Once it became clear that the cases ex-
tending constitutional immunity against taxation 
to private persons were no longer to be followed, 
Congress was not required to take affirmative ac-
tion to remove an immunity from the lessees of In-
dian lands when that immunity no longer existed, 
nor was it necessary for it to consent to the imposi-
tion of particular taxes against such lessees once 
the previously existing constitutional barrier was 
removed. Its silence during this period must be in-
terpreted in the setting of the contemporaneous 
34 
judicial decisions. Mayo v. United States, sn/mt. 
::i!) lT. S. at 447-448. 
\\V believe that < 'oiigress, by failing to make spe-
cilii'"*j»i#MVi>io!i for the taxation of the lessees here, 
I MI* not indicated imv intention that thev shouhl be 
exempt Tn in taxation on their activities. The situ-
ation is similar to the silence of Congress during 
the time that the Gilt ex pic decision stood for the 
• wistHire of the lessee's immunity against a state 
net incline tax. The Mountain Producers cast* 
demonstrates that no significance should he at-
tached i«. this, for the tax exemption there, quite 
properly. Tell along with the constitutional doc 
nine, unchecked by notions of legislative intent 
ill..! r\*u\\\ milv have been fabricated out of (\>n-
yregional inaction. Nurelv, the failure of the lei*-
islatiire to mark its disagreement with constitu-
tional decisions does not signify an adoption of 
those ..pinions as the policy of the law makers 
which will persist bevond the time that thev are 
overruled. 
Nor i.; the existence of a statutory exemption 
from taxation to be interred from the fact that 
('••!!:• res* has seen fit to consent to taxation of the 
iiiiifral production from the lands of certain In-
di.ms but has not done so in the case of others. Dif-
fereic«> in legislative policy respecting the taxa-
tion «.t the various Indian tribes do not add up to 
similar di(Terences in policy towards their private 
lessees. The retention of whatever immunity at-
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taches to the royalty interests of the lands involved 
in this case is not at all inconsistent with the les-
sees* being taxed on their income or on their share 
of production. The situation is parallel to that 
where the express retention of the tax immunity of 
the United States does not spell out an exemption 
for private persons who may have a direct associa-
tion with the (Government. 
If the non-sequitur of the reasoning of the lower 
court were not. otherwise apparent, it would become 
so by a consideration of the incongruous intentions 
imputed by it to Congress. Thus, it has never been 
intimated that the action of Congress outlined 
above or its silence in other respects gave any les-
sees a statutory immunity against ad valorem taxes 
on their property and equipmeut, or on their share 
of the oil. Taber v. Indian Territory Co., supra; 
Indian Territory Oil Co. v. Board, supra. Actu-
ally, Congress has acted on the supposition that 
such legislative immunity does not exist.10 Also, 
10
 The Act of February 14, 1931, c. 179, 46 Stat. 1108, 
amended the Aet of May 10, 1928, supra, to provide against 
any double taxation and to provide that where the machinery 
and equipment was taxed on an ad valorem basis for the fiseal 
year ended June 30, 1931, the gross production tax should 
not be imposed prior to July I, 1931. The legislative history 
recognized that even when the land itself was tax-exempt be-
cause of the restrictions, the lessees were liable for an ad 
valorem tax on their property. II. Rep. No. 2327, 71st Cong., 
3d Scss., and H. Rep. No. 1399, 71st Cong., 3d Sess.. con-
taining a letter from the Commissioner on Indian Affairs 
dated January 15, 1931. 
'Mi 
the history of Congressional action and inaction 
was in it considered to he an assertion of immunity 
for lessees against a state or federal net income 
tax. 1/flrrriny v. Mountain Producers Corp., 
stt/tni. It would he surprising, accordingly, if Con-
gress should have had no objection to the imposi-
tion uf an ml valorem tax but should have objected 
to the collection of the identical amounts from the 
leasee when accomplished by a gross production 
tax which is used in the place of the more cutnber-
>oine ml ralorcm levy, it would also be strange if 
Congress believed it proper that the lessee should 
pav a net income tax but not a tax measured bv 
gross income or gross production. 
Actually, when Mountain Producers had settled 
ihe conclusion that such lessees stand in no more 
favori-d position to invoke a constitutional immun-
ity against a net income tax than any other private 
< Jo\ erumeiit contractor, Congress was certainly en-
t it led to believe that these lessees would be re-
quired to pay the same kind of non-discriminatory 
local taxes as other contractors are required to 
bear. The failure of Congress, either before or 
after the Mountain Producers decision, to assert a 
tax exempt status for the lessees of restricted In-
dian lands, undoubtedly indicates an intent to per-
mit them to be taxed by the local authorities to the 
limit of constitutional power. 
Oner the constitutional doctrine was resolved 
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plausible reason for creating an implied legislative 
one. Except as it may be reflected in an increased 
income to the Indians, Congress would have no dis-
cernible purpose in exempting the lessees from the 
taxes which are under consideration. However, 
whether such an exemption would result in an in-
creased return to the Indian wards is only theo-
retic. The observations in the Mountain Produc-
ers case, supra, pp. 38G-387, that a tax on the les-
see's net income lias only a remote or indirect eiTect 
on the (lovernnient is supported by the fact that 
the leases approved by the Department of Interior 
provided for the same rental and royalty payments 
both before and after the overruling of Gillespie v. 
Oklahoma, supra." Further, the royalty and ren-
tal payments provided for by the Department of 
Interior in the case of leases of lands allotted under 
17
 Under Regulations Ciovcrning the Leasing of Restricted 
Allotted Indian Lauds for Mining Purposes, approved Octo-
ber 8, 1937 (25 C. F. R., Sections 189.1-189.33) (issued prior 
to the Mountain Producers decision but still in effect), leases 
are offered to the bidder offering the highest bonus, in addi-
tion to the stipulated rentals and royalties which are a rental 
of $1.25 per acre per year and royalties of 12% percent, the 
rental to be credited on the royalties due. The same royalties 
(without a minimum rental) were provided for in the pre-
decessor regulations approved July 7, 1925. 
Because differences in the value of different tracts of land 
would '>e reflected in the bonus which the lessor is willing to 
pay, an exact comparison is impossible. The fuct that the 
royalties have remained the same does, however, tend to show 
that the lessors have not been significantly affected by the 
Mountain Producers decision. 
as 
tlit* General Allotment Act are exactly the same a> 
those in tlit' ease of lands of members of the Five 
Civilian! Tribes, where the lessees liave been sub-
jei-j i.i the gross production tax since ]i)28.'" It 
senilis a safe conclusion that the lessee's tax status 
has liltle, if anv, effect on the Indian rovaltv own-
ei s. At least, if the taxation of the lessee is deemed 
!•» have an adverse effect on the governmental p«l-
i«\ inward the Indian lessors, it is a matter whieh 
should rail for a positive indication by Congress.'* 
The rejeelioii of the "economic burden" argu-
iin'iil as a ground for implying a constitutional ta\ 
iuiiiiiiiiily is equally persuasive for rejecting ihc 
(•••iiiciitioii that Congress has created one bv infer-
enre. Ol.hthonut Ta.r ('onnn'ii v. United States, 
*>• >>)tt, :\\\) V. S. at «>04. The statement in (1tares v. 
.V. )*. /•.*• iv/. O'Krrfr, s,i/»a, .'50(> U. S. at 480, is 
similarly apt here— 
il it appears that there is no ground for im-
plying a constitutional immunity, there is 
eijually a want of any ground for assuming any 
,sN«'f K<'pul;iti<iii> (loverning the Leasing of Restricted 
I.HIMU of .Members of Pive Civilized Tribes, Oklahoma, for 
.Mining, approved April L'7, V.m C2."» C. P. R., Sections 18:1.1-
KM')) . 
,!
* since the lessees, as previously indicated, are liable lor 
ml riilon nt taxes, it is difficult to see why the gross produc-
tion ta\. ulfii levied in lien ol' stteh tuxes, would have Kiteh 
on effect mi T!••* royalty owners as to impel Congress to in-
voke an immunity lor the levees against this tax, but not 
:f.-;inst I be ml valorem tax. 
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purpose on the part of Congre&s to create an 
imnmnit}'. 
In the absence of a dear expression of a legislative 
purpose to immunize a private lessee or contractor 
from non-discriminatory local taxation, doubtful 
indications of Congressional intent ought to be in-
terpreted against the existence of such immunity. 
Smith v. Davis, supra, o23 IT. 8. at 117; Oklahoma 
Tax Comm'it v. Vnitvd States, supra; Buchstaff 
Co. v. McK inlet/, :>>08 U. 8. 358; draws v. A\ Y. c.r 
rel. O'Ktrfe, supra, :UK5 U. S. at 479-480. Here, 
where Congress has never expressed a purpose to 
place the private lessee in a tax immune status, the 
conclusion is clear. A cautious approach in inter-
preting the silence of Congress will not only avoid 
the casting of an unnecessary burden on it to dis-
avow an immunity which it does not desire, hut 
will also prevent an unwarranted temporary inter-
ference with the taxing authority of the State.2" 
30
 Where the immunity of the United States itself or of its 
property is asserted, the silence, of Congress must be given an 
opposite meaning for it is not incumbent on Congress to make 
an express declaration of the immunity. See United States v. 
Allegheny County, 322 U. S. 174, 177, 180; Mayo v. United 
States, 310 U. S. 441, 447-448. Whether Congressional silence, 
where the taxable status of the property of Indians is in 
question, should be weighed for or agaiust the existence of 
the immunity (compare Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. United 
States, supra, and Superintendent v. Commissioner, supra, 
wilh Carpenter v. Shaw, supra, and United States V. Iiickcrt, 
supra) need not be resolved here, for the tax immunity of n 
•10 
These matters plainly indicate the conclusion that 
no tax innniinity exists lor the taxpayers in these 
cases. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing, the decisions helow 
should he reversed and the validity of the imposi-
tion of the taxes should he sustained. 
Respect fully submitted, 
PHILIP B. PKHLMAN, 
Solicitor General. 
TUKKOX LAM Ait CAUDLE, 
Assistant Attorney General 
ARNOLD RAUM, 
(JKOKCK A. STINSON, 
HiLBfiirr P. ZAUKY, 
Special Assistants to the 
Attorney General. 
August, 1948 
private lessee <ir contractor stands on an altogether different 
basis and no sound reason can be suggested for a "liberal" 
interpretation in favor of its existence. 
ADDENDUM F 
S. REP. NO. 768, 69TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1926) 
Calendar No. 770 
69TH CONGRESS) SENATE ( REPORT 
1st Session j ( No. 768 
TO AUTHORIZE OIL AND GAS MINING LEASKS UPON UNAL-
LOTTED LANDS WITHIN EXECUTIVE OIIDER INDIAN RESER-
VATIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 
MAY 6 (calendar day, MAY 7), 1926.—Ordered to be printed 
Mr. CAMERON, from the Committee on Indian Affairs, submitted the 
following 
REPORT 
[To accompany S. 4152) 
The Committee on Indian Affairs, to whom was referred the bill 
(S. 4152), to authorize oil and gas mining leases upon unallotted lands 
within Executive order Indian reservations, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, report favorablv thereon witn the 
recommendation that the bill do pass with the following amendments: 
Page 1, line 8, beginning with the word "and," strike out all that 
follows down to and including the word "act" in line 10. 
Page 2, line 13, after the word "Indians" insert the following: 
Provided further, That production of oil and gas and other minerals on such 
lands may be taxed by the State in which such lands are located in all respects 
the same as the production on unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of the 
Interior is hereby authorized and directed to cause to be paid out of the royalty 
income derived by said Indian owner or owners the ratable proportion of the 
total production tax assessed against such royalties, but the royalty share of any 
tax by a State herein authorized shall not become a lien or charge of any kind 
or character against the land or property of the Indian owner or owners, but 
shall only become a lien against the royalty income of said Indian owner or 
owners: Provided further, That until the State of New Mexico enacts a law 
placing a production tax upon royalty, bonus, or other income of Indians or 
Indian tribes, under the terms of this act and an act entitled •'An act to author-
ize the leasing for oil and gas mining purposes of unallotted lands on Indian 
reservations affected by the proviso to section 3 of the act of February 26, 1891," 
approved May 29, 1924 (Forty-third Statutes 244), the Secretary of "the Interior 
i& authorized and directed to pay said State, out of the proceeds of such royalty, 
bonus, or other income, such sum as shall be equivalent to the tax levied by 
such State upon an equal quantity of such oil, gas, and other minerals produced 
upon unrestricted lands. 
Page 2, line 20, strike out the words ll the President or." 
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Page 3, line 8, after the word "built," insert "a" and change the 
word "loads" to "road." 
Page 3, line 10, after the word "of," insert the word "the" and 
after the word " which," in the same line, insert the word "such." 
Page 5, line 1, after the word "Secretary," insert the words "of 
the Interior." 
Page f>, line 2, aflor the word "Secretary," insert the words "of 
the Interior." 
Page ">. line 11. after the word "built ," insert " a " ami rhange the 
word "roads" to "road." 
Page f>. line 12. after the word "of" insert the word 4i the." 
Tin4 history of this legislation is as follows: On December Hi, 1925, 
a bill was introduced. S. 1722, providing for the leasing of Executive 
order reservations for oil and gas mining purposes. This bill was re-
ferred to the Secretary of the Interior, who submitted a report thereon, 
recommending, instead of the proposed S. 1722, that a bill be passed 
along lines suggested in a draft of a bill which the Secretary of the 
Interior attached to his report. Several bills were introduced and 
considered by the committee, which, after exhaustive hearings, 
adopted S. 4152, as amended and reported herein. 
The proposed measure is supported by the Interior Department 
and has the indorsement of the different organizations for the pro-
tection of Indian rights. 
The reports of the Secretary of the Interior and the bill suggested 
by him are as follows: 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 
Washington, January 2X9 1926. 
Hon. J. \V. HARREI-D, 
Chairman Committee on Indian Affairs, 
United States Senate. 
MY DUAR SENATOR HARRELD: Further response is made to your letter, with-
out date, requesting an opinion on 8. 1722, " A bill to provide for the disposition 
of bonuses, rentals, and royalties received under the provisions of the act of 
Congress entitled 'An act to promote the mining of coal, phosphate, oil, oil 
shale, gas, and sodium on the public domain/ approved February 25, 1920, from 
unallotted lands in Executive order Indian reservations, and for other purposes." 
Instead of enacting legislation which would authorize the leasing of unallotted 
land on Executive order Indian reservations subject to the general leasing act, I 
believe that authority should be granted for leasing such land under terms and 
conditions similar to those governing the leasing of unallotted land on Indian 
reservations created by treaty as provided in the act of May 29, 1924 (43 Stat. 
244). I therefore have cause to be prepared and submit herewith a draft of a 
bill to that effect, and suggest that it be enacted in lieu of Senate bill 1722. 
Indian reservations, however created, are under the jurisdiction of the Indian 
Service, and it is believed that it would be much more satisfactory to have the 
mineral resources of tribal Indian land developed as nearly as possible under the 
same laws, rules, and regulations, subject to the same local jurisdiction, and thus 
enable the officer in charge of the reservation to enforce the laws of the United 
States relative to Indian reservations and trade and intercourse with the Indians. 
This is especially true of the Navajo Indian Reservation, which was originally 
created by treaty with the Indians, additions thereto being subsequently made 
by Executive order. Oil of a very high grade is now being produced on the treaty 
part of the reservation, under leases negotiated under authority contained in the 
act of February 2S, 1891, and there has been some development work on the 
Executive order part of the reservation under permits issued by this department 
during the period it was held that such land was subject to the general leasing 
act of February 25, 1920. 
The Attorney General, on May 27, 1924, held that the general leasing act does 
not apply to Executive order Indian reservations. Following that holding this 
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Indian Reservation in Utah and 4 in Arizona. It is understood that some of the 
permittees have expended considerable sums of money in attempting to develop 
the land. Provision is made in the bill to allow the permittees to continue 
prospecting for oil and gas on the land covered by their permits and to grant 
them leases in the event valuable oil or gas deposits are found. In addition to 
the applications upon which permits were granted, there were filed approxi-
mately 400 for which no permits were granted. Undoubtedly many of these 
applications were purely speculative and nothing expended by the applicants in 
attempted development, and it is not believed that they should be recognized 
or given any preference right to a leave covering the land for which they applied. 
Provision is made that 37?>£ per rent of the rentals, royalties, and bonuses 
received will be turned over to the State wherein the land is located, to be ex-
pended for construction and maintenance of public roads within the respective 
reservations where the leased lands arc located and public roads contributory 
thereto and forming a part of the same highway system, or for the support of 
public schools attended by Indian children, the remainder of the money to be 
used for the expenses of administration and for the benefit of the Indians. The 
provision as to roads will be of advantage not only to the Indians and the lessees, 
but to the public generally. The requirement that any of the money used for 
educational purposes be expended for support of public schools or other educa-
tional institutions attended by Indian children is believed to be fair and just 
alike to the State and the Indians. 
A part, at least, of any funds which may be deposited in the Treasurv to the 
credit of the Indians will be available for appropriation by Congress for pavment 
of cost of administration of their affairs and thus avoid the appropriation of pub-
lic money for that purpose. Moreover, any remainder may be used, as authorized 
bv Congress, from time to time, for the benefit of the Indians in the development 
of water on their grazing ranges or other needful purposes without incurring the 
appropriation of public money. It is not therefore believed that any of the funds 
arising from leases should be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts. 
Early and favorable consideration of the draft is respectfully recommended. 
Very truly yours, 
HUBERT WORK. 
A BILL To authorize oil and gas mining leases upon uoallot ed lands within Eiecutive ord<*r Indian 
reservations 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled
 9 That unallotted lands within the limits of any 
reservation or withdrawal created by Executive order for Indian purposes or 
for the use or occupancy of any Indiaus or tribe may be leased for oil and gad 
mining purposes in accordance with the provisions contained in the act of May 
29, 1924 (Forty-third Statutes, 244). 
SEC. 2. That the proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and gas 
leases upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals 
shall be distributed as follows: 37H per centum shall be paid in lieu of taxes to 
the State within the boundaries of which the leased lands or deposits are located, 
upon the condition that the same are to be used by such State, or subdivisions 
thereof, for the construction and maintenance of public roads within the re-
spective reservations in which the leased lands are situated and public roads 
contributory thereto and forming a part of the same highway system, or for the 
support of public schools or other public educational institutions attended by 
Indian children; 6 2 ^ per centum shall be deposited in the Treasury of the 
United States to the credit of the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the reser-
vation or withdrawal was created, and shall draw interest at the rate of 4 per 
centum per annum and be available for appropriation by Congress for the expense 
of administration and for the use and benefit of such Indians. 
SEC. 3. That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, under such 
rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to allow any applicant to whom a j>cr-
mit to prospect for oil and gas upon lands within an Indian reservation created 
by Executive order has heretofore been issued iir accordance with the provisions 
of the act of February 25, 1920 (Forty-first Statutes, 437), to continue prospect-
ing for period not exceeding two years from the date of the passage of this act 
on the land described in his permit, under the terms and ronHifinnc <Wni.. — *-
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land embraced in any permit, the permittee shall be entitled to a lease of one-
fourth of the land embraced in the prospecting permit: Provided, That the per-
mittee shall be granted a lease for as much as one hundred and sixty acres of said 
lands, if there be that number of acres within the permit. The area*to be selected 
by the permittee shall be in compact form and, if surveyed, to be described by 
the legal subdivisions of the public-land surveys; if unsurvcyed, to be surveyed 
by the Government at the excuse of the applicant for lease in accordance with 
rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and the 
lands leased shall l>e conformed to and taken in accordance with the legal sub-
divisions of such surveys; deposits made to cover expense of surveys .shall be 
deemed appropriated for that purpose, and any excess deposits may be repaid 
to the person or jH*rsons making such deposit or their legal representatives. 
Such leases shall be for a term of twenty years upon a royalty of 5 |>cr centum in 
amount or value of the production and the annual payment in advance of a rental 
of $1 i>er acre, the rental paid for any one year to be credited against the royalties 
as they accrue for that year, with the preferential right in the lessee to renew the 
same for successive periods of ten years upon such reasonable terms and con-
ditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of "the Interior. The permittee 
shall also be entitled to a preference right to a lease for the remainder of the land 
in his prospecting permit at a royalty of not less than 12H P** centum in amount 
or value of the production, the royalty to be determined by competitive bidding 
or fixed by such other method as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe: 
Provided, That the Secretary shall have the right to reject any or all bids. 
DEPARTMENT or THE INTERIOR, 
Washington, March 10, 1926. 
Hon. J. W. HARRELD, 
Chairman Committee on Indian Affairs, United States Senate. 
Mr DEAR SENATOR HARRELD: On January 2S, 1926, upon request for an 
opinion on S. 1722, I submitted a report. I now desire to submit this supple-
mental report because some question has been raised as to the scope or meaning 
of the words "In lieu of taxes to the State" as used in section 2, line 4, of the type-
written draft of a bill which accompanied my report of January 28, 1926. 
As construed and understood by this department at the time the report of 
January 28, 1926, was made, this language *'in lieu of taxes to the State" means 
that 37}^ per cent of the proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses of oil and gas 
leases upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations or withdrawals 
shall be paid to the State, for designated purposes, in lieu of any and all taxes 
against the Indians, but does not include taxes against others. This being the 
meaning placed upon the language by the department in order to remove any 
doubt about this language I suggest and recommend that the words "in lieu of 
taxes," appearing in line 4, of section 2, of the typewritten bill accompanying 
my report of January 28, 1926, be eliminated, and that after the word "located, 
in line 5, of section 2, of the typewritten bill the following language, followed by 
a comma, be inserted, "in lieu of any and all taxes against Indians to whose 
credit 62^6 per centum shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States 
as is in this section hereinafter provided." 
I also suggest that this amendment above set out be made to S. 3159 by striking 
out of S. 3159, in section 2, page 2, line 1, of the printed bill the words "in lieu of 
taxes " and that after the word " located," in section 2, page 2, line 2, of the printed 
bill, the following be inserted "in lieu of any and all taxes against the Indians to 
whose credit 62i^ per centum shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United 
States as is in this section hereinafter provided/1 
Very truly yours, 
HUBERT WORK. 
The enactment of this legislation will accomplish the following 
purposes: 
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4. Extend relief to permittees and applicants who in good faith 
expended money in development looking to the discovery of oil and 
gas under the general leasing act of February 25, 1920, upon Execu-
tive-order Indian reservations, at a time when such lands were held 
to come within the terms of the said act. 
The first section of the bill establishes a uniform policy for the 
leasing of all Indian reservation lands for oil and gas mining purposes, 
under the supervision of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, it simply 
applies existing law relating to treaty reservations to Kxecutive-order 
reservations. The law of May 29, 1924, applicable to treaty reserva-
tions and herein extended to Executive-order reservations, is as 
follows: 
That unallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of the Five 
Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject to lease for mining purposes 
for a period of 10 years under the proviso to section 3 of the act of February 28, 
1891 (26 Stat. L. 795), may be leased at public auction by the Secretary of the 
Interior, with the consent of the council speaking for such Indians, for oil and gas 
mining purposes for a period of not to exceed 10 years, and as much longer there-
after as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities, and the terms of any exist-
ing oil and gas mining lease may in like manner be amended by extending the 
term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be found in paving quantities. (43 
Stat. 244.) 
The proviso to section 3 of the act of February 2S, 1891, is as 
follows: 
That where lands are occupied by Indians who have bought and paid for the 
same, and which lands are not needed for farming or agricultural purposes, and 
are not desired for individual allotments, the same may be leased by authority 
of the council speaking for such Indians, for a period not to exceed five years for 
grazing or farming or 10 years for mining purposes, in such quantities and upon 
such terms and conditions as the agent in charge of such reservation may recom-
mend, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. 
The first section of the bill as amended also provides that the 
money received from oil and gas mining leases shall be deposited in 
the Treasury to the credit of the Indian tribes the same as tne income 
derived from leases on treaty reservations, and authorizes the State 
in which the leased lands are located to levy a production tax on 
all the oil produced within the State, including that of the lessee or 
oil operator. 
These provisions are in line with similar action by Congress in other 
instances. Section 24 of the Indian appropriation act of May 18, 
1916 (39 Stat. L. 123-155) authorized the leasing for mining pur-
poses of unallotted lands on the diminished Spokane Indian Reserva-
tion in Washington and provided that the proceeds arising therefrom 
should be paid into the Spokane tribal fund. 
Section 26 of the act of June 30, 1919 (41 Stat. L. 3-31) authorized 
the leasing of unallotted lands on Indian reservations within the 
States of Arizona, California, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming for purpose of mining metal-
liferous mineral and provided that the money arising tnerefrom 
11
 shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit 
of the Indians belonging and having tribal rights on the reservation 
where the leased land is located.19 This applied to all reservation 
lands within the States named. 
Section 7 of the act of June 25, 1910 (36 Stat. L. 855-857). ^ V P tn 
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Congress has repeatedly provided that the proceeds from the sale 
of surplus lands on Executive-order reservations within the States of 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada. North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Utah, and Washington shall be crediteci to the Indians. 
The bill reported on by the Interior Department provided that 
3 7 ^ per cent of the royalty income should be paid to the Stato within 
which the leased lands are located, but limited the State in the 
expenditure of such money to roads within or tributary to the respec-
tive reservations or for the support of schools attended by Indian 
children. It would ho relatively of no value to a State to pay it 
money and then renuiro the expenditure of the same for such limited 
purposes. It has been deemed advisable to pay all the royalty 
income to the credit of the Indians and to permit the State to levy 
taxes on the entire production within its borders the same as upon 
unrestricted lands. This policy is the same as that of the act of 
May 29, 1024, applicable to treatv reservations, and it also enables 
the States to have the unrestricted use of the money so collected. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that 
such taxation is permissible only when directlv authorized by the 
Congress. (Indian Territory Illuminating Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 
U. S. 522: Howard v. Gvpsv Oil Cp., 247 U. S. 503; Large Oil Co. v. 
Howard, 248 U.S . 540.)' 
The Congress has already adopted the policy of permitting State 
taxation of oil, gas, and other minerals produced on Indian lands in 
the case of the Osages (41 Stat. 1250), the Quapaws (41 Stat. 1249), 
and upon treaty reservations generally (act May 29, 1924, 43 Stat. 
244). 
Since Congress has by the act of June 30, 1919 (41 Stat. 3-34), 
forbidden the further creation of Executive-order reservations, except 
by act of Congress, section 2 of the proposed bill provides that no 
changes shall be made in the boundaries of existing Executive reser-
vations except by act of Congress. 
In general, ttio congressional policy toward the disposal of the 
wealth of Indian Executive-order reservations has been a uniform 
one for 50 years, the proceeds from the natural resources as well as the 
use of the surface having been allowed to the tribes or credited to 
them, and this policy, continued in the bill now reported, is in evident 
accord with equitv and with the historical fact that the greater part 
of all the existing Indian reservation area has been created since 1871, 
the date when the treaty-making power with the Indians was ended. 
The last section of the bill is necessary to afford equitable relief 
to those who in good faith expended money in prospecting for oil and 
gas in accordance with the general leasing act of February 25, 1920 
(49 Stat. 437). On June 9, 1922, the Secretary of the Interior 
promulgated a written opinion holding that lands covered by the pro-
visions of the proposed bill came within the terms of the said general 
leasing act, and granted 16 permits to prospect for oil and gas in 
Utah and 4 in Arizona. Tne permittees, 20 in number, imme-
diately proceeded in the work of exploration and development of the 
lands covered by their permits, and in so doing expended very sub-
stantial sums of money, totaling in the aggregate between three and 
four hundred thousand dollars. 
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A number of other persons made applications for oil and gas 
prospecting permits, but these permits were not granted for the 
reason that on May 27, 1924, the Attorney General of the United 
States gave an opinion that the general leasing act did not apply to 
Executive order Indian reservation lands. \ u r \ limited number of 
these persons, whose applications were not granted for the reason 
above stated, had already joined with the permittees in the said work 
of exploration and development ami li.ul t out i tbtit* d in llie money so 
expended. 
The said permits reouired thai the work ol exploration and de-
velopment should be diligently prosecuted and the opinion of the 
Attorney General was nol renduul iinnll neail\ (no u"ii aftu the 
said work had been first undertaken. 
The lands covered by these permits ,n barren practically without 
water holes and without stock wells, and hence only incompletely 
occupied even by Indians Tin Am\ of I he hardships endured in 
fulfilling the said obligations is graphically told in the record of the 
case of lTnited States v. Harrison, ICquitv S2SS, United States District 
Court of I hull 
Based upon the opinion of the Attorney General, the United States 
brought suits in the United States district court of Utah to cancel 
the permits already issued. The court in United States v. Harrison, 
just cited, refused to sustain the conUnlion i f ilu Ciovernment and 
dismissed the case, and the following language ib touml in the court's 
decision, viz: 
The equities are all m lavor oi the dcioiuiunl 1 lie right of the 
Government to insist upon and enforce what, tin effect, is n forfeiture is too 
doubtful in my mind for the court to adopt that view and deprive the defendants 
of possible benefits to be derived from the large expenditures which they have 
made upon this ground in t^ ootl faith 
The Government promptly appealed the case to the Circuit Court 
of Appeals at Denver, which court certified certain questions to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, where a decision can not be 
expected for probably two years 
From the foregoing it is evident that the permittees and applicants, 
who have made these expenditures and have done this work in good 
faith, have substantial equities uhnli icqnire recognition, and the 
last section of the bill gives them the n^ht to proceed with their work, 
and if discoveries are made to obtain leases in the manner provided 
by the said act of February 25, 1920, under which their applications 
were originally made. This section is principally a reenactment of 
the applicable provisions of the said act of February 25, 1920, so 
that (development may proceed under the supervision of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs, and leases be granted under the provisions and 
regulations of the general leasing law h\ \ irt \tv of w Inch these equities 
were created. Those applicants who did not make expenditures in 
such work of exploration and development are not included in the 
relief provided for bv this bill. 
The departmental order under which the\ proceeded was subse-
quently reversed, and in the absence either of a vested right or an 
equity gained through investment made for the actual development 
8 OIL AND GAS LEASES UPON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 
The disadvantage to the Indians if the several hundred noninvest-
ing applicants are each given the privilege of developing a square 
mile of oil land with a royalty of only 5 per cent, as compared to a 
royalty of 1 2 ^ per cent ana upward wnich they must pay under 
the Indian oil leasing law, is evident, and tho granting of such privi-
lege to such noninvesting applicants would merely he a gift made to 
them, out of the Indian wealth, of sums which might run into mil-
lions of dollars. 
The bill as reported back to the Senate is fair and equitable to the 
Indians, to the States where the Indian reservations are located 
and to those who desire to prospect for oil and gas. 
o 
ADDENDUM G 
H.R. REP. NO. 763, 69TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1926) 
69TH CONGRESS ) HOUSE OF KEPRESENTATIVES ( REPORT 
1st Session j ( N o . 763 
OIL AND GAS MINT i . j u s i ; ]> 
nANDS 
A P R I L 1, 192G.—Committed tn the (^oniinilii * of ifin WUnU II u .i i i \n 
of the Union and ordered to be printed 
•mmittce on Indian Affairs, submitted the 
f o l l n \ l III J/ 
REPO 
[To accompan 9133] 
Ti te Committee oi i Indian Ai lairs, to whom was referred the bill 
(H. R. 9133) to authorize oil and gas mining leases upon allotted 
lands within Executive order Indian IVM nations, Inning considered 
the same, report thereon with a l-emmim iidnhon that il do pass with 
the following amendments: 
Page 1, line 11, after the word liwithdrawals" strikeout all.dowH. 
to arid including the word " centumfT in line 10, page 2, 
Page 2, line 16, strike out the words 4*the expense of administra-
tion and for the use and benefit of such Indians" and insert in lieu 
thereof the following: "expenses in connection with the supervision 
of the development and operation of the oil and gas industry and for 
the use and benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said Indians, or 
their tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the expenditure 
of such money, but no per capita paym< vnt shall be made except by 
act of Congress." 
Page 2, after line 17, insert a new section, as follows: 
SEC. 3. That taxes may he levied and collected In the State or local authorit\ 
upon improvements, output of mines or oil and gas wells or other rights, property, 
or assets of any lessee upon hinds within Executive order Indian reservations 
in the same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and collected, and such 
taxes may be levied against the share obtained for the Indians as bonuses, rentals, 
and royalties, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized and directed 
to cause such taxes to be paid out of the tribal funds in the Treasury: Provided, 
That such taxes shall not become a lien or charge of any kind against the land or 
other property of such Indians. 
P a g e 2 , l ine 18, c h a n g e t h e M-iini'i U I • '" .! IM ' -I 
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Page 4, line 17, add the following: 
And provided further, That the Secretary of the Interior in his discretion, is 
authorized to reinstate, in the order of their original filing, all applications of 
qualified applicants filed prior to May 27, 1924, for permits to prosj>ect for 
oil and gas under the said, act of February 25, 1920, upon any lands covered 
by the provisions of this act, and which applications were not granted, upon 
the following conditions: Written rccjucst for such action shall l>e filed by the 
original applicant or his heirs in the land office of the appropriate land district 
within ninety days from the date of the approval of this act, and the reinstatement 
of any such applications shall confer the right of prospecting and to secure a 
lease or leases as in this section provided, upon the lands described in such 
application. 
The reports of the Secretary of the Interior on the bill are as 
follows: 
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, 
Washington, February 16, 1926. 
Hon. SCOTT LF.AVITT, 
Chairman Committee on Indian A flairs, 
Hou.se of Ilcprcscnlativcs, Washington, D. C. 
MY DEAR MR. LEAVITT: Further reference is made to your letter of February 
10t 192G, submitting for a report thereon a copy of II. It. 0133, to authorize oil 
and gas mining louses upon unallotted lands within Executive-order Indian 
reservations. 
Should H. It. 9133 be enacted, unallotted Executive-order Indian reservations 
would be subject to leasing for oil and gas mining purposes as other tribal reser-
vations are. Prior to May 27, 1924, a number of permits to prospect for oil and 
gas on Executive-order Indian reservations were issued by this department to 
applicants under the general leasing act of February 25, 1920. (41 Stat. 437.) 
The Attorney General by opinion of May 27, 1924, held that the act of February 
25, 1920, does not apply to such reservations. Following that holding this de-
partment has not granted any leases covering such lands. Permits had been 
"issued to 16 persons covering hinds within the Navajo Indian Reservation in 
Utah and four in Arizona. It is understood that some of the permittees have 
expended considerable sums of moneys in attempting to develop the lands. 
The bill under consideration, if enacted, will allow such permittees to continue 
pros|>ecting for oil and gas on the land covered by their )>ermits, and provides 
that they shall be entitled to leases in the event valuable oil or gas deposits are 
found, covering one-fourth of the acreage embraced by their prospecting permits, 
provided that a permittee may be given a lease or as much as 160 acres if his 
permit covers that much. 
In addition to the applications upon which permits were granted, there were 
filed approximately 400 for which no ])crmits were issued. Undoubtedly many 
of these applications were purely speculative and nothing expended by the 
applicants in attempted development, and it is not believed that they should be 
recognized or given any preference right for leases covering the lands for which 
they applied. 
Provision is made that 37H per cent of the rentals, royalties, and bonuses 
received will be turned over to the State wherein the land is located, to l>e expended 
for construction and maintenance of public roads within (he respective reserva-
tions where the leased lands are located and public roads contributory thereto 
and forming a part of the same highway system, or for the support of public 
schools attended by Indian children, the remainder of the money to l>c used for 
the expenses of administration and for the l>cncfit of the Indians. The provi-
sion as to roads will be of advantage not only to the Indians and the leasees but 
to the public generally. The requirement that any of the money used for edu-
cational purposes be expended for support of public schools or other educational 
institutions attended by Indian children is believed to be fair and just, alike to 
the State and the Indians. 
A part at least of any funds which may he deposited in the Treasury to the 
credit of the Indians will be available for appropriation by Congress for payment 
of cost of administration of their affairs and thus avoid the appropriation of 
** -»•»•• *-r»iv»nin,|/»r i n n v \\o u s e d . BS 
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development of water on their grazing ranges or other < tout 
incurring the appropriation of public money 
Early and favorable consideration of II. R * n .t iod. 
V e r y t r u l y y o u r s , 
D K il A t .T M R N r t > !• I ! i E I: : r i; u i < > u , 
Washington, March 10, 1926. 
Hon. SCOTT LKAVITT, 
Chairman Committee on Indiin Affairs, 
Ilowsc of Representatives. 
MY DEAR MR. LEAVITT: Responsive to \ our request of V v\n u; \r\ 10, li)2(), 
under date of February 1<>, I submitted a report on I!. R. 913"., entitled "A bill to 
authorize oil and gas mining leases upon unallotted lands within Executive 
order Indian reservations." 
Some question has since been raised as to the scope or meaning of the words 
"in lieu of taxes to the State" as used in section 2, line 2, page 2, of this bill. 
As construed and understood by this department, the language found in .section 2 
of this bill simply means that the 37V£ per cent of the royalty therein referred 
to is to be paid to the State for certain designated purposes, in lieu of any and all 
taxes against the Indians, but does not include taxes against the white man, 
lessees or otherwise. This being the true intent in tins respect, in order to remove 
any further doubt about that feature of the bill, it is respectfully suggested 
that the words "in lieu of taxes," line 2, page 2, of the bill, be eliminated and after 
the word "located," lincvJ, page 2, the following be inserted: "in lieu of any and 
all taxes against the Indians to whose credit 62}^ per centum shall be deposited 
in the Treasury of the United States as is in this section inM-iM».*n,»r ?^-vided " 
Very truly yours, 
The enactment s accomplish the following 
purposes; 
1. Permit exploration and gas on Executive order Indian 
reservations. 
2. Give to^the Indians i . „i me oil and gas royalties. 
3- Authorize the States to tax the production of oil a 
such reservations. 
4. Extend relief to permittees and applicants who have in good 
faith sought to discover oil and gas under the general leasing act <if 
February 25, 1920. 
5. Remove the necessity for further litigation in the courts. 
The first section of the bill provides for a uniform method of 
making oil and gas leases on Indian reservations under the super-
vision of the Indian Bureau. The law now in effect on lands "occu-
pied by Indians who have bought and paid for the same/' otherwise 
Known as "treaty reservations/' which would be by this act extended 
over Indian reservations created by Executive order is as follows: 
That unallotted land on Indian reservations other than lands of the F ivc 
Civilized Tribes and the Osage Reservation subject to lease for mining purposes 
for a period of 10 years under the proviso to sect ion 3 of the act of February 2Sf 
1891 (26 Stat. L. 795), may be leased at public auction by the Secretary of the 
Interior, with the consent of the council speaking for such Indians, for oil and gas 
mining purposes for a period of not to exceed 10 years, and as much longer there-
after as oil or gas shall be found in paying quantities, and the terms of any exist-
ing oil and gas mining lease may in like manner be amended by extending the 
term thereof for as long as oil or gas shall be found in paving quantities. ( 13 
Stat. 244) 
The proviso to section 3 of the act of February 28, ISO I, reads: 
That where lands arc occupied by Indians who have bought ami paid for* the 
same, and which lands arc not needed for farming oi agricultural pui poses a »d 
are not desired for inHivMn. >i «n ,*.«-. * ** 
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of the council speaking for such Indians, for a period not to exceed five years fo 
grazing or farming or ten years for mining purposes, in such quantities and upo: 
such terms and conditions as the agent in charge of such reservation may recoro 
mend, subject to the approval of the Secretary o( the Interior. 
The second section of the hill as amended provides that the mone; 
received from oil and g.-ts lenses on Kxeeiilive order Indian rescrvn 
tions shall he deposited in the Treasury to the credit of the Indian 
in the same manner JUS such ineome is now credited to the triha 
funds of Indians who reside on treaty reservations. 
That such action h\ Congress is not unprecedented is shown b\ 
the following extract from a letter, dated December (i, 1023. fror 
lion. Hubert Work, Secretary of the Interior, to the chairman of th 
Cominitttcc on Indian Affairs: 
Congress has heretofore recognized the ritfht of the Indians occupying Excel: 
live order Indian reservations to money*; arising from the leasing of their land: 
.Section 21 of the Indian apprnprnprialinii act of May IS, 11)10 (3!) Stat. L. 123 
l.r>5), authorized the leasing for mining purposes of unallotted lands on th 
diminished Spokane Indian lteserv:itionf in Washington, and provided that th 
proceeds arising therefrom should l>e pnid into the Spokane tribal fund. 
Section 20 of the ad of June :'*<>, \<)\\) (II Stat. L. 3-31), authorized the lcasin 
of unallotted lauds on Indian reservations within the Slates of Arizona, Call 
forma, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico. Oregon, Washington, and Wye 
ming for the pur|>ose of mining metalliferous minerals and provided that th 
money arising therefrom 'shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United State 
to the credit of the Indians belonging and having tribal rights on the rcservatio 
where the leased laud is located." Many of the reservations affected by thi 
act were created by Incentive order. 
By section 7 of the act of June 2a. MHO (30 Stat. L. X55-S57), Congress recog 
nized the right of the Indians of a reservation to the proceeds of timber cu 
from their unallotted lands, no distinction being made between reservation 
created by treaty or by Kxecutive order. 
Congress has repeatedly recognized the right of Indians living on Exccutiv 
order Indian reservation* to the proceeds of the sale of surplus land of sue 
reservations. Such legislation has been enacted affecting Indian reservations i 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Utat 
and Washington. 
The bill as introduced provided for a division of the proceeds re 
ceived from rentals, royalties or bonuses so (hat 02]4 per cent \roul< 
he credited to the Indians and .'#7J"j per cent paid to the State wher 
the leased hinds are located. Payments to the State, however, wcr 
to he conditional upon the expenditure of the money so obtained upoi 
roads within or contributory to the respective reservations or for th 
support of schools attended by Indian children. The practical efTec 
of this limitation was to require the expenditure of all of the incom 
from oil and gas leases either directly or indirectly for the benefit o 
the Indians. 
To pay money to a State and then require the State to expend i 
for Indian purposes seems to be unnecessary and of no advantage t 
the State. Your committee recommends that the bill be amended b; 
providing that the entire proceeds from oil am! gas leases be depositee 
in the Treasury, where the same shall be subject to appropriation b; 
Congress for tne use and benefit of the Indians. 
In order to clarify the meaning of the term "the expense of ad 
ministration/' your committee* recommends that ''expenses in con 
nection with the supervision of the development and operation o 
the oil and gas industry" be substituted therefor. 
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of the council speaking for such Indians." If it is proper to ascertain 
the wishes of the Indians before the leases are made, then the Indians 
should certainly be consulted as to the disposition of tin ITM nc. * di 
rived from such leases prior to the time when appropriations of [he 
same are made by Congress for their benefit. The proven t • sret i<m 
2 will require the Bureau of Indian Alfuirs to state the drsnv of In 
Indians in submitting estimates of a] >pi oprintions fi om • .ILK'"In 11 d i a l 
funds to Congress through the Budget. 
It is the opinion of your committer1 that inn: i; ti nrd dole- in ihc 
form of per capita | myments ai e a: ; demoralizing to Indian- a > like 
payments would be to i m c f | i i a l n u m b e r of whiter p e o p l e , i n t u n c -
t)f great drought or other severe and gei »eral h a r d s h i p it i>»a\ bo de-
sirable to make such payments, but the Bun au of Indian Affairs 
should not have authority to do so without the consent i Congress 
Since the legal title to all lands reserved for fndians is in the 
United States, none of such lands are subject to State or local taxa-
tion. The Supreme Court has repeatedh d e e i d e d t h a t ti e m i n e r a l s 
taken from Indian lands are likewise tax exempt unless Con^ivss 
specifically consents thereto. (Indian 'lYrritory IHuminalmi: Oil 
Co. v. Oklahoma, 240' IT. S. 522: Howard v. <1\ psx ( hi Co : M""; 1 S. 
503; Large Oil C<», t Howard, 24 N U. S. 5li).) 
Congress has adopted the policy of permit ting the State and local 
authorities to tax the minerals produced on Indian lands in flu ,
 ;l r 
of thcOsages (41 Stat. 1250), the Quapau s t t-H S t a t 12 1!)) a n d nj • n 
treaty reservations generally (43 Stat. 2 4 0 . The terms relating to 
taxation used in the new section 3 of the hill are taken from* the 
{>roviso to section 32 of the general leasing i u "t ( 11 Stat. 450) w Inch las been construed l>\ the Supreme Com t in f l ic c a s e of M i d - X o r l h e r n 
Oil Co. v. Walker, Treasurer of the «: ^ta!< i of Montana a: ;; J ollows: 
We think that the proviso plainly discloses I he intention of ( <»iiy,ivss Ihal 
persons and corporations contracting with the United States under the Igeneral 
leasing] act should not for that reason be exempt from any form *»f Slate taxation. 
In the latter part of section 3 a distinction is made between the 
State taxes which may be levied upon the property of leasees and 
upon the share obtained for the Indians b\ providing thai : "Jlnli JY 
local taxes may only be levied upon the rentals, royalties or bonuses 
received by the Indians. The effect of this section is to permit the 
State to collect directly from the oil producer on Indian lands any 
and every kind of tax that may be assessed against others engaged 
in like operations elsewhere in the Slate. The Slate is not authorized, 
however, to collect such taxes directly from the Indians but the same 
are to be paid for them by the Secretary of t h e I n ! CM i< w am 1 a pin >viso 
is added which exempts the lands or other property of the Indians 
from any tax lien. The final result of this legislation will be that the 
entire output of oil and .gas will be (axed by the Slates, tin • pi odnecr 
paying upon his share and the Indians ii( >on the share blaiiu • J 1 »r 
them. 
The last section c >f tin : bill is necessary in oi dei t< > afl 'oi d e q u i t a b l e 
relief to those who in go< ul faith ha\ t expended money in prospecting 
for oil and gas in accordance with the general leasing act of Februarv 
25, 1920. (41 Stat. 437.) On June o! 1022. Albert* B. Fall, the then 
Secretary of the Interior, decided that lands withdraw n froi n tlie 
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public domain by Executive order for the use of Indians are lands 
''owned by the United States" within the purview of that term as 
used in the act of February 25, 1920, and therefore subject to lease 
under that act. A number of applications were received of which 20 
ripened into prospecting permits. 
On May 27, 1924, Attorney General Harlan F. Stone rendered an 
opinion to the effect that if Congress had intended the act of February 
25, 1920, to apply to Executive order Indian reservations that act 
would have so stated in specific terms. For this and other reasons 
the Attorney (Jeneral ruled that " the leasing act of 1920 does not 
apply to Mxcculive order Indian reservations." 
Following this opinion the Attorney General caused a suit to ho 
filed in the United States District Court in Utah to rane.el the 20 
oil and jjas prospecting permits granted by Secretary Fall. The 
decision of the Federal judge on April 27, 1023,,is JUS follows: 
United States District Court, District of Utah. United States of America, 
plaintiff, v. JOd McMahon Harrison, defendant. No. S2SS, E 
(At the conclusion of the testimony arid argument the court said:) 
This ease, gentlemen, as indicated a moment ago, seems U> have been brought 
by the Attorney General to cancel permits granted by the Secretary of the 
Interior pursuant to the leasing act, on the ground not tlint the Secretary of the 
Interior did not have authority to issue permits under the act but that he had 
no authority to issue permits upon this particular piece of land. The land it is 
claimed was set apart by Executive order for Indian purposes, but it does not 
appear that any Indian rights have attached. It is as much in I he future, so 
far as the Indians are concerned, as it was on the 17th day of May, 1SS4, the day 
the order was made. The title both legal and equitable continued and was in the 
Government at the tune this permit was issued. That being true, the Executive 
order could have been set aside at any time, could be set aside yet by the Execu-
tive. 
My impression is, gentlemen, that the Seerelnry of the Interior could have set 
it aside under the authorities; and especially >o in view of the leasing act wherein 
he is specifically given authority under certain rules and regulations to issue 
permits upon Government land. 
The equities arc all in favor of the defendant. The claim of the Government 
is, as I view it, highly technical in that no substantial rights with respect to the 
Government or anyone else are alleged or ehuuied. Thc.c is no question of 
fraud here; no claim that these lands have been occupied by Indians or can 
possibly be occupied by Indians in any practical way. It is a desert, unfit for 
occupancy by anv human being. 
The right of the Government to insist upon and enforce what in effect is 8 
forfeiture is too doubtful in my mind for the court to adopt that view and deprive 
the defendants of possible benefits to be derived from the large expenditure? 
which they have made upon this ground in good faith. I shall hold against the 
contention of the Government, and I will add also in all these other cases a. 
well, if the facts arc the same. 
I can see no advantage to anyone for the court to take this matter unde 
advisement and write an elaborate opinion upon it or an opinion of any sort, fo 
that matter, especially in view of the fact that counsel for the Government, an< 
also for the defendants in part, arc nonresidents. Being here, gentlemen, an< 
knowing what the decision is, you can jx»rhaps arrange for a speedy appeal o 
the case and review by the appellate court. 
Mr. WILLIAMS. Mav I consider that a decree entered in this case dismiisin 
the bill? 
The COURT. That will be the end of this case, yes; decree will be entered dis 
missing the bill; that will be the decree. 
Ordered filed and made a part of the record. 
TILLMAN D. JOHNSON, District Judge. 
OIL AND GAS MINING LEASES UPON UNALLOTTED LANDS 7 
The case was promptly appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Denver and on December 10, 1925, was certified to the Supremo 
Court in the following manner: 
In Supreme Court of the United States, No. N72, OCIMIMM t r im WI » Che 
United States of America v. Ed McMahan Harrison Mitlucsf < ill i'u uni (IK 
Southwest Oil Co., certificate 
QUESTIONS CERTIFIED 
1. Was there authori ty in the Secretary of the hit i ioi to i - uc , nml< i (he 
provisions of the leasing act of February 25, 1020 (-11 SU\\. I,. IX" , -l II, <\unp. 
Stat . 1923 Supp. sec. 4640!^ss) the permit which the Unit < MI State. i ,i >\v s< M :ks u » 
have canceled in this suit? 
If this question be answered in the negative then we ask: 
2. Can this suit be maintained by the United States in equiti to cancel the 
permit, it having been issued upon formal hearing by the Se cretarv of the In-
terior, no claim of fraud or bad faith being made, and the Government having 
brought no ac t ion to cancel the same for 1 year . 10 months and 9 days after its 
issuance, appellees Midwest Oil Co. and Southwest Oil Co. in that time having 
expended over $200,000 in developing the property for oil, which to them is a 
total loss if the permit is canceled? 
These questions of law arc by the UniU d States Circuit Court c >f \ppeals I or 
the Eighth Circuit hereby certified to the Supreme Coin t in uccorc Linn! , -;111 the 
frovisjons of section 239 United States Judicial Code. 
Judges who sat in the Circuit Court of Appeals on the hearing < I lite ease: 
UOBT. E. L E W I S , 
United States Circuit , htdtje. 
WILLIAM S. K E N VON, 
United States Circuit J udge. 
T H O S . C. M U N G E R , 
United States District Judge 
From the foregoing it is evident that the 20 permittees have sub-
stantial equities-which are worthy of recognition, and the last section 
of the bill provides that they may proceed to prospect under their 
permits as originally issued and upon the discovery of valuable de-
posits of oil and gas to obtain leases in the manner provided by the 
act of February 25, 1920, under which their applications weie made. 
This section consists principally of a reenactment of the applicable 
provisions of that act, so that development may proceed on the lands 
embraced within the 20 permits under the supervision of the Bureau 
of Indian Affairs instead of the General Land Office. 
The committee amendment at the end of section 4 is designed to 
afford relief to the qualified applicants who filed their applications 
for oil and gas leases on Executive order Indian reservations during 
the time when the act of February 25, 1920, was held to be applicable 
to such reservations. The amendment does not grant to these appli-
cants any rights other than those which they possessed upon the 
date when Attorney General Stone rendered Jiis oninion. Your com-
mittee has been unable to ascertain the exact number of such applica-
tions, but the Commissioner of the General Land Office estimates 
that they do not exceed 400. It is known that 225 applications were 
filed in New Mexico, where the principal oil discoveries In i • c been 
made. 
The enactment of the bill will undoubtedly result in (In dismissal 
of the suit now pending before the Supreme Court of the United 
States to test the validity of Secretary Fall's ruling that the leasing 
act of 1920 applies to Executive order Indian reservations. That 
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of Indian Affairs because under the terms of that net none of the oil 
and gas royalties would be paid to the Indians. Hon. Charles H. 
Burke, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, has always insisted that 
the Indians are justly entitled to receive ail of the income from oil 
and gas lenses and has never agreed to any legislation the effect of 
which would deprive them of the benefits thereof. Since the most 
favorable outcome of the pending litigation could not possibly secure 
for the Indians any tiling more than is granted them nv this bill the 
suit should be dismissed as soon as it becomes a law. 
The bill as amended places the permittees and applicants in the 
same situation as they were when the suits were filed against them. 
While there are able lawyers who contend that the Supreme Court 
of the United States will sustain Secretary Fail's ruling, yet those 
who desire to secure leases under their present applications would 
certainly prefer to procccnl in accordance with the terms of this bill 
rather than wait until that court has rendered a decision. 
With the rights of both the Indians and the oil operators recognized 
as provided in the bill there can be no reason why the Supreme Court 
should decide the pending suit, unless it is deemed desirable for that 
court to use it as means of passing upon the question of whether the 
Indians who occupy Executive order Indian reservations have title 
thereto. The court could ignore that issue in deciding the case, but 
if every contention in favor of the Indians were approved it would 
still be necessary for Congress to pass an act authorizing oil and gas 
leases on Executive order Indian reservations, disposing of the rentals, 
royalties, or bonuses and permitting the States to levy taxes. 
With the general leasing act of 1920 declared to be inapplicable, 
Congress would then be compelled to do the very tilings proposed to 
be done by this bill. 
Nothing in this bill is intended to in any manner change or alter 
the ownership or legal and equitable title to the lands described by 
its terms. The question of what rights the Indians may have in 
and to Executive order reservations will not be affected by its passage 
and the courts can squarely decide that issue without reference to 
this legislation. 
Under the Constitution, Congress has complete authority to dis-
f osc of the public domain and to control the uses of the lands of ndian tribes. It is therefore no disrespect to the Supreme Court 
for Congress to pass laws relating to such matters while they are 
the subject of legal controversy. Many instances can be cited 
where that has been done, but the following should be sufficient: 
On April 11, 1921, in the case of United States v. Northern Pacific 
Railway Co. (256 U. S. 51), the Supreme Court rendered a decision 
remanding the case for further hearing, or if the parlies did not 
avail themselves of that privilege, with direction to the lower cour 
to enter a decree, without prejudice to have certain -questions deter 
mined by the land department. While the matter was still pending 
and unadjudicated by the court or by the department, Congres. 
June 5, 1924 (43 Stat. 401), passed a joint resolution directing 
withholding of action in the matter pending a congressional investi 
gation, which investigation is now in progress, and which will UD 
rloubtedlv eventuate in further legislation. 
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Coog r e s s o n j^ai-ch 4, 1923 (42 Stat. 1448), passed an act disposing 
of certain oil claims in the bed of Red River, Okla., although the 
lands were at that time included in pending proceedings before the 
United States Supreme Court, and remained in possession of a 
receiver appointed by the court for a year or more alter the passage 
of the act. In each of these cases property valued at millions of 
dollars was involved, yet Congress did not hesitate to enact legisla-
tion vitally affecting its ownership. 
The bill as introduced was an attempt to compromise conflicting 
opinions as to how to develop the oil and gas resources to be found on 
about 22,250,000 acres of land which has been withdrawn from the 
public domain by Executive order at various times and under vary-
ing conditions for the use and occupancy of Indians. The bill as 
reported back to the House is fair and equitable to the Indians, to 
the States where the reserved lands are located, and to those who 
desire to prospect for oil and gas. As amended, the bill reads as 
follows 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Rejrrescntatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That unallotted lands within the limits of any 
reservation or withdrawal created by Executive order for Indian purposes or 
for the use or occupancy of any Indians or tribe may be leased for oil and pas 
mining purposes in accordance with the provisions contained in the act of May 29, 
1924 (Forty-third Statutes, page 244). 
SEC. 2. That the proceeds from rentals, royalties, or bonuses ot oil and gas 
leases upon lands within Executive-order Indian reservations or withdrawals 
shall be deposited in the Treasury of the United States to the credit of the tribe 
of Indians for whose benefit the reservation or withdrawal was created or who 
are using and occupying the land, and shall draw interest at the rate of 4 per 
centum per-annum-and be available for appropriation by Congress for expenses 
in connection with the supervision of the development and operation of the oil 
and gas industry and for the use and benefit of such Indians: Provided, That said 
Indians, or their tribal council, shall be consulted in regard to the expenditure 
of such money, but no per capita payment shall be made except by act of Congress. 
S E C 3. That taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority 
upon improvements, output of mines or oil and gas wells or other rights, property, 
or assets of any lessee upon lands within Executive-order Indian reservations 
in the same manner as such taxes are otherwise levied and collected, and such 
taxes may be levied against the share obtained for the Indians as bonuses, 
rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized 
and directed to cause such taxes to be paid out of the tribal funds in the Treas-
ury: Provided, That such taxes shall not become a lien m charge of nn 1 iml 
against the land or other property of such Indians. 
S E C 4. That the Secretary of the Interior is hereby authorized, under such 
rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to allow any applicant to whom a 
permit to prospect for oil and gas under lands within an Indian reservation or 
withdrawal created by Executive order has heretofore been issued in accordance 
with the provisions of the act of February 25, 1920 (Forty-first Statutes, page 
437), or the holder thereof, to prospect for a period of two years from the date 
this act takes effect, or for such further time as the Secretary of the Interior may 
deem reasonable or necessary for the full exploration of the land described in 
his permit, under the terms and conditions therein set out, and a substantial 
contribution toward the drilling of the geologic structure by the holder of a 
permit therein may be considered as prospecting under the provisions hereof; 
and upon establishing to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Interior that 
valuable deposits of oil and gas have been discovered within the limits of the 
land embraced in any permit, the permittee shall be entitled to a lease for one-
fourth of the land embraced in the prospecting permit: Provided, That the 
permittee shall be granted a lease for as much as one hundred and sixty acres of 
said lands if there be that number of acres within the permit. The area to be 
selected bv the permittee shall be in mninnff form find if surveyed to be de-
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accordance with rules and legulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of th« 
Interior, and the lands leased shall be conformed to and taken in accordance 
with the legal subdivisions of such surveys; deposits made to cover expense of 
surveys shall be deemed appropriated for"that purpose, and any excess deposits 
may be repaid to the person or ]>crsons making such deposit or their legal repre-
sentatives. Such leases shall be for a term of twenty years upon a royalty of 
5 per centum in amount or value of the production and the annual payment in 
advance of a rental of $1 per acre, the rental paid for any one year to be credited 
against the royalties as they may accrue for that year, with the preferential 
right in the lessee to renew the same for successive periods of ten years upon 
such reasonable terms and conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of 
the Interior. The permittee shall also be entitled to a preference right to a 
lease for the remainder of the land in his prospecting permit at a royalty of not 
less than 1 2 ^ P<*r centum in amount or value of the production, the royalty to 
be determined by competitive bidding or fixed by such other method as the 
Secretary may by regulations prescribe: Provided further, That the Secretary 
shall have the right to reject any or all bids: And provided further, That the 
Secretary of the Interior in his discretion is authorized to reinstate, in the order 
of their original filing, all applications of qualified applicants filed prior to May 
27, 1924, for permits to prospect for oil and gas under the said act of February 
25, 1920, upon any lands covered by the provisions of this act, and which appli-
cations were not granted, upon the following conditions: Written request for 
such action shall be filed by the original applicant, or his heirs in the land office 
of the appropriate land district within ninety days from the date of the approval 
of this act, and the reinstatement of any such applications shall confer the right 
of prospecting and to secure a lease or leases as in this section provided, upon 
the lands described in such application. 
MINORlT'i Vir.WS 
Regretting our innhility to concur in the majority rep t 
9133, which provides for the leasing of public lands, knov 
tive order Indian reservations for oil and mining privilcir. --..y 
submit our minority views: 
I, he; i i , ,s i 1 M M < H* I \ MD 
H. R. 9133, reported out by the Committee on Ii idian AfFairs, 
authorizes the leasing of what is known as Executive order Indian 
reservations for oil and mining development, but the act is especially 
applicable to what is known as Navajo Executive order Indian 
Reservations. 
The President lias at different times in the past by so-called 
Executive orders designated certain portions of the Government 
public lands for temporary use of different Indian tribes. On other 
occasions, by similar Executive orders, the President has restored to 
the public lands domain certain portions of the Executive order 
Indian reservations. 
The President at no time has been given authority by Congress to 
transfer title in the public lands by Executive orders setting aside 
portions of the public domain for the use of the Indians. The legal 
title, therefore, to this so-called Executive order Indian reservations 
is at all times in the Government. For an illustration of the nature 
and character of the Executive order setting aside certain portions 
of the public lands for the use of the Indians, a copy of an order made 
by President Cleveland, April 2S, 1886, is hereby given, us follows, 
to wit: 
APRIL 24, 1886. 
It is hereby ordered that the following described tract of country in the Terri-
tory of New Mexico, viz, all those portions of townships 29 north, ranges 14, 15, 
and 16 west of the New Mexico principal meridian, south of the San Juan River, 
be, and the same is hereby, withdrawn from sale an<1 settlement and set apart as 
an addition to the Navajo Indian reservations. 
GROVER CLEVELAND. 
An illustration of an Executive order of the President restoring to 
the public land domain certain portions of Executive order Indian 
reservations is herowith shown by Executive order of President Harri-
son, made November 19, 1892: 
It is hereby ordered that the Executive order of May 17, 1884, by President 
Chester A. Arthur, withdrawing from sale and settlement and setting apart as a 
reservation for Indian purposes certain lands in the Territories of Ttalt and Ari-
zona, be, and the same hereby is, modified so that all the lands described in said 
order which lie west of the one hundred and tenth degree of west longitude and 
within the Territory of Utah, be, and the same hereby are, restored to the public 
domain, freed from reservation made by said order. 
BENJ. IIAHIUSON. 
Had thero been a transfer vesting of the title in the Indian tribe 
t.Vin PrnQidnnt. wr .v 1 ' l • - - > 1- «. -I • • 1 • - 1 - *\ • -* •- ' » — :^ 
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The legal effect of and moaning of Executive ordor Indian reserva-
taions is that the Indians may temporarily have the surfaco of the 
land for use in hunting, fishing, grazing, etc., the land at all times 
being subject to restoration to the general public domain. 
.SECRETARY FALL AUTHORIZES LEASING OF GOVERNMENT LAND AND 
MINERAL RESERVES 
While Senator Fall was Secretary of the Interior he authorized 
tin? leasing of certain portions of the Government mineral reserves 
and lands. Some of them went to Mr. Doheny, others went to Mr. 
Sinclair, and others, those involved in this bill, went to Ed. McMahon 
Harrison et al. 
It seems that the Government has employed special counsel to 
prosecute suits for the cancellation of the Doheny leases and other 
suits for the cancellation of the Sinclair leases, and still another suit 
restraining operation on the Executive order, Navajo Reservation. 
The last-named suit is to he especially affected by this bill. In other 
words, this bill (II. U. 9133), if enacted into law, will virtually rob 
and tako from the Supreme Court its jurisdiction of the subject matter 
involved in the suit. In nroof of this statement reference is here made 
to the statement made i>y Commissioner Burke, of Indian Affairs, 
before the committee which especially considered the bill. See top 
of page 28 of hearings, where Mr. Burke says: 
This suit (referring to the suit pending in the Supreme Court) is to be dis-
missed on the passage of this bill. That will lie the end of the litigation. 
Congress should not undertake to legislate a determination of 
suits in equity. The suit pending in the Supreme Court, which is to 
be dismissed upon the passage of this bill, is an equity suit, in which 
the court is not only to determine the legal status and title to the land 
involved but also to determine the equities and rights of the parties 
to the suit, as based upon facts proved by testimony and under 
oath. 
The Doheny and the Sinclair suits arc also pending before the 
Supreme Court. They, too, nre the result of the attitude of Secretary 
Fall toward the Federal Government ami its public lands and oil 
reserves. Is it wise for the Congress to supersede and intercede in 
behalf of either party or both parties to either of the suits now pend-
ing before the Supreme Court, in which Secretary Fall is so con-
spicuously involved? If so in one, then why not in the others? It 
is our opinion that the Congress would be setting an unwarranted 
and unjustified precedent in interfering with litigation pending be-
fore the Supreme Court in the manner that this bill would interfere. 
TO WHOM DORS THE OIL AND GAS AND OTHER MINERALS IN AND UNDER 
EXECUTIVE ORDER INDIAN RESERVATIONS BELONG 
In law, the Indians have only a temporary and permissive use of 
the surface of the land, and this through the gracious goodness anil 
paternalistic attitude of the Government toward the Indians. 
rn»A i l imi j l f t S in a sense only been loaned for surface use to the 
*• —- *~ i\xt, .mhlip drunaii 
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the land has at all times belonged to and now is 
Government. 
The whole of the Navajo Indian Reservation counti \ , fi < >i i i a 
report of the Geological Survey, appears to he from a prospective 
viewpoint good oil territory. The last paragraph of that report 
reads as follows: 
In conclusion it may be said that a review of all data at hand shows that nearly 
all of the Navajo Reservation is occupied by rocks which rithcr do or may pro-
duce oil, but that it will take a great deal of d< M ailed geologic work lit • < milinc the 
most promising areas. 
There does not appear from the hearings or any other source any 
special reason why wiiat may be one of the Government's richest oil 
reserves should be given to one tribe of the Government Indian wards. 
The urgency of this bill from a Government standpoint has not 
appeared in the hearings or from any other source. Then* is no pres-
ent scarcity of oil to supply the needs of the* general public While 
there doubtless will be a time when the demand for oil will he much 
greater than now, those who arc interested in securing the leases and 
who are to be given a preference l>\ I his bill are t lie ones to be espe-
cially benefited at this time. 
THE GOVERNMENT THE GUARDIAN I: ( lit I! s b l A V TRIBAL IMM >PEKT\ AND 
D E P E N D E N T A NI ) HES 1 Mi T E D INDIANS 
According to the JISSIIII icd a u t h o r i t y < >f the Govcnu .n • .-.:•<•-
sions of the Supreme Court and the acts of Congress, the ( ; t 
sustains a guardianship relation to the Indian tribes and their property 
and the restricted dependent membership thereof. There are many 
f)Oor tribes without property of any eonsequt TIC *c\ This bill provides or transferring rich mineral rights, which now belong to the Federal 
Government, to the Navajos, who already have a large reservation 
said to be rich in oil and coal mineral rights. There would not seem 
to be any equity or fairness on the part of the Great While Father to 
lavishly give to his wards who already have plenty when there are 
many other wards.of the same relationship to the guardian who do 
not have plenty 
We, therefore, dissent from the majority report for three reasons: 
First. The enactment of this legislation would in substance be 
ratifying and validating what is claimed to be the unauthorized and 
illegal official acts of Secretary Fall and would be legislating subject 
matter away from the Supreme Court, which would be a bad 
precedent 
Second. The oil and other mineral rights in the lands involved in 
this bill are the property of the Federal Government and do not belong 
to the Navajo Indians and should not be virtually transferred in this 
way to any Indians. 
Third. If the Government, in expressing a paternalistic spirit and 
relationship towsird any of its Indian wards, wishes to give away its 
mineral reserves, then we submit that those Indian wards most needy 
shoidd be first remembered or at least- should be ti c a ted equally iveD 
with the more wealthy Indian wards. 
Respectfully submitted. 
W Tl MMIOI ! 
| i I ' \ II I ll ll II I I ' M V 
MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. FREAR 
The Hayden Tndian oil leasing hill (H. R. 0133) as originally intro-
duced this session, on which hearings were held, provides for a 37J^ 
per cent Indian oil royalty tax to he paid to the State. Ostensibly 
this tax is to he used for Indian highways or schools directly or 
indirectly, to be expended in the discretion of the State. The 
remaining 02 J^ per cent of the oil royalty is to be paid directly to the 
Interior Department to be held for the benefit of the Indian tribe 
owning or occupying the Executive order reservations. 
These Executive order reservations arc located in 10 different 
States and comprise over 22,000,000 acres of land occupied by about 
85,000 of the 225,000 restricted Indians. The position of those 
opposed to the inequitable 37 K» P o r c o n t oil tax proposal is to be found 
in the fact that all unallotted treaty reservations ?iow held by Indians 
pay the same rate of oil lax to the State in which the land is located 
as is paid by the white people and other residents of the State. No 
favor and no injustice is extended to the Indians who occupy these 
reservations. It was contended by Secretary Fall and others tnat the 
Executive order lands were only "used" by the Indians and differ 
in title from the treaty reservations, and it is now contended that a 
3 7 ^ per cent oil tax should be paid by the Indians to the State pri-
marily because of their doubtful title. The determination of the title 
of the Indians in Executive order lands briefly will be referred to here-
after. 
In the Sixty-eighth Congress an oil-leasing bill was introduced by 
Representative Havden to cover these same Executive order lands. 
The copy of that bill is not before me, but is understood to have 
contained a proposal that Indian oil royalties should be taxed by 
the State the same as all other royalties and in the same manner as 
oil royalties from treaty reservations are now taxed. That tax, for 
illustration, in Oklahoma under that State's law is only 3 per cent 
on the Indian royalties, whereas H. R. 9133 as Introduced provides 
a 37H per cent tax or twelve times as much. 
The iia}'den bill last session went to the Senate and was there 
amended or an independent proposition was inserted in the Senate 
bill covering the same Indian oil proposition. The Indian oil royalty 
tax provided for in the Senate bill was 37H per cent, or over twelve 
times the amount that would have been paid under the Hayden bill 
that passed the House that session. 
The House and Senate bill, with the conference rcr>ort, came back 
to the House on March 3, 1925. Mr. Snyder and Mr. Hayden were 
managers on the part of the House. The report is found in volume 
G6 of part 5, Sixty-eighth Congress, second session, page 5433. A 
oint of order made b}r Mr. Dalhngcr against the report was sustained 
y the Chair and the bill failed in its passage. The point of order 
was based on the fact that the conferees had agreed without sub-
mitting the 37>£ per cent Senate amendment to the House for its 
i 
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Bill H . R. 9133, introduced at this session, i is app< M in s 1 rom page 1 
of the hearings, provides I he same Indian tax ;i ate c»f 37J4 per cent 
contained in the Senate amendment, thai was j>la< i <1 in the House bill 
last session, and similarly leaves the while producer I ix exempt. A 
similar Indian oil leasing bill to II. K. 5U;{.'! is before the Senate 
committee at this time Il • contains tin : :anu rale of -ST1 j pet < r nt 
Indian royalty oil tax to be paid the Stat<\ as appears from that- bill 
That bill,or an amendment with that rate of M} \ per cent, will be sent 
back to the House. The n i xu il confei v < s appointed on f IK Senate and 
House Indian oil leasing bill presumably will be largely the same as 
those who recommended the 3 7 ^ per cent Indian royalty oil tax It si 
session. 
The Indian oil leasing bill (H. R. 9133) wiis referred this session I*i 
a subcommittee. Only one hearing was held on the bill, which covers 
22,000,000 acres of Indian reservation land, as stated. At that 
hearing of not to exec *cd t\\ o hour? % \\ ith about Ill pi igc ls of :K :tual tes-
timony, the only witnesses who appeared were those acting I oi oil 
interests, claiming equities under the Fall order no> \ beinj ;; /' jni \ ue .1 
by the Government in the Federal courts. 
Also there appeared the Indian Commissioner, w ho appro\ ed the 
37H pe rcen t tax or gift to tlie States contained in the bill, and testi-
mony was offered by Representative Hayden in behalf of his bill. 
Against the bill appeared John Collier, ex< Tittive sec ret i i \ \ i i i<: i i 
can Indian Defense Association. "Not one member of tlie S5,000 
Indians who occupied 22,000,000 acres of land, nor any authorized 
representative of such Indians, was present I -o testify The hearings 
will show the brief character of that OIK l day s t estimony which %is 
accompanied by documents and dat a necrssa i \ t .o m under? landing 
of the measure. 
After the hearing on February 1! >, 1! )2G. I y the subcommitt< t , the 
next meeting occurred on March 24, when bill II. K. 9133 was again 
taken up for consideration. An amendment offered by Kepresenta-
tive Hayden to his own bill abandoning the 3 7 ^ per cent Indian 
royalty tax and substantially embodying the tax pi ovisions of his 
bill of last session, was then adopted. 
I t was stated that while no objection was had to tl u s n i lendmc nt 
which would tax Indian oil royalties the same as those MI ti <: Mit \ 
reservations, nevertheless acceptance of the bill in that form would 
mean its passage through tlie House to the Senate, where, as before, 
tlie 3 7 ^ per cent tax amendment would be reinserted, unci without 
any opportunity to consider the tax proposal on its merits the House 
would oe confronted with a brief discussion and proposed conference 
report with tlie time entirely controlled by tlie proponents of the 
373^ per cent tax proposal, and for that re nson, especially in view 
of the experience 01 last session, no argunu Mil: could safely !>c had in 
the House to the bill when amended. 
The subcommittee report was presented u > the general c .unmittee 
and adopted substantially in the same form, excepting that instead of 
22 applicants under the old Fall order the bill was amended to include 
any number of the 475 applicants that the Secretary may determine. 
Over 1,000,000, acres possibly may be so «; -i \ < MI t .> those applicants 
whose claims w< 5 re < > v e r r 1 11 ec 1 b y A t t o r 11 e \" ( i < 111 e r a 1 S tc,> 11< >""s c » j > 11111 »1:1 
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The bill finally was approved by the Indian Committee on March 
27, by a vote of 8 for and 5 opnosed out of the 13 members present. 
The opposition will be overwhelming if the facts can be understood. 
The objection readied in committee to the bill's present form arc 
herewith briefly stated: 
If the llayden Indian oil leasing bill, II. It. 0133, as now reported 
could pass Congress in the form now presented by the committee 
with all parties equally taxed, it. would still be objectionable because, 
of the -I7f> Fall applicants and 1,200,000 acres that mnv be given to 
these favored applicants under the illegal Fall order. A royalty rate 
of only 5 per cent to the Indians on one-quarter of these lands, 
300,000 acres, is without justification. The Senate amendment of 
37^2 pur <*-nt royalty tax was placed in the Senate bill bust session 
and as stated it was accepted by the conferees of the House without 
any action permitted by the. House and was thrown out on the point 
of order. 
The present bill was introduced containing the 37J'.j per cent 
Indian royally oil tax contained in both Senate1 and House bills, 
and that rate has been separately considered by the Senate and 
House committees. The bill is practically certain to have the Senate 
amendment added to its provisions if it passes the House at this 
time, and will then conn* back without reasonable opportunity by 
the House to consider the amendment, just as it occurred last ses-
sion. The further important fuct is noted that the Senate 37]/£ 
per cent Indian royalty tax was approved by the Indian Bureau 
last session, and the same rate, according to Commissioner Burke 
in both House and Senate bearings, has been approved by the Indian 
Bureau this session. No measure, based on past experience, will 
pass Congress without the approval of the Indian Bureau. 
The bill as. reported by the committee without the 371^ per cent 
Indian oil royalty tax does not meet the conditions heretofore ap-
proved by the Indian Bureau. I t may be further stated that the 
only way to fairly present the question before the House will be to 
await receipt of the Senate bill and such action then had upon the 
Senate bill as may be deemed necessary. By that means alone will 
fair discussion be afforded in the House on the 373£ per cent oil 
tax amendment. 
CLAIMS AFFECTING INDIAN' TITLKS IN CONTROVERSY 
Briefly staled, it is claimed by oil interests that these Executive 
order reservations ought to be thrown open to the public lands leasing 
privileges. On June 9, 1922, Secretary of the Interior Fall ordered 
these Indian lands thrown open to oil prospectors on the same terms 
that public land oil leases were then made, under an act of February 
25, 1920. 
These terms, briefly, included a 5 per cent r e a l t y for the first 
G40 acres, and on three contiguous sections lessees were given prefer-
ence on roj'ally bids of at least Yiy^ per cent. Thirty-seven and one-
half per cent of the royalty so paid on public land leases is given to 
the State in which the Government lands were located, and 52>£ per 
ceut is deposited in the reclamation fund, with 10 per cent for tho 
Treasury. The** oil permits were given by Secretary Kail by order, 
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and about 475 applications were filed according to Commissioner 
Burke, page 35, subcommittee hearings. 
Based on protects from various Indian welfare organizations, the 
President thereafter asked for a legal opinion from the Attorney 
General affecting the status of Executive order reservations. 
In that opinion, containing about -1,000 words, pages 77 (o X2 of 
printed hearings, the Attorney General upheld I lie content inn of the 
Indian Rights Association as follows: 
* * * * * * * 
The important matter here, however, is tliat neither tlie* euurU nor Congress 
have made any distinction as to the character or extent of Indian rights a; 
between Executive order reservations and reservations established by treaty 
or act of Congress. So that if the general leasing act applies to one class there 
seems to !>c no ground for holding that it does not apply to others. You are 
therefore advised that the leasing act of 1020 duos not apply to Executive order 
Indian reservations. 
Respectfully, 
HAHI.AN F. STONB, Attorney General. 
No uncertainty exists in that judgment, based on a long li.st of 
authorities quoted and a thorough discussion of the subject, ttused 
on that opinion the Fall order was set aside and no applications 
recognized, on the theory that Indian rights prevented such applica-
tions being considered. 
A suit was brought by one Harrison, a Fall oil permittee. The 
local Federal judge sustained his right without taking the matter 
under advisement (hearings, p. S3), and two questions were there-
after certified by the court of appeals to the Supreme Court. Sup-
porting the opinion of Attorney General Stone is the opinion of tne 
solicitor of the Interior Department, who rendered an opinion several 
days ago to the same effect as that found by the Attorney General. 
Based on such opinions, the United States owns all reservations, 
including treaty reservations. Executive order reservations were 
substituted for treaty reservations since 1S71 with slight exceptions. 
No difference exists in these titles, and Congress has power to take 
from any of these Indian reservations whatever tribal lands it sees 
fit to transfer, although no such action can be defended nor luis 
any been undertaken for ninny years. On the other hand, the 
public oil leasing act does not appl}' to any of the Indian reserva-
tions, and according to the Attorney General and solicitor of the 
Interior Department the same rights to title exist on the 22,000,000 
acres of Executive order reservations affected by the llayden bill 
that exist with all other reservations. 
An enabling act should be passed in order that oil development may 
be had upon the Indian hums and the income derived for the benefit 
of the Indians. I t is here contended, however, that production and 
Indian oil royalties should be taxed the same as, but no higher than, 
all other oil royalties. Oklahoma unallotted treaty reservation 
Indians and Indians on trcatv reservations in all the remaining oil 
producing States now pay to the State oil royalty tax rates averaging 
about 3 per cent,, the amount fixed by the laws of the several States 
for production and royalties anywhere in these States. 
The 373^ per cent tax rate originally in the Ilaydcn bill was carried 
through conference last session without any vote by the House. It 
is a tax 12 times the rate of taxes paid from treaty reservations 
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without any justification therefor except to claim it is a compromise 
of suits now pending. For illustration, on a total oil production of 
$1,000,000 under the hill, with a 37>£ per cent oil royalty tax the 
Indian trihe would receive from the 475 or loss number of Fall appli-
cants, on the hasis of a 5 per cent royalty, $.">()yQ0(). Of this $50,000 
royalty on $1,000,000 production the State with its 37}4 per cent 
Indian oil tax would got SIS,750 and the Indian trihe would have 
placed to its credit the remaining (Y2lt per cent or $31,250, which is 
ahout 3 per cent net royaltv for Indians on those lenses. The oil 
driller and producer would, however, get $950,000 of the $1,000,000 
for his share and would he exempted from taxation. On a 3 per cent 
tax, if the State exacted that from him, he would still receive over 
90 per cent net of the total oil production. 
If the oil royalties reach 12*^ per cent, or one-eighth, as in ordi-
nary eases, the Indian trihos' share would ine.roaso two and one-half 
times the 5 per cent royalty, hut in all eases subjected to the 37J/£ 
per cent State tax, with proportionate decreases in the oil producer's 
share. Many tribes will he affected hy this oil leasing hill on which 
none of the Indians affected have yet expressed an opinion so far as the 
hearings show. The hill says the .St ale will expend this 37^£ per cent 
for the Indians. That provision is heyond any reasonable explana-
tion or expectation of relief to the Indians. 
In other words, the Navajo Trihes land is the reservation on which 
Fall gave his permits and received the other applications. If the oil 
production on the Navajo Tribe's reservation reach $1,000,000, ac-
cording to the illustration, the Xavajo Indians will receive $31,250 
from that amount of oil production, or an average of less than $1 per 
capita to members of the trihe. This might not be so important 
ordinarily as between individuals, but apart from the fact that this 
bill is intended primarilv to reach prospective Navajo oil fields, it is 
further stated that nearly $900,000 reimbursable charges are pending 
against this tribe that must eventually be paid. 
One-third of the Navajo Tribe is suffering from trachoma, 7,000 
children were recently reported without schools, ni\d generally speak-
ing the tribe was stated to be three generations backward compared 
with other northern tribes. 
This suggestion is only offered to show the injustice of permitting 
the House or the Senate, to enact a 37 x/1 per cent royalty oil tax to bo 
collected against the Indians. 
In conclusion it is submitted: 
First. That the House bill originally contained the 3 7 ^ per cent 
Indian tax. 
That tax was stricken out in committee before the bill was reported. 
The Senate will amend the bill if passed and substitute the 3714 
per cent tax. 
The bill will thon come back in conference. 
That was precisely the situation last session excepting that no 
vote on the Senate amendment was then had in the House. 
This plan removes the 37j^ per cent discussion from the House 
until it comes in under pressure of a conference report. 
Second. The allowance of upward of 475 applicants under the 
T7.il — j — „ :„„ .._,.,«„,j ^t ocin nnn .>,»r.,^  nf Inn/1 mi/wiiinrtcr of 
«L « «.
 ra „„,, upoN UNALLOIIED ^ 
JAMES A. 1< 
«EAK 
MINORITY VIEWS OF MR. HOWARD 
I find myself unable to indorse the majority report in approval of 
this bill. . , ,.
 r n m n r p i i c r u | all the conclusions reached 
Because of mab>l,w of u ^ o m p r e h m j 
by my colleague, lion, t»amcs> A. , 
withhold my signature. nassa^c of this bill in its present 
I respectfully P ™ * f ^ ^ ™ ^ proposed is 
form, having reached the co icu on twai , ^ legislation 
^ f ^ i ^ " 1 1 " bef°rC ^ 
Supreme Court of the United States. ^ ^ HOWARD. 
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ADDENDUM H 
H.R. REP. NO. 1883, 72D CONG., 2ND SESS. (1933) 
72D CONGRESS ) HOUSE OF BEFBESENTASSVES ( EEPOET 
£d Session f ( No. 1883 
PERMANENTLY SET ASIDE CERTAIN LANDS IN UTAH AS AN 
ADDITION TO THE NAVAJO INDIAN RESERVATION 
JANTJABT 19, 1933.—Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
ctate of the Union and ordered to be printed 
Mr. LEAVTTT, from the Committee on Indian Affaire, submitted the 
following 
EEPOBT 
[To accompany H. R. 117351 
The Committee on Indian Affairs, to whom was referred the bill 
(E. R. 11735) to permanently set aside certain lands in Utah as an 
addition to the Navajo Indian Reservation, and for other purposes, 
having considered the same, report it favorably to the House with 
the recommendation that it do pass with the following amendments: 
Pn«re 3, line 1, strike out the period after the wora "Utah" and 
add the following: "nor shall further Indian homesteads be made in 
said countT under the act of July 4, 1884 (23 Stat. 96; U. S. C , title 
43, sec. 190)." 
Page 3, line 19, strike out the period, insert a comma in lieu thereof 
and add "except as to the payment of fees or commissions which are 
hereby waived." 
This bill refers to certain lands now temporarily withdrawn from 
all forms of entry by an order of the Department of the Interior 
dated February 19, 1929, and would permanently withdraw the 
area for use of the Navajo Indians; it also includes a smaller tract of 
land withdrawn by departmental order of July 27,1932, and provides 
that the State of Utah may exchange school tracts within the area for 
other tracts of public land elsewhere within that State. 
This land has been used by the Indians since early history. The 
first mentioned part was originally set aside by Executive order (1884) 
for reservation purposes; in 1892 it was restored to the public domain 
by another Executive order. In 1908 the department withdrew the 
land for the use of the Indians and, finally, in 1922 it was restored 
to the public domain in the belief that it might prove more useful if 
made available for entry. Through all this time the Indians have 
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used the land to some extent; during the last 10 years the livestock 
industry has grown by leaps and bounds among the members of the 
tribe and it is apparent that, if this business is to continue to thrive, 
and the friends of the Indians hope it will, additional grazing land 
must be provided. It appears that only three white families have 
attempted to reside within the area. 
No new policy is established and no outlay of money by the Federal 
Government is involved. Provision is made for disposition of any 
revenue arising from any ofl and gas which might be discovered 
within the area and the State of Utah is permitted to select unreserved 
and nonmineral tracts elsewhere in lieu of school sections within the 
area. It appears that the rights of all persons involved are adequately 
protected in the measure. 
The Secretary of the Interior reports favorably in the following 
language: 
DEPARTMENT or THE INTERIOR, 
Washington, January If, 1055. 
HOD. EDGAR HOWARD, 
Chairman Committee an Indian Affair*, 
House of Representatives. 
Mr DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: ID further response to your request of December 29, 
1932, for a report OD H. R. 11735, which is a bill "To permanently set aside cer-
tain lands in Utah as an addition to the Navajo Indian Reservation, and for other 
purposes," there is transmitted herewith a memorandum on the subject that has 
been submitted by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. 
After a review of the proposed measure, I agree with the commissioner. 
Very truly yours, 
RAT LTMAK WILBUR, Secretary. 
DEPARTMENT OP THE INTERIOR, 
OPPICE OP INDIAN AFT AIRS, 
Washington, January 7, 1933. 
Memorandum for the Secretary. 
Reference is made to the letter of December 29,1932, from the clerk of the House 
Committee on Indian Affairs, requesting information for the committee on H. R. 
11735, a bill to permanently set aside certain lands in Utah as an addition to the 
Navajo IndiaD Reservation, and for other purposes. 
The bill proposes to return to the Navajo Indians a strip of country in southern 
Utah commonly referred to as the Paiute strip, and also add an additional small 
tract adjacent to the reservation in Utah lying between Montezuma Creek and 
the Utah-Colorado State line. 
The so-called Paiute strip area covering approximately 500,000 acres, was 
originally set aside as a reservation for Indian purposes by Executive order of 
May 17, 1884. Later by Executive order of November 19*, 1892, the tract was 
restored to the public domain and by departmental order of May 28,1908, it was 
again withdrawn for Indian purposes. Subsequently by departmental order of 
July 17, 1922, the tract was once more restored to its former status as public 
land, as it was then reported that the Indians were not utilizing the land suffi-
ciently to warrant its retention as an Indian reservation. 
Since the last restoration in 1922, conditions have greatly changed with respect 
to the need of this area for Indian purposes and as the existing reservation does 
not afford sufficient grazing area for the livestock of the Indians, the so-called 
strip was by departmental order of February 19, 1929, temporarily withdrawn 
from all forms of entry or disposal in aid of proposed legislation. 
The lands within the strip have always been occupied by Indians, only three 
white families, "squatters," nave been found living within the entire area. These 
"squatters19 have settled close to the present reservation northern boundary for 
the purpose of trading with the Indians, and not being on the reservation they 
— ~~* ^ntiirpH to ooerate in accordance with the regulations governing trade 
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The smaller area -covered by the bill located between Montezuma Creek on 
the west and the State boundary line on the east covers approximately 52,000 
acres and is used by Indians. All vacant land within tliis area was temporarily 
withdrawn by departmental order of July 27,1932. 
The Navajo Tribal Council during its annual meeting at Fort Wingate, July 
7 and 8, 1932, expressed itaelf as favoring enactment of the bill, and during its 
previous meeting of 1931, the council also favored the bill and further requested 
that the Paiute strip be obtained for the Navajo Indians under the best terms 
possible to negotiate. 
During the past few years objection developed on the part of the local citizens 
to the addition of these lands to the Navajo Reservation, and accordingly a 
meeting was arranged which took place at Blinding, Utah, on July 15, 1932, by 
myself and others with a representative gathering of citizens of San Juan County, 
Utah. This meeting culminated in the appointment of a committee of nine 
citizens to represent the local people ana a written agreement was reached 
whereby the citizens as represented by the committee went on record as favoring 
the bill H. R. 11735 with certain specified qualifications. Three copies of the 
written agreement are inclosed. 
In accordance with item 1 of the agreement, it is necessary to amend the bill 
slightly BO as to preclude the making of any further Indian homesteads. The 
other items enumerated in the agreement are administrative in their nature and 
can be worked out in the future should the bill be enacted. 
Section 2 of the bill will grant the State of Utah the right to relinquish such 
tracts of school land within the areas as it may see fit in favor of the Indians, and 
also the right to make lieu selections of public land within the State equal in area 
to that relinquished, said lieu selections to be made &s is provided for in the Utah 
enabling act. As the proposed addition of these areas to the reservation benefits 
the Government in its administration of the affairs of the Indians, it is believed 
desirable to further amend the bill so as to preclude the payment of fees or com-
missions by the State should it make lieu selections. 
It is therefore recommended that the bill be amended as follows: 
Page 3, line 1, after the word "Utah" add the following: "Nor shall further 
Indian homesteads be made in said county under the act of July 4. 1SS4 (23 
Stat. 96)/' 
Page 3, line 19, immediately after the statute reference, add the following: 
"Except as to the payment of fees or commissions which arc hereby waived." 
Should the bill H. i t 11735 be amended'as suggested, it is recommended that 
it be enacted. 
C. J. RHOAOS, Commissioner. 
BLAKDIKG, UTAH, July 15, 193! 
MEMORANDUM or AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN A COMMITTEE or NINE, REP-
RESENTING THE CITIZENS OF BLANDINQ, UTAH, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF 
INDIAN AFFAIRS, REGARDING THE PIUTE STRIP 
1. It was agreed, after full discussion, that the lines described in H. R. 11735, 
Seventv-second Congress, first session, should constitute the northern boundary 
of the Kavajo Reservation. 
2. In consideration of the proposed addition to the reservation contemplated 
by the above bill, it was agreed that no more fourth-section Indian allotments or 
Indian homesteads under the 1S84 act should be made in San Juan County, 
Utah, outside of said boundary lines. 
3. The north, line of the proposed reservation addition, east of Montezuma 
Creek, is to be fenced by the Indian Service. 
4. The 37H royalty clause in the above bill is to remain, but the State of Utah 
is free to change to the usual form. 
5. The clause in the bill relative to granting the State the right to exchange 
its school lands within the area involved is satisfactory to the committee. 
6. It is agreed that the scenic tracts are to be developed by the National Park 
Service, with the cooperation of the Indian Sen-ice. 
7. Control of the killing of game outside the proposed reservation Hn« ;• •-
b e i n *u*f»nr<4or»**A W-J4V * u ~ C?A-A 
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* T J- j-:...-f>»#.ir cattle or sheep across non-Indian land, the 
9. In the event I n d i " - - ^ $ 'SJckunder inch conditions shall applv 
^ e d ^ b f f i T l h f S K t S T S Nine and the Commiss,oner of Indian 
Affairs: ^
 mAA t^mtMm A Adams. Monticello, Utah; Charles Redd, Committee: ^ ^ . ^ J ^ w Perkins, Blanding, Utah; Dr John 
Blandmg. U ^ G e o r g e J ^ ^ S ^ Blanding. Utah; Marion 
B^gers, 31andmg, Ujan. * " " £ £ Verdure, Utah; H. C. Per-
Hunt. Bluff, W ^ . p g 1 g fiSck? Blinding Utah by Charles 
kin. Blanding, Utah, B. D. g ^ ^ j ft. Stewart, section 
S ^ l S ^ f f l h A S 3 5 £ « behaU of the ConnnU-
•ioncr of Indian Affair** 
Approved. C. J. RHOADS. 
